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Abstract
Clean energy technologies lower harmful emissions associated with the generation and use of
power (e.g. CO2) and many of these technologies have been shown to be cost effective and to
provide significant benefits to adopters. Examples of clean energy technologies include
renewable and/or efficient distributed generation (e.g. solar, wind, geothermal, fuel cells,
cogeneration); energy efficiency technologies; intelligent energy management; efficient energy
storage; green building technologies; biofuels; and ancillary products and services that reduce
emissions associated with power generation, transmission and distribution.
This thesis examines why new ventures founded to commercialize these technologies have failed
to achieve widespread adoption. Based on interviews with clean energy entrepreneurs and other
stakeholders and on case studies of clean energy technology ventures, a new venture simulation
model was developed that models the cash flow, labor force, market, competition, and product
development for a prototypical clean energy technology venture.
When the model is parameterized to correspond to a venture that starts with superior technology
at an attractive price its behavior corresponds to the experience of many of the companies
interviewed. The modeled venture takes many years to achieve profitability due to long sales
cycles, limits to market growth, and the time needed to gain experience producing and selling its
products, and therefore has a high probability of failure.
Analysis of the model results in a set of guidelines for what these ventures, investors, and policy
makers should do to increase their odds of success. The venture is better off starting with more
sales and marketing personnel and expertise rather than engineers, and should develop no more
product features than are necessary to sell the product. The venture should forego recurring
revenue and instead receive payments up front whenever possible. A single initial equity
investment in the venture is considerably more valuable than a series of investments.
Government policies that raise the cost of carbon emissions; reduce barriers and increase
incentives for adoption of clean energy technologies; and subsidize the development of these
technologies can greatly increase the growth of these ventures and the odds of success.
Thesis Supervisor: John Sterman
Professor of Management and of Engineering Systems
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1 Introduction
The way we produce and manage energy may be the critical issue of our time. Economic
development and almost every aspect of our lives depend on energy use; however, the use of
fossil fuels for energy production is altering the climate of our planet in ways that may produce
great harm. Most climate scientists believe that the greenhouse gas emissions created by the
burning of fossil fuels must be reduced dramatically in order to avoid the prospect of rising seas
and other drastic consequences of climate change. Fortunately, these reductions can be made
utilizing cost effective technologies that exist today or are very close to readiness for
deployment. However, clean energy technologies are not yet being adopted intensively enough
to make a significant difference in greenhouse gas emissions. In contrast to the history of new
ventures that changed the world by commercializing technologies such as electric power,
telephones, automobiles, and computer technology, new ventures have been unsuccessful
commercializing clean energy technologies that appear to be ripe for wide adoption. This
dissertation will explore the reasons behind these failures, and what can be done to improve the
chances that clean energy technologies introduced by new ventures will be widely adopted.
The initial problem considered for this research was to determine the optimal technologies to
support the use of distributed generation (DG). That problem was then expanded to include the
support of demand side management (DSM) and energy efficiency technologies. As additional
information was gathered, however, it was determined that there were a wide variety of attractive
DG and DSM solutions being promoted by new ventures that were inexplicably not being
adopted, and as a result, many of these firms were struggling or failing. The focus of the
research then turned to the question of why these economically efficient clean energy
technologies were not being adopted, and why these new ventures were failing. Based on data
from over a hundred interviews, a system dynamics simulation model was created to develop a
better understanding of the factors that determined whether these ventures would succeed or fail
and whether their products would become widely adopted.
This introduction will first define and lay out the benefits of clean energy technologies and
discuss why more widespread adoption of these technologies would benefit both the users of the
technology and society. Next, the reasons for focusing on new ventures are addressed. Finally,
the objectives of the research are presented, followed by an outline of the remainder of the
dissertation.
1.1 Definition and Benefits of Clean Energy Technology
For the purpose of this dissertation, clean energy technology is defined as any technology that
reduces harmful emissions that result from the production and use of energy. Webster defines
technology as "the practical application of knowledge especially in a particular area." Harmful
emissions principally include greenhouse gases (CO2, methane, etc.), Sox, and NOx. Energy is
defined as "capacity of a physical system to do work" or "usable power (e.g. as heat or
electricity)". In practical terms, energy is principally delivered as electricity or fuels (fossil
fuels, biomass, etc.) for heating, cooling, and transportation. Examples of clean energy
technologies include renewable and/or efficient distributed generation (e.g. solar, wind,
geothermal, fuel cells, cogeneration); energy efficiency technologies which enable the use of
energy services at lower cost to users; intelligent energy management; efficient energy storage;
green building technologies; biofuels; and ancillary products and services that reduce emissions
associated with power generation, transmission and distribution.
1.1.1 Why Focus on Clean Energy Technology
Clean energy technology is critical because of its potential to offset anthropogenic climate
change. Other than drastically reducing the standard of living in the developed world and
thwarting the aspirations of developing regions, the widespread adoption of technology that
reduces greenhouse gas emissions is the only currently feasible solution to address this crisis. A
discussion of climate change and its causes is outside the scope of this dissertation, but for
reference, see the IPCC reports and Stern Review (IPCC, 2007; IPCC et al., 2001; Stern, 2006).
In brief, greenhouse gas emissions (primarily CO2) from the burning of fossil fuel (primarily for
transportation and electricity generation) are causing a greenhouse effect in the earth's
atmosphere, which is causing the planet to warm at an accelerating rate. Potential harms include
the loss of species; changes in weather patterns that will negatively affect food production and
disease transmission; disruption of the water cycle; and rising seas that may flood cities located
on coastlines. Recent research indicates that these trends correlate directly with the production
of greenhouse gas emissions, and that they are accelerating.
The only feasible way to minimize global warming and its consequences is to drastically reduce
total greenhouse gas emissions. (Note that reducing the rate of increase in emissions, or even
halting the increase of emissions altogether would not be sufficient). Because the growth of
industrial economies have relied on the burning of fossil fuels, reducing worldwide emissions
from these fuels is a tremendous challenge that will require disruptive technology and radical
new ways of generating and using energy.
1.1.2 Classes of Clean Energy Technology
Two significant classes of clean energy technologies are distributed generation (DG) and
demand-side management (DSM):
Distributed Generation (DG): For the purpose of this dissertation, DG is the efficient
generation of power (usually electricity and sometimes heat or cooling) at the site of the user.
This is also sometimes known as embedded generation, and is distinguished from centralized and
distribution-level generation, which is generated at a power plant and transmitted over the
electric grid to the user. It is also distinguished from backup generation; energy produced at the
user site but meant to run only when the grid fails and which often increase emissions.
Distributed generation may be renewable (e.g. wind or solar power), conventional engines
producing combined heat and power (CHP), or a wide variety of older (e.g. diesel engines) or
newer (e.g. microturbines, fuel cells) technologies that may be economically run continuously
and that produce significantly fewer emissions per unit of power generated than technologies
associated with a central-grid system.
Demand-Side Management (DSM): For the purpose of this dissertation, DSM is the
management of power usage (most often electricity) that maximizes efficiency, minimizes cost,
and uses as little energy as possible while achieving the same or better level of production and
comfort for members of the organization or community served. It encompasses energy
efficiency measures, as well as load shifting or shaping (shifting power use to periods of lower
demand and cost). DSM is distinguished from Demand Response (DR), which is the ability to
respond to a request to reduce the usage of power on a short-term basis.
1.1.3 Benefits of Clean Energy Technology
Economically efficient use of clean energy as exemplified by DG and DSM technologies provide
numerous benefits to end users and to society. Some of these benefits are summarized below:
DG (with cogeneration) can generate power more efficiently and more economically:
Distributed generation based on cogeneration technologies (CHP) yields much higher
efficiencies than even the most advanced central stations, with over 80 percent of the energy
from fuel being used for productive purpose (Miller, Rogol, & Martin, 2004). Central plant
efficiency usually ranges from 35 to 50 percent, and approximately 10 percent of electricity
generated at central plants is lost to heat during transmission and distribution over long distances.
Greater efficiency--less fuel burned to generate the same amount of useful energy-- lowers costs
as well as reduces greenhouse gas and other harmful emissions.
DG reduces overall system costs and price volatility: Placing smaller, more efficient generators
closer to end users reduces the need to construct large power plants, thus obviating some
transmission and distribution costs. When additional generation capacity is required, it is
quicker, easier, less costly, and less risky to add capacity through distributed generation facilities
sited close to the sources of load than to build new central generation plants. The much smaller
capital outlay over time ("right-sizing") required for local distributed generation systems reduces
risk. Price volatility (when market prices are present) will be reduced because users have more
precise control over onsite generation assets.
DSM is economically beneficial for both end users and utilities: It has been estimated that
users typically use at least 10 percent (and often up to 30 percent) more electricity than necessary
to meet their power demands (Borbely-Bartis, 2003). Given that U.S. businesses and consumers
spent -$300 billion on electricity in 2006 (Energy Information Administration, 2007), it's
possible that between $30 and $90 billion could have been saved by using energy efficiency
measures to meet power demands more efficiently. For example, one business that implemented
programs to reduce energy consumption, Owens Coming, achieved $32 million in annual energy
cost savings while increasing production by 18 percent. Garforth (2003) cites many other
examples of similar savings.
Reducing consumption demand will also save many utilities from having to make costly new
investments in generation capacity. By using electricity more intelligently, consumers will not
only save electricity, but will reduce peak load demands, which can result in significantly higher
cost savings (operations and investment). For supply-constrained remote (village) systems, it is
essential to manage the demand as well as the supply of power.
The use of DSM and DG can create opportunities for the use of generation technologies that
produce no harmful emissions: As described above, using DSM technologies to reduce
consumption of electricity by 10 to 30 percent will reduce generation of electricity, and
consequently reduce emissions. Additionally, because the final few percent of generation
required by peak loads is often the least efficient, these technologies could contribute to
emissions reductions significant larger than 10 to 30 percent. Sensitivity to local conditions and
the opportunity to produce power at small scales combine to create greater flexibility in the use
of energy sources, including renewable sources, which produce no harmful emissions at all and
ease dependence on fossil fuel sources.
DSM and DG systems increase security and reliability: A hybrid distributed system including
multiple sources and kinds of generation, some sited close to end users, would be significantly
less vulnerable to natural or man made disasters. Such a system could also be much more
reliable than a system of central plants with extensive and sometimes overloaded transmission
and distribution networks. Insofar as they are part of the hybrid system, overloaded grid-based
elements will be less strained by a more balanced load. For some large businesses, the cost of a
single outage can be in the millions of dollars. Increasing reliability will reduce the probability
and frequency of system outages, and therefore reduce the attendant costs.
DSM and DG systems can reduce generation requirements: By using DSM to lower the peaks
of load curves, the minimum generation capacity required to assure reliable supply will be
reduced. Furthermore, given stochastic sources of generation, such as wind, shifting loads from
peak to off-peak times will increase the real-time value of generation during off-peak periods and
reduce the need for storage. Also, greater reliability will reduce system costs by eliminating the
need for redundant systems.
1.1.4 Why This Problem Requires Engineering Systems Analysis
Daniel Hastings defines Engineering Systems as technologically enabled networks and meta-
systems which transform, transport, exchange and regulate mass, energy and information (D.
Hastings, 2004). By almost any definition, the systems that produce, transport, and utilize
energy are among the largest and most significant engineering systems in the world. Analysis of
these systems requires a systems level approach, meaning that the many components and
stakeholders of the systems and the relationships between them must be taken into account.
Systems dynamics is a powerful methodology for performing such analysis, as will be discussed
in Chapter 2. Though this dissertation focuses on only one aspect related to these systems,
mainly how the adoption of clean technologies promoted by new ventures may be increased, the
analysis must and does take into account the structure of the current system, the relationships
between the users, providers and regulators of energy, and exogenous parameters such as the
price of fuels and state of the economy. Also, though it has not been the case in the past,
sustainability (which is achieved, in part, by reducing or preventing harmful emissions) will need
to be an organizing design principle for energy-related engineering systems in the future
(Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al., 2004). The policy and strategy implications of this dissertation
should promote the inclusion of a large proportion of clean energy technologies in these systems.
1.2 Problem Statement
Though high energy prices, deregulation, security concerns, and the availability of new
technologies have fostered adoption of clean energy technologies on a limited basis, they are not
as widely adopted as would optimally benefit users and society. Economic analysis alone does
not explain why adoption has been muted.
1.2.1 State of Adoption of Clean Energy Technology
There appears to be a large disconnect between the acknowledged value of DG and DSM and the
adoption of these technologies. According to the Congressional Budget Office, DG "is an
important, although small, component of the nation's electricity supply (Congressional Budget
Office, 2003). The Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates that in 2000, only 0.5
percent of total U.S. electricity generation was from "non-utility generation for [customers] own
use." And according to NYSERDA, in NY state, which has programs in place to encourage DG,
existing market penetration of CHP (the most economical form of DG) is small except for large
industrial applications (Hedman, Darrow, & Bourgeois, 2002). According to a DSM program
assessment report prepared in 2000, nearly all the DSM programs studied had lower participation
levels than originally envisioned (Albert et al., 2000).
1.3 Why Focus on New Ventures
Though the vast majority of energy production and use (including the use of clean energy
technologies) is currently managed by large firms, if new technology is to be widely adopted, it
is more likely to be driven by new ventures. This has been the case for many significant
disruptive technologies that initially had no or limited adoption and progressed to widespread
adoption. In fact, James Utterback, citing previous research by other researchers as well as his
own collaborative projects, found no case where a disruptive innovation that expanded
established markets and that was not based on existing core competencies of an industry came
from within the industry in question (J. M. Utterback, 1996). Examples include:
Gas light to electricity: In the 1870s, gas lamps were the primary source and preferred
technology for residential, commercial, and public lighting in the United States. Though
hundreds of firms supported the gas-based system, a new venture fundamentally changed the
lighting industry. In 1878, Thomas Edison formed the Edison Electric Lighting Company to
commercialize electric lighting. Within 25 years, electric lighting had replaced gas lighting as
the preferred technology in U.S. cities (J. M. Utterback, 1996).
Automobiles: At the beginning of the 2 0 th century, horse-drawn vehicles were the dominant
modes of road transportation. In 1900, a former Edison engineer formed the Henry Ford
Company. As Ford's innovations sparked innovations on the part of many other new ventures,
automobiles became the dominant mode of road transportation within two decades (Kimes,
2005).
Computers and Computer Software: One of the most important and largest industries in the
world today is dominated by companies that began as new ventures commercializing new
computer-based technology. The story of companies such as Intel, Microsoft, and Google are
well known. Intel was founded in 1968 by two scientists who left an established company
(Fairchild Semiconductor) and did not hire their fourth employee or announce their first product
until 1969. However, their technology was rapidly adopted, and they went public in 1971,
became a Fortune 500 company by 1978, and became the number one semiconductor
manufacturer by 1991 (Intel, 2006). Microsoft was founded in 1975 by two college dropouts,
went public in 1986, and was selling the most widely used computer operating system and was
one of the largest companies in the world by 1993 (Tsang, 2000). Google was founded in 1998
by two Ph.D. students, went public in 2004, and today is not only the number one web search
company but is one of the world's largest companies.
Each of these major innovations arose in the presence of substantial established industries and
companies supporting competing technologies. In each case, new ventures drove the
commercialization of the new technologies, eventually supplanting major existing industries and
their attendant engineering systems. Given this history, if clean energy technologies are to
replace or significantly supplement existing energy technologies, new ventures rather than
established companies will drive the process.
Because clean energy technology can provide significant value, one would expect that some of
the thousands of these firms that have attempted to produce them over the last few decades
would have become extremely successful by now, and a reasonable percentage would have been
moderately successful. This has not been the case.
The most successful new clean energy ventures are still miniscule compared to traditional energy
companies and utilities, and most new clean energy ventures have not been successful at all. In a
sample of approximately 1,000 clean energy companies that sought funding from early stage
investors between 1997 and 2006, not a single company achieved widespread adoption of their
products or technology. Many of these companies failed to become profitable at all.
1.4 Research Objectives
Based on these observations four questions are posed that guide this research:
1. Assuming that clean energy technologies are economically and environmentally beneficial in
many cases, why are they rarely adopted?
2. What are the institutional/regulatorv/economic/technical factors bearing on the introduction
of a clean technology and how do these constitute a dynamic system?
3. What faictors determine whether companies commercializing clean energy technologies will
succeed or.fiil in bringing them to market?
4. What strategies and policies will increase the odds of success of these companies and the
widespread adoption of clean energy technology?
Extensive investigation has revealed no prior investigation of these questions based on a systems
view linking technology and commercial attributes to economic, policy, and institutional factors
in a dynamic framework. Furthermore, little work has been done to better understand the factors
that determine whether new ventures commercializing clean energy technologies will succeed.
Most importantly, the development and analysis of an empirically based model will suggest
specific strategies and policies to increase the odds of success of these ventures.
1.5 Dissertation Outline
This chapter has addressed the objectives of the dissertation, the type of data to be analyzed, the
methodology selected, and the research questions to be addressed. Subsequent chapters will fill
out these introductory comments in greater detail.
Chapter Two reviews the literature related to the adoption of clean energy technologies, the
analysis of such adoption, and success factors for new technology ventures. In particular, we
will look at engineering and economic analysis that has been performed for DG, DSM, and clean
energy technologies in general that demonstrate their value to customers and to society. We will
also review the literature that details the challenges inherent in the adoption and diffusion of
innovation. We will review literature that discusses the most important factors in the success or
failure of new technology ventures, and review the data on early stage investments in these
ventures. Finally, we will examine how system dynamics has been used to analyze and develop
better understanding of similar problems.
Chapter Three draws on an extensive set of interviews to reveal the attitudes and incentives of
the wide range of stakeholders involved in a decision to adopt a new clean energy technology,
and to lay out the regulatory, market, institutional, behavioral and technical factors in the
adoption of clean energy technologies.
Chapter Four presents three case studies of clean energy technology ventures and the challenges
they face. The first case is a company that is profitable but has not yet achieved widespread
adoption that sells technology to manage the use of energy for commercial real estate. The
second is a company working to become profitable that is selling a product and service that
improves the operation of power plants at very low cost. The third is a company that no longer
exists, which attempted to provide CHP systems to produce low-cost heat and power for
commercial real estate. Each of the case studies demonstrates some of the factors essential to the
success or failure of such a venture.
Chapter Five describes the system dynamics simulation model developed from this research,
including its structure and equations. This chapter describes the boundaries, parameters, and
relationships between the parameters of the model.
Chapter Six presents the results of running the model with default parameters for a prototypical
clean energy technology venture. The results of sensitivity analysis on the parameters will be
presented, and analysis of the simulation will be used to determine what factors have the greatest
impact on the success or failure of the venture.
Chapter Seven presents a summary of the research and builds upon the prior analysis to provide
specific strategy and policy suggestions to increase the odds of success of clean energy
technology ventures. Analysis of the model is used to examine the effect of the strategy and
policy prescriptions. Further, the contributions of this study are presented, and opportunities for
further research are discussed.
2 Literature Review
A fundamental premise of this study is that clean energy technologies are beneficial, are not as
widely adopted as would be optimal, and that increasing the diffusion of these technologies is
warranted. We assume that the success of new ventures is an important factor in the diffusion of
these technologies and that factors that contribute to the success of these ventures (such as the
availability of capital from private investors) are critical. This chapter will review the support in
the literature for these assumptions. The first section is a brief review of studies of the benefits
and barriers to the adoption of clean energy technologies, and specifically to distributed
generation and demand side management. The second section is a review of the extensive
literature on the diffusion of technology and innovations most relevant to this study. Third, we
review the literature on what factors are most important to the success of new ventures, and
review data on and studies of the financing of new ventures. Given that the focus of this work is
to improve the odds of success of new ventures with the purpose of increasing the adoption of
new technologies, these last two sections will provide the most relevant grounding for this work.
Finally, we will briefly discuss system dynamics--the modeling methodology applied in this
research to help us learn how to enable new clean energy technology ventures to be more
successful.
2.1 Clean Energy Technology
As stated in Chapter 1, for the purpose of this dissertation, "clean energy technology" is defined
as any technology that reduces harmful emissions resulting from the production and use of
energy. Two classes of technology comprise a significant percentage of clean energy
technologies available today: distributed generation (DG) which includes renewable forms of
energy generation (such as solar, geothermal, and distributed wind) and various forms of energy
efficiency improvements under the heading of demand side management (DSM). This section
will present evidence for the benefits of those technologies and the barriers they face.
2.1.1 Distributed Generation
A considerable body of work (e.g. Lovins (2002); Honton (2000)) has established the economic
and other values of DG. In a detailed 400-page report, Lovins (2002) identifies 207 distinct
economic benefits of "making electrical resources the right size." The main findings of this
investigation are:
* "The most valuable distributed benefits typically flow from financial economics-the
lower risk of smaller modules with shorter lead times, portability, and low or no fuel-
price volatility. These benefits often raise value by most of an order of magnitude (factor
often) for renewables, and by about 3-5-fold for nonrenewables.
* Electrical-engineering benefits-lower grid costs and losses, better fault management,
reactive support, etc.-usually provide another -2-3-fold value gain, but more if the
distribution grid is congested or if premium power quality or reliability are required.
* Many miscellaneous benefits may together increase value by another -2-fold-more
where waste heat can be reused.
* Externalities, though hard to quantify, may be politically decisive, and some are
monetized.
* Capturing distributed benefits requires astute business strategy and reformed public
policy."
Case studies have been performed to demonstrate those benefits, such as Firestone, Creighton,
Bailey, Marnay, & Stadler (2003), Bailey, Ouaglal, Bartholomew, Marnay, & Bourassa (2002),
and Siddiqui et al.(2003). Furthermore, many studies have been done on the prospects and
market potential for DG, both nationally (Congressional Budget Office, 2003; Daniels &
Greenberg, 2002), and regionally (Hedman et al., 2002), and have consistently found that DG
technologies have not yet come close to reaching their market potential.
The literature lays out various barriers DG faces (National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2000);
(California Energy Commission, 2000). These barriers include volatile fuel and electricity
prices, entrenched and politically powerful competition, and regulatory issues such as
interconnection, standby charge and siting regulations (Lovins, 2002).
2.1.2 Demand Side Management and Energy Efficiency
DSM initiatives have been supported through consumer marketing, education (including
technical assistance), subsidies, and regulatory standards (U.S. Department of Energy, 1997;
Wirl & Orasch, 1998). The purpose of these programs is to stimulate energy efficiency through
incentives and regulations. The technologies involved have included higher efficiency appliance
motors and lighting, programmable thermostats, insulation, etc. Consumers and businesses have
been encouraged to purchase and properly use these technologies.
Some researchers have disputed the extent of the benefits provided by utility-sponsored DSM
programs (P. L. Joskow, Marron, Donald B, 1992); (Loughran & Kulick, 2004). In fact, utilities
have conflicting incentives to support DSM programs. Though they have been required to offer
these programs and have been compensated for successful implementation, in many cases
maximizing the energy efficiency of their customers lowers their profits. Therefore, though they
have incentives to appear "green" they often have a financial incentive not to increase customers'
energy efficiency. Nevertheless, an array of reports and studies has shown considerable benefits
from the energy efficiency technologies promoted by these programs. Weizsacker, Lovins, and
Lovins (1997) report that efficiency efforts of California utilities saved nearly $2 billion more
than they cost, and saved the amount of energy predicted for far less than the cost of producing
the same energy. Parfomak and Lave (1996), in an econometric study of results of conservation
efforts by 39 utilities found that 99.4% of reported conservation impacts were statistically
observable in system level sales. And the National Association of Regulatory Utility
Commissioners (2001) found that utility sponsored DSM programs saved about 29,000
megawatts at a cost of only $0.03 per kilowatt-hour saved in the early 1990s. Whether or not
provided through a utility-sponsored program, energy efficiency is widely considered beneficial
to its users (CoolCompanies, 2005; Garforth, 2003). These benefits include:
* Reducing energy costs for the firms that adopt energy efficiency measures;
* Reducing system-wide energy costs by decreasing peak loads on central generation and
transmission systems;
* Lowering dependence on the supply of fossil fuels;
* Improving indoor comfort and air quality through the use of energy efficient insulation
and heating and cooling systems;
* Increased production at lower cost resulting from the use of more efficient industrial
equipment.
While confirming the benefits of DSM, the literature also indicates the various barriers DSM
faces (Albert et al., 2000; Machold, 1994). Similar to DG, volatile fuel and electricity prices
make it difficult to determine the return on investment for energy efficiency. Insufficient
marketing and lack of understanding by end users also limits the adoption of these technologies.
2.1.3 Real Time Pricing and Demand Response
Much of the work listed above notes the importance of real time pricing in order to encourage
DG and DSM (e.g. (Congressional Budget Office, 2003)). To understand the pricing of
electricity in competitive markets, the seminal work is Schweppe, Caramanis, and Tabors (1989).
A recent study by the Center for the Study of Energy Markets (CSEM) analyzes the benefits of
"dynamic pricing" coupled with demand response (Borenstein, Jaske, & Rosenfeld, 2002).
Several studies have been based on experience with real time pricing and demand response
program trials (Neenan et al., 2003; Williamson, 2002). And another recent study (Matsukawa,
2004) shows that access to information about energy use contributed to adoption of energy
conservation measures among residential users.
2.2 Adoption and Diffision of Innovations
The literature on the diffusion of innovations is extensive and encompasses a number of different
perspectives, theoretical formulations, and empirical results. This section will present a
summary of economic models of technology diffusion including epidemic, rank, order, stock,
and threshold models principally based on (F. M. Bass, 1969; Blackman, 1999; Granovetter,
1978 ; Mansfield, 1961; Stoneman, 2002); review four influential and widely cited works on how
and why innovations are adopted and widely diffused (Christensen, 2000; Moore, 1991; Rogers,
2003; J. M. Utterback, 1996); and present some of the empirical results of diffusion research.
2.2.1 Economic Theories of Technology Diffusion
As discussed in Blackman ( 1999) and based on the work of Stoneman (2002), economic theories
of technology diffusion can be categorized into epidemic models (which includes the Bass
model), as well as rank, order, and stock models. Also, Granovetter (1978) developed models of
collective behavior which could be applied towards the diffusion of innovations where the key
concept is that of a threshold.
2.2.1.1 Epidemic Models
Epidemic models (Mansfield, 1961) are the most influential theoretical models of diffusion.
These models are based on the idea that diffusion and adoption of new technologies, products, or
ideas often spread in a similar manner to an epidemic. They start off slowly, but as more people
are infected or firms adopt the product, they infect or introduce the innovation to their friends
and neighbors, who in turn pass it on to their contacts, leading to exponential growth.
Eventually, however, a large enough percentage of the susceptible population has already
contracted the disease or adopted the innovation to slow down the rate of new infections or
adoptions as it asymptotically approaches the maximum adoption level. This creates a classic S-
shaped curve (Figure 2-1).
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Figure 2-1: Prototypical Adoption Curve
Bass (1969) developed a well-known model for new product growth by adding the effect of
marketing to a logistic epidemic model (Figure 2-2). In this model, marketing and advertising
create an initial adoption rate that establishes and increases the stock of adopters. As the number
of adopters increases, adoption stimulated by word of mouth increases (the infection), creating a
positive feedback loop and exponential growth. However, as that growth drains the number of
potential adopters the negative feedback loops of market saturation gain strength and the rate of
adoption slows as the remainder of the population become adopters. The equations are:
(1) Adoption Rate = Adoption from Advertising + Adoption from Word of Mouth
(2) Adoption from Advertising = Advertising Effectiveness a * Potential Adopters P
(3) Adoption from Word of Mouth = Contact Rate c * Adoption Fraction i *
Potential Adopters P * Adopters A/Total Population N
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Figure 2-2: Bass Diffusion Model (diagram from (Sterman, 2000))
Empirically, the Bass diffusion model describes the adoption curve of a large number of new
products and innovations quite well. In response to the criticism that the model does not include
decision variables such as price, Bass and his colleagues generalized it to include decision
variables (F. Bass, Krishnan, & Jain, 1994). They have also demonstrated why the standard Bass
model without decision variables works as well as it does empirically and how the generalized
model can be used for product planning purposes. Also see Mahajan, Muller, & Wind (2000).
2.2.1.2 Rank, Order, Stock and Threshold Models
Epidemic models have been criticized for not adequately reflecting reality. It is said to be more
probable that a firm would adopt an innovation based on its own characteristics and profit
maximizing behaviors than simply based on advertising and social contact. Rank models are
based on the idea that these differences among firms explain diffusion patterns. Blackman
(1999) identifies seven variables critical to adoption decisions:
* Capital vintage. Firms with less productive and older capital will find it more profitable
to adopt.
* Firm size. Larger firms that can take advantage of economies of scale, spread risks, and
access credit can more easily adopt new technologies than smaller firms can.
* Beliefs about the return on the new technology. Firms with more optimistic expectations
about the economic benefits to them of the innovation are more likely to adopt.
* Search costs. Firms that can more easily find and learn about new innovations (perhaps
due to their geographical location or the attributes of their personnel) are more likely to
adopt.
* Inputprices. It may cost some firms less to adopt, making them more likely to do so.
* Factorproductivity. Firms that can more productively utilize the innovation (perhaps
due to better labor productivity) are more likely to adopt.
* Regulatorv costs. Firms that have less exposure or susceptibility to regulatory costs
associated with the innovation are more likely to adopt.
Rank models assume that firms can be "ranked" based on one or more of these variables and that
the higher ranked firms will adopt first. For example, Salter (1960) found capital vintage to be a
differentiating factor in adoption, Davies (1979) found firm size to be a factor in adoption,
Jensen (1983) found beliefs about return on the new technology to be important, Kislev and
Shchori-Bachrach (1973) found factor productivity to be a differentiating factor, and Millman
and Prince (1989) found variation in firms' exposure to regulatory costs to help determine which
firms would adopt a new technology first. These models assume that the more firms that have
high rankings across these variables, the more quickly the innovation will be adopted (cf.
epidemic models, in which the rate of information transfer controls the rate of adoption).
Order models are based on the idea that firms that adopt innovations earlier will obtain higher
returns from the innovation (e.g., early-adopter wind farm developers will secure premium wind-
generation sites, and get the most out of the technology). These models assume that over time
the net return on the innovation increases enough to overcome these effects and allow for wide
adoption (e.g. wind turbine prices will fall far enough to enable lesser sites to be developed
profitably). For further examples, see Fundenberg and Tirole (1985) and Ireland and Stoneman
(1986).
Stock models assume that the value of an innovation decreases as the stock of firms who have
adopted increases (e.g. as more firms adopt an innovation that enables them to respond to real
time prices of electricity, the differential in prices will decrease, lowering the value of
responding). The net return on adoption declines as the total stock of firms that have adopted
increases. For examples, see Reinganum (1981) and Quirmbach (1986).
Threshold models are based on the theory that a critical parameter must exceed a threshold in
order for a decision (such as to adopt an innovation) to be made (Jacobsen, 2000). For example,
Granovetter (1978) proposes threshold models where potential adopters act based on the
concentration and distribution of present adopters, and only when the number or proportion of
others have made the decision to adopt exceed a threshold do the net benefits of adoption exceed
the net costs.
2.2.1.3 Summary of Economic Theories of Technology Diffusion and Relationship to Clean
Energy Technologies
Epidemic, rank, order, and stock models explain different aspects of technology diffusion. The
models take into account information and learning; the characteristics of the technology
innovation being adopted; and the characteristics of the firms making the adoption decisions.
Each of those factors plays a role in diffusion, and depending on the nature of the innovation and
the industry (or sectors) and the geographical region or country where the technology is being
adopted, one or two of those factors may explain most of the adoption behavior. These models
provide insights into how these factors affect the strength and timing of the diffusion.
Based on a review of the literature on economic theories of technology diffusion, Blackman
(1999) presents several policy prescriptions to increase the adoption of clean energy technologies
to address climate change:
* Subsidies for activities that improve information flow about clean energy technologies,
such as demonstration projects, testing and certification of new technologies, consultancy
services, and science parks;
* More stringent regulation of polluting activities;
* Reductions in energy subsidies;
* Improvements in the financial intermediation for clean energy projects; and
* Investments in human capital and infrastructure in the energy sector.
2.2.2 Influential Works on Technology Diffusion
2.2.2.1 Diffusion of Innovations
Difiusion of Innovations (Rogers, 2003), first published in 1962 and revised five times since, is a
classic and comprehensive work on how (and why) innovations are adopted. Rogers defines
di/i7tsion as "the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over
time among the members of a social system." He defines an innovation as "an idea, practice, or
object perceived as new by an individual or other unit of adoption." He asserts that "the
characteristics of an innovation, as perceived by the members of a social system, determine its
rate of adoption." Rogers provides an extensive history of diffusion research, and discusses
several major criticisms. For this study, the two most relevant of these are the pro-innovation
bias and the individual-blame bias.
The pro-innovation bias is the implication of most diffusion research that an innovation should
be diffused to and adopted by all members of a social system, that it should be diffused rapidly,
and that the innovation should be neither re-invented nor rejected. Rogers states that
even in the case of an overwhelmingly advantageous innovation, potential adopters may
perceive it very differently than change agents or researchers. Simply to regard the
adoption of the innovation as rational (defined as use of the most effective means to reach
a given end) ... is to fail to understand that individual innovation-decisions are
idiosyncratic. They are based on an individual 's perceptions of the innovation.
This is an extremely important point with respect to the adoption of clean energy technologies.
Though rational analysis (as above) may demonstrate the benefits of adoption, the perception of
the decision maker may be very different. Given his or her frame of reference, the rational
decision may be to not adopt.
Rogers defines the individual-blame bias as "the tendency to hold an individual responsible for
his or her problems, rather than the system of which the individual is a part." This tendency is
also known as fundamental attribution error (Ross, 1977). This is an important idea. Neither
clean energy technology developers nor customers can be held fully responsible for the failure of
these technologies to be adopted. It is a system-wide problem, and requires a system-wide
solution.
Rogers' describes five stages in the innovation-decision process:
Knowledge, when the individual is exposed to the innovation's existence and gains an
understanding of how it functions;
Persuasion, when the individual forms a favorable or unfavorable attitude toward the
innovation:
Decision, when the individual engages in activities that lead to a choice to adopt or reject the
innovation;
Implementation, when the individual puts an innovation into use; and
Confirmation, when the individual seeks reinforcement for an innovation decision already
made but may reverse the decision if exposed to conflicting messages about it.
Finally, as a central thesis of his work, Rogers describes five attributes of innovation and their
rate of adoption. Four of these attributes positively related to adoption: relative advantage,
compatibility, trialability, and observability as perceived by potential adopters. Increased
complexity, however, is negatively related.
According to Rogers, relative advantage is the "degree to which an innovation is perceived as
better than the idea it supersedes." For the purpose of this dissertation, we are going to focus on
clean energy technologies that have a demonstrable relative advantage in terms of a better feature
set than the competition. However, the perception of this relative advantage on the part of the
adopter is an open question.
Compatibility is the "degree to which an innovation is perceived as consistent with the existing
values, past experiences, and needs of potential adopters." Clearly identifying an innovation and
comparing it to previous ideas are very valuable in making an innovation seem compatible with a
customer's needs. It is important that those pushing adoption understand indigenous knowledge
systems in which an individual's understanding of the new technology is couched.
The other two positive attributes are trialability, "the degree to which an innovation may be
experimented with on a limited basis," and observability "the degree to which the results of an
innovation are visible to others." Possession of these four qualities enhances the likelihood that
an innovation will be adopted.
Complexity, the "degree to which an innovation is perceived as relatively difficult to understand
and to use," is likely to inhibit adoption If members of a social system, such as a firm, find a
new technology intimidating and complex, they will be less likely to adopt it.
Rogers identifies five categories of adopters, based on the degree of their innovativeness, defined
as "the degree to which an individual or other unit of adoption is relatively earlier in adopting
new ideas than other members of a system." These categories are: innovators, early adopters,
early majority, late majority, and laggards. He finds that the earlier adopters tend to be more
venturesome, have greater rationality and intelligence, have more empathy and are more social
and interconnected. They are characterized by having a greater ability to cope with uncertainty
and risk, and to have generally higher socioeconomic status than do later adopters.
Rogers finds that social networks and opinion leaders are critical in the diffusion of innovations.
While innovators may be eager to adopt an idea, regardless of network influences, a member of
the late majority group may be much more resistant. Peer network influences are likely to be
much more influential in such a firm's decision to adopt a new technology.
2.2.2.2 Mastering the Dynamics of Innovation
In the introduction to Mastering the Dynamics of Innovation (1996) James Utterback restates
Robert Solow's premise that "technological change, broadly considered, contributes as strongly
to economic growth and wealth creation as do the traditional factors of production: labor and
capital." Utterback provides numerous examples of how technological innovation results in the
creation of new firms and new industries as well as the decline or demise of established ones.
Utterback develops a general model of innovation dynamics for assembled products in an
industry. The model consists of three phases, which he terms fluid, transitional, and specific. In
the fluid phase, the initial product innovation hits the market (the first typewriter appears in a
store, or Edison demonstrates the light bulb). Numerous entrepreneurial firms spring up to refine
the idea and bring it to market in different ways (different keyboards appear for typewriters or
body designs for automobiles). Eventually, a dominant design emerges which is sufficient for
the market to accept en masse.
This marks the transitional phase, which is characterized by a decrease in the rate of product
innovation, the exit of many of the initial competitors and an increase of process innovation by
the remaining firms to lower the cost of large-scale manufacturing and distribution (the
QWERTY keyboard is standardized and steel auto bodies are stamped out in factories).
Eventually, the industry enters the specific phase characterized by highly defined products and
relatively few large firms competing on the bases of price, efficiency, and incremental
improvements. In the course of time and invention, an "outsider' firm may develop a radical
innovation and start the cycle all over again with a different set of players (e.g. the replacement
of electric typewriters with word-processing computers).
This last point is important if not central. Citing previous research by other researchers as well
as his own collaborative projects, Utterback finds no case in which a disruptive innovation that
expanded established markets and that was not based on existing core competencies of an
industry came from within the industry in question. In other words, there is no evidence that an
established firm has ever successfully diffused a disruptive innovation. Utterback provides
multiple explanations for why this is the case, such as the tradeoffs between efficiently
producing the current product to meet the needs of existing customers vs. investing in a radical
innovation that might not pay off. Also see Henderson & Clark (1990).
2.2.2.3 The Innovator's Dilemma
In The Innovator 's Dilemma (2000), Clayton Christensen reinforces Utterback's conclusion by
explaining how the very attributes that lead to success for large firms prevent them from
successfully developing and marketing disruptive innovations. He asserts that the strategies and
forces that enable an industry to most effectively meet the needs of and profit from existing
majority markets prevent them from developing and marketing innovations that will create the
majority markets of the future. Christensen believes that new ventures have a powerful
advantage in building markets for technologies when it does not make sense for established
leaders to do so. In order for existing firms to succeed in the face of disruptive technologies that
change an industry, they must create or spin off new ventures themselves. Christensen provides
"distributed power generation" as an example of disruptive technology to electric utilities.
2.2.2.4 Crossing the Chasm
Geoffrey Moore, in Crossing the Chasm (Moore, 1991) addresses the challenges associated with
marketing and selling technology products to majority adopters. He advances the thesis that
there is a gap (chasm) between early adopters and the early majority adopters. Because early
majority adopters are pragmatists rather than visionaries, they are less willing to take risks on
unproven technologies (or technologies that their peers are not using). Although demand for
increased efficiency (and reduced emissions in the case of energy technologies) may push them
toward the front of the adoption life cycle, regulatory and budgetary constraints, as well as their
own prudence, keep them cautious.
Late majority adopters, whom Moore calls "conservatives," are even more risk averse. This is
the type of adopter that many clean energy technology companies must approach as their initial
customers (e.g. utilities). Conservatives tend to distrust discontinuous innovation, and believe in
tradition more than progress, incremental gains rather than massive changes. Their real goal is to
avoid a foolish move. Moore observes that "numerous studies have shown that in the high-tech
buying process, word-of-mouth is the number one source of information buyer's reference."
Majority adopters prefer to wait until a technology is an "industry standard" before adopting it.
Of course, a new technology cannot become an industry standard without being adopted by these
users. How can technology firms and their would-be customers overcome this paradox?
Moore's prescription is to implement a niche market strategy. For a new technology to become
the market leader, the initial market must be focused and small. He uses a "D-day" analogy:
1. Target the point of'attack: Identify target customers who may have a "compelling" reason to
adopt an innovation;
2. Assemble an invasion.fbrce: Construct a "whole product" and the partners and allies needed
to make it a reality;
3. Define the battle: Create the competitive criteria and position the product, in that context, as
the easiest to adopt;
4. Launch the invasion: Select a distribution channel and set pricing to provide motivational
leverage.
Moore states that though it is very difficult for a new technology to break into a mainstream
market, once it has it is relatively easy (and lucrative) to stay. This is especially true for clean
energy technologies. As will be detailed in subsequent chapters, it is much harder, takes much
longer, and is much more expensive to achieve wide scale adoption of energy technology.
However, if wide scale adoption is achieved, the technology will become a standard for a long
time.
2.2.3 Empirical Diffusion Research
An extensive amount of empirical diffusion research has been performed. Hastings (1976)
found that the availability of complementary assets accelerates adoption of technology. Davies
(1979) studied 22 process innovations in the U.K. and concluded that more complex and costly
innovations take longer to diffuse than simple and inexpensive ones, and that older capital
stocks lead to higher rates of adoption of new technologies. Stoneman (2002) found that R&D
and better human capital lead to higher rates of adoption. See also (V Mahajan, Muller, & Bass,
1990; Vijay Mahajan et al., 2000; Maier, 1998; Parker, 1994) for a sampling of the literature on
diffusion models applied to the sales of new products. Chandrasekaran and Tellis (2006) provide
a review of new product diffusion models and their findings. Sood and Tellis (2005), using data
on 14 technologies from four markets, found that technological evolution follows a step function
rather than a single S-curve, with steep improvements in performance following long periods of
no improvement. Hauser, Tellis, and Griffin (2006) provide a review of the literature on
innovation across five research fields, including consumer response to innovation, market entry
strategies, and prescriptive techniques for product development processes.
With respect to energy technologies, Joskow and Rose (P. L. Joskow & Rose, 1990) found that
larger firms are more likely to adopt technologies earlier than smaller firms, perhaps due to their
greater ability to invest initial capital. Also, they observed that investor-owned utilities tend to
adopt innovations earlier than publicly owned utilities, and exhibit more involvement in R&D.
Joskow also argues (2000) that new entrants to the electricity market will not succeed unless
they offer markedly different services from the incumbents. In a study of energy efficiency
improvements, Jaffe and Stavins (Jaffe & Stavins, 1995) found that regulatory pressure
accelerates the adoption of clean energy technologies.
2.3 Success Factors for New Ventures
Surprisingly few comprehensive studies have focused on the factors that are most important to
the success of new technology ventures. To date, the author has been unable to find any
comprehensive studies focusing on the factors most important to the success of a new clean
energy technology venture.
Michael Porter (1980; 1985) discusses strategies that lead to success for firms in general in his
seminal works on competitive strategy. Relevant advice for new ventures includes pursuing
niche markets that are not served by larger competitors with products that have high value but
narrow scope. This is similar to Moore's advice (Moore, 1991). Porter also makes the point that
for new and rapidly growing industries, the costs of entry are lower. A later empirical study of
entry barriers (Robinson & Mcdougall, 2001 ) supported the assertion that the effect of entry
barriers on venture performance is less restrictive at the early stages of an industry life cycle.
While these observations may not apply to the energy industry as a whole, those segments
related to clean energy technology are new, rapidly growing, and seemingly ripe for new
entrants. Of course, Porter's theory of the "five forces" (plus, perhaps, a sixth force that would
include government influence) and his theories regarding sustainable competitive advantage
apply to new ventures as well as existing ones.
Roberts ( 1991) published one of the most significant works on new technology ventures to date.
Having collected detailed information through interviews and questionnaires and from public
records, he studied several hundred early stage high technology companies. He defined success
for these firms based on their sales history, growth, and profitability. He found the following
characteristics tended to be most significantly correlated to success:
* Multiple founders;
* Founders with appropriate personal characteristics, such as a high need for achievement
and only moderate need for personal power;
* Starting with a leading-edge, advanced, and attractive technology, with a high degree of
technology transfer from its prior source or incubator organization;
* Product orientation from the beginning (as opposed to personal services);
* Relatively large investment of initial capital, especially for firms that are subject to strong
regulatory controls;
* Extensive sales experience among the founders;
* Marketing orientation of the firm from the outset, including attentiveness towards
customers desires and awareness of competitors' behavior and strengthening of the
marketing orientation as the firm evolves;
* Managerial orientation of the firm from the outset, including prior supervisory or
business experience on the part of the founders, an effort to balance technical, sales,
manufacturing, and administrative functions, and sensitivity to the company's cost
structure; and
* Strategic focus of the firm on its core technology and markets.
In a more recent study, Eesley and Roberts (2007) found that prior startup experience among
founders with master's degrees, even if limited to a single instance, correlates significantly with
higher performance of new ventures. Wong, Cheung, and Venuvinod (Wong, Cheung, &
Venuvinod, 2005) studied incubated high technology ventures in Hong Kong, and found that
entrepreneurial personality, motivation for starting the venture, managerial skills, and approach
towards innovation significantly influenced their potential for success.
Several researchers have looked at various factors that contribute to success or failure of new
ventures that are primarily not technology-based. Lussier (Lussier, 1995) developed a model to
evaluate the "nonfinancial" factors that best predict the success of young firms. He found that
business planning, the use of professional advisors, education level of the founders, and the
ability to attract and retain high quality employees were the most significant predictors of
success. His review of others studies showed that capital, record keeping and financial control,
industry and management experience, business planning, and the use of professional advisors
were good predictors of success or failure. Brfiderl, Preisendorfer, and Ziegler (Bruderl,
Preisendorfer, & Ziegler, 1992) combined human capital theory with ideas from organizational
ecology to test which factors most contributed to success based on a survey of 1,840 businesses
founded in Germany. They found that education, general work experience, industry-specific
experience, start-up size (number of employees, capital invested, etc.) and access to larger
markets showed the strongest effects. Note that these studies of primarily non-technology
businesses emphasize basic education and general experience of the founders, while Roberts'
study of technology ventures focuses more on the personal characteristics and focus of the
management team. This difference is likely due to the fact that in order to found a technology
venture a base level of education and experience is required (though Roberts found that a
doctoral level education was, in fact, negatively correlated with success).
Utterback, Meyer, Tuff, & Richardson (1992) studied technology ventures inside a large
aluminum company. They found that successful ones demonstrated lasting commitment and
persistence above all else and that speeding concepts to market can be a mistake. However, in a
system dynamics study of software startups, Hilmola, Helob, and Ojalac (2003) found that
reducing product development lead time is one of the most important factors that determine the
success of the ventures .
Joglekar and Levesque (2006) studied startups with staged venture financing in which research
and development (R&D) and marketing were significant fractions of overall expense (primarily
technology ventures) to determine how best to allocate resources between those functions. They
determined that allocations of resources to R&D and marketing should account for the
anticipated productivity of those functions, and that it may be best to cap both R&D and
marketing expenses in certain situations. They also determined that it is best to minimize the
number of venture funding rounds (i.e. it is better to obtain a single large investment than
multiple smaller ones). They found it often suboptimal for a firm to focus on profit
maximization to the exclusion of other strategies that would increase the value of the venture
(e.g. investment in growth).
Gans and Stem (2003) develop a synthetic framework to determine commercialization strategies
for technology ventures based on the "commercialization environment--the microeconomic and
strategic conditions facing a firm that is translating an 'idea' into a value proposition for
customers." They determine that the prime drivers of a successful startup commercialization
strategy is the degree to which competitors who may be familiar with the technology are
nevertheless unable to develop and market it themselves, and the degree to which incumbent
firms have assets that contribute to the value of adopting the new technology. They assert that
when the technology is non-appropriable (e.g. through intellectual property protection) and
important complementary assets are held by incumbent firms, the new venture is well positioned
to cooperate with the incumbents rather than compete. Conversely, when their intellectual
property protection is weak and assets required by incumbent firms are not required, it is optimal
for the new venture to compete and create their own market by exploiting the "blind spots" of
incumbents. This has implications for new clean energy ventures that may or may not depend on
the assets of utilities and other incumbents. For example, a venture with patented technology to
improve the efficiency of electric transmission grids may be well positioned to cooperate with
the grid owners and operators. However, a venture that is selling a combined heat and power
system that does not have strong intellectual property protection and can be used for "off grid"
operation may wish to find markets where current operators are not active.
2.4 Venture and Angel Investing
One of the most critical factors identified for the success of new technology ventures,
particularly energy technology ventures, is the availability and amount of financing. The
principal source of financing for most technology ventures is private equity investors, including
those who invest their own capital (often known as "angel" investors), and professional investors
who raise funds to invest in new ventures (venture capital investors).
2.4.1 New Venture Investment Data
An excellent source for data on venture investing in startup and early stage companies is the
Pricewaterhouse Coopers MonevTree Report, which is a collaboration between
PricewaterhouseCoopers and the National Venture Capital Association based upon data from
Thomson Financial (Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 2006). The MoneyTree Report has tracked
professional venture capital investments by stage of company, geographical region, industry, and
several other categories every three months since 1995.
The MoneyTree Report defines a seed or start-up stage company as being in "the initial stage" of
development. Such a company would have a concept or product under development, but
probably not yet fully operational. The firm has usually been in existence less than 18 months.
The report characterizes an early stage (more advanced than a start-up) company as having "a
product or service in testing or pilot production. In some cases, the product may be
commercially available." The early stage company may or may not be generating revenues and
usually has been in business less than three years.
A similarly excellent source for data on angel investing is the Center for Venture Research
(CVR) at the University of New Hampshire (The Center for Venture Research, 2006). The
CVR tracks angel investments across the United States. Its data show that most seed stage
investments are made by angels, in terms of both number of investments and in total dollars
invested. However, the mean investment by an angel is significantly smaller than the mean seed
stage venture investment. See Figure 2-3 for a comparison of mean venture early stage and seed
investments 1995 through 2006 (Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 2006) and of mean investments by
angels in 2000 and 2003 through 2006 (Center for Venture Research, 2006).
Figure 2-3: Mean VC and Angel Investments
2.4.2 Funding Gaps
A report prepared for the Economic Assessment Office of the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (Branscomb & Auerswald, 2002) found that "most funding for technology
development in the phase between invention and innovation comes from individual private-
equity 'angel' investors, corporations, and the federal government--not venture capitalists." This
is consistent with the CVR data (Center for Venture Research, 2006) showing that the majority
of early stage investments come from angel investors. The NIST report also found that capital
markets for early stage technology ventures are not efficient, and that conditions for success of
innovations are concentrated in a few geographical regions (e.g. Boston metro area, Silicon
Valley) and industrial sectors.
Figure 2-4, from this report, shows that angel investors fill a funding gap between federal
funding for basic research and proof of concepts and venture funding for product development.
An early stage company with a market-ready innovation that it has not yet successfully
introduced to the market may face this gap, and both the NIST report and CVR assert that the
current level of angel investing alone is not adequate to fully fill it.
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Figure 2-4: Funding Stages and Gaps
2.5 System Dynamics
The modeling methodology that has been used for this research is system dynamics. The best
explanation and examples of the use of system dynamics is Sterman's Business Dynamics
(Sterman, 2000). System dynamics is a powerful methodology for studying and understanding
complex "real world" systems (such as a business or industry). What distinguishes system
dynamics from other system modeling methodologies is the use of feedback loops, accumulation
of flows into stocks, and time delays. These attributes combine to create models with nonlinear
and often non-intuitive behavior, which often can provide useful insight into the behavior of the
real world system being modeled.
However, as Sterman cautions, "all models are wrong" (Sterman, 2002). The best constructed
model is still a simplification and abstraction of reality, and its best use lies in how well we learn
from it (by improving our own mental models), and not in its replication of the behavior of a real
world system. The details supporting the assumptions and construction of the model used in this
research are outlined in Chapter 5.
2.5.1 System Dynamics Modeling of Electricity Markets
System dynamics has been used extensively and effectively to study the electrical power industry
and markets and aid in resource planning. Ford (1997) lists 33 publications on the application of
system dynamics to electric power, which range from models of national energy systems to the
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impact of new technologies to the behavior of individual companies. Lyneis has modeled both
technology diffusion (Lyneis, 1993) and competition in the electric utility industry (Lyneis,
1997). Also see Bunn and Larsen's System Modelling/fbr Energy Policy (1997).
2.5.2 System Dynamics Modeling of Diffusion of Innovation
System dynamics models have been used effectively to analyze the adoption of a wide variety of
innovations. In one example, Homer (1977) developed a system dynamics simulation model to
analyze the emergence of new medical technologies which took into account the development
and manufacturing efforts of the manufacturers as well as the selection and use of the
technologies by the physicians who adopted them.
Vij, Vrat, and Sushil (1991) modeled the diffusion of energy technologies using a probit
approach. Rather than base the adoption rate on word of mouth from adopters, the adoption rate
is based on the potential adopters' perception of the rate of return of adopting the new
technology. The rate of return of the new energy technology is based on energy prices and the
perceived risk of adopting the new technology as well as on its cost and financial benefits.
Maier (1998) used system dynamics to investigate the process of innovation diffusion by
extending traditional new product diffusion models to include competition and the process of
substitution among successive product generations.
2.6 Conclusion and Rationale for this Research
Of the bodies of literature most relevant to this study, the literature on diffusion of innovations is
considerably more extensive than that on the factors that lead to success of new ventures. Yet
given the assertion that only new ventures can successfully commercialize disruptive innovations
(e.g. see Christensen (2000) and Utterback (1996)), if we are interested in encouraging the
adoption of disruptive innovations, than we should be interested in encouraging the success of
new ventures who attempt to commercialize them. Clean energy technology is a disruptive
innovation in that it supplies energy using none of or much less of the predominant source of
energy in the world today (fossil fuels), and reduces the need of the massive infrastructure built
to transmit energy and electricity great distances. And given the benefits of these clean energy
disruptive innovations, we should be interested in finding out how to encourage the success of
new clean energy technology ventures. Yet little work has been done in this area. This research
attempts to fill that gap.
3 Stakeholders and Factors in the Adoption of Clean Energy
Technology
This chapter draws on an extensive set of interviews to reveal the attitudes and incentives of the
wide range of stakeholders involved in decisions to adopt new clean energy technologies. Each
stakeholder may play more than one role in the negotiation of product adoption (or rejection).
The diverse factors that may impinge upon such a decision are also considered. This chapter
disaggregates the roles, incentives, and disincentives that influence a decision to adopt a new
clean energy technology. The next chapter fleshes out the process by presenting the complex
interaction of the stakeholders in three real cases of the experiences of new ventures in the clean
energy technology market.
3.1 Interviews
Over the course of four and a half years, over 100 interviews were conducted with clean energy
entrepreneurs and a variety of stakeholders related to clean energy ventures. The stakeholders,
described in detail in Section 3.2, include the customers of clean energy technology, energy
service providers, investors in the ventures, and participants in policy-making processes related
to clean energy technologies.
Interviewees were selected from both established and newly created clean energy technology
ventures: from large and small customers of these products and technologies; and from a wide
variety of sectors of the industry, including distributed generation, demand side management,
renewable energy generation, energy efficient building technologies, and energy equipment
maintenance. Many of the interviewees were recommended by prior interviewees.
Most of the interviews were informal, though notes were recorded for most. Several formal
interviews were also conducted that were based on a sequence ofpre-determined questions; these
were recorded on tape. The consent form for the interviews is attached as Appendix A and the
questions for those interviews are attached as Appendix B.
3.2 Stakeholders in the Adoption of Clean Energy Technologies
Because the goal of this research to is to better understand and thus overcome current barriers to
the adoption of clean energy technologies, it is critical to know who the primary stakeholders are
and how they relate to a clean energy technology venture and to each other.
To be adopted, a clean energy technology must be of significant value to all stakeholders along
both its customer chain and supply chain. Those along the customer chain include the adoption
decision maker, as well as direct and indirect users. Stakeholders in the supply chain include the
developer of the technology, resellers and distributors, and partners who provide complementary
systems and services. The needs and interests of other significant industry players such as
electricity distribution companies (DISCOs), energy service companies (ESCOs), system
operators (ISOs and RTOs), regulatory bodies (state and federal), and public policy makers and
their constituents must also be taken into account. Without the explicit or implicit support from
a preponderance of these players, the adoption of the technology will be impeded. This section
fills in the outline of the stakeholders in the adoption of a clean energy technology (Table 3-1
column 1), their interests and needs in relation to and independent of the new technology
(column 2), and the roles each stakeholder can play in affecting the adoption of a new
technology (column 3).
Role in TechnologyStakeholders Relevant Interests and Needs Adoption
Clean Energy * Maximize adoption of the technology * Developer
Technology * Meet and exceed customer needs * Marketer
Developer
* Overcome barriers to the adoption of the * Enabler
technology * Proponent
Facility Managers * Ease of use (save time and resources) * Adoption decision Maker
* Minimize risks to facility * Direct User
* Reduce complaints from occupants * Indirect User
* Reliable power
* Minimize expense
CFOs or Financial * Minimize expense * Adoption decision Maker
Managers * Generate good return on investment * Indirect User
* Minimize risk to business
Facility Users and * Maximize comfort * Indirect User
Occupants * Maximize ability to do work * Proponent
* Reliable power * Opponent
Utilities * Maximize revenue (or minimize loss of * Barrier
(distribution revenue) from distribution service * Enabler
companies) * Minimize risk to distribution network
* Reduce complexity, and personnel time
required per customer
Large scale * Maximize revenue (or minimize loss of * Opponent
generation owners revenue) from generation
ISOs, RTOs * Maximize and maintain system- * Barrier
reliability * Enabler
* Minimize system costs enhance price
stability
ESCOs * Maximize revenue from services and * Enabler
distribution of products * Marketer
* Expand business offerings and services * Proponent
* Enhance reputation * Opponent
DG Equipment * Maximize revenue from equipment sales * Enabler
Manufacturers: * Enhance reputation and visibility * Marketer
e Proponent
Competing and * Maximize revenue (or minimize loss of * Proponent
complementary revenue) from technology sales * Enabler
technology- * Maximize network effects (through * Opponent
providers: adoption of complementary technology)
* Barrier
* Minimize direct competition
Government, * Maximize overall welfare of producers * Enabler
Policy Makers and consumers * Barrier
* Maximize system reliability
* Minimize system costs
* Minimize environmental damage
* Improve system security
General Public * Minimize retail power costs * Proponent
* Improve system reliability and security * Opponent
* Minimize environmental damage
Table 3-1: Stakeholders, Roles, and Interests.
3.2.1 Stakeholders and their Interests
The first two columns of Table 3-1 list 12 classes of stakeholders and the interests that motivate
them.
Clean Energy Technology Developer - The New Venture: The clean energy technology
developer is primarily concerned with developing a technology that meets and exceeds the needs
of the adopters, and maximizing the adoption of the technology and thereby maximizing its
revenues and viability as a commercial venture. To do so, the developer has to understand the
needs and requirements of each of the other significant stakeholders (especially potential
customers), and be able to overcome objections and barriers that exist today and will arise in the
future.
Facility Managers: Most likely, the facility manager of a given organization is a central player
in deciding whether that organization will install a clean energy technology. Facility Managers
want a technology that is easy to use and conforms to expectations of how to manage their
facilities. It is important to them to minimize any possible physical or financial risks to their
organizations, and they may be skeptical of a technology until it is proven to be completely
reliable in their eyes. However, a Facility Manager who is currently experiencing problems with
the reliability and/or expense of power, and is under pressure to find a solution, will be motivated
to try a new solution. If the organization has already adopted or decided to adopt a prior clean
energy technology, a Facility Manager is more likely to be willing to adopt another. Word of
mouth from colleagues who have experience with a similar technology is also likely to play an
important role. In the final analysis, direct users such as facility managers will have to "trust"
the technology before fully adopting it.
CFOs or Financial Managers: Organizations that do not have a suitable facility manager or for
which the CFO or Financial Manager of a division make the energy decisions are likely to
evaluate clean energy technologies on a more purely economic basis. The question will be what
the return on investment and financial risks will be. Unless it can be proven that adoption of a
new technology will provide significant economic benefits to their organization (i.e. by saving
money on power expenses and improving the reliability of power) without incurring significant
risks, they may block its adoption.
Facility Users and Occupants: It is important to consider the comfort and needs of the people
who occupy any facility that uses a new energy technology. They may become the system's
strongest advocates or detractors depending on how it affects their work and comfort. They also
may play a role in the decision whether to adopt the system in the first place. If an energy
technology is successful in increasing the reliability of power at a facility as well as the
responsiveness of systems such as HVAC and lighting to the needs of occupants, then the users
may become proponents of the system and facilitate its adoption through word of mouth.
However, if they perceive that the new technology interferes with their comfort or ability to do
their work, they are likely to become vocal opponents of the technology.
Utilities (distribution companies): Utilities currently have enormous influence over the
deployment of clean energy technologies. They may also influence whether organizations
deploy these technologies. Utilities and distribution companies will be concerned about loss of
revenue resulting from the use of DG and DSM. They will also be concerned about risks to the
distribution network resulting from the use of DG. As a result, they have in the past and may in
the future impose strict interconnection requirements and significant standby charges that would
reduce the incentive for any organization to adopt DG.
It is therefore important that the system-wide benefits of any new clean energy technology be
conveyed to the utilities. For example, the adoption of DG may reduce their need to make
expensive upgrades to the distribution network, and may result in more satisfied customers.
However, if distribution companies continue to impose barriers to protect their revenue, other
means, such as through changes in regulation, may have to be found to overcome these barriers
Large-scale generation owners: Large-scale generation owners (such as the owners of coal-
fired plants) are not likely to favor the promotion of DG based clean energy technologies. In a
deregulated environment, they are likely to view successful DG operators and manufacturers as
competitors, and are likely to oppose the adoption of DG and any complementary clean energy
technologies. This opposition must be heeded during the development of regulations that may
affect the adoption of DG. See below for more on the impact of regulations. However, if the
clean energy technology provide benefits to the generation owners or enable them to conform to
new regulations, the generation owners may become adopters of the clean energy technology.
However, it must be kept in mind that these are likely to be extremely conservative adopters.
ISOs and RTOs: The Independent System Operator (ISO) or Regional Transmission
Organization (RTO) is responsible for the reliable operation of the bulk power generation and
transmission system. Therefore, they are likely to support any technology that they think will
increase the reliability and stability of the transmission system, and to oppose any technology,
which they perceive will introduce undue risks.
No single clean energy technology is likely to affect the bulk power transmission system unless
and until it is widely adopted. However, if the possibility of its wide adoption becomes apparent,
the ISO or RTO for a region may become a powerful ally or opponent of the system depending
on its managers' perception of potential system-wide effects. For this reason, the system should
be designed to have positive system wide-effects that can be effectively communicated to the
ISO or RTO.
ESCOs: Energy service companies (ESCOs) are often the implementers and installers of clean
energy technologies within other organizations. This puts them in a position to advocate for
technologies they approve. They are also likely to be interested in expanding their product
offerings. If a new technology can benefit their customers, and marketing it would enhance their
reputations as well as revenues, they could directly market and resell the system.
However, ESCO personnel would first have to be trained in the usage and installation of the new
technology and to represent the product well. Poorly trained representatives could impede the
adoption of a new energy technology even more than well-trained representatives could
encourage its adoption.
DG Equipment Manufacturers: Current DG manufacturers will have an incentive to advocate
for new clean energy technologies that use their products. However, they first must be made
aware of the existence and the benefits of these technologies. They also must be convinced that
the technologies enhance the value and usage of their particular systems.
Competing and Complementary Clean Energy Technology Providers: At first blush, it
seems that competing ventures would strongly oppose the use of another clean energy
technology. However, if the functionality of their system and the new technology does not
completely overlap (which is likely to be the case), perhaps ways to partner can be found. For
example, multiple energy management systems can be used to check the validity and enhance the
reliability of each other's data. Furthermore, competing and complementary ventures are likely
to be on the same side of the fence with respect regulatory and legislative battles.
The success or failure of similar products and technologies may affect the adoption of other new
technologies. If similar systems are wildly successful, interest in new clean energy technologies
will likely increase. However, if customers have strongly negative experiences with similar
systems, they may be unwilling to consider a new energy technology.
Government, Policy Makers: The government and policy makers are unlikely to be directly
affected by a new clean energy technology unless and until it becomes very widely adopted (or
their own facility adopts it). However, regulations and legislation can have significant impacts
on the adoption of clean energy technologies. The impact of regulation will be covered below.
General Public: Because the initial market for new clean energy technologies is likely to be
large commercial and industrial facilities, the general public may not be affected by them
initially unless they are occupants of a facility that adopts the technology. However, the
influence of the general public on government representatives may have an effect on the
adoption of these technologies, particularly with respect to addressing climate change. Once
widely adopted, the technologies may have system-wide effects that could increase reliability of
power and lower prices for all consumers, in addition to providing environmental benefits.
3.2.2 Interaction among Stakeholders: Roles in the Introduction of New Technologies
Naturally, the activities and concerns of these stakeholders interact in various ways as their roles
in the future of a new technology play out. For example, enablers and barriers to a significant
degree, and proponents and opponents to a lesser degree, will affect the decisions of potential
customers. Competing technology providers may be opponents in one situation (selling to the
same customer) but allies in another (lobbying regulatory bodies). An indirect user of the system
in one situation (such as the occupant of a facility) may become a proponent or enabler in
another situation (such as at a legislative hearing).
Though some of these interactions may not be foreseeable, all potential interactions should be
taken into account to understand the factors in the adoption of new clean energy technologies. In
each specific case, some stakeholders and the roles they play will be more significant than others
will, but each will influence how extensively the technology will be adopted. As indicated in
column 3 of Figure 1, the nine roles a stakeholder may play are:
Developer: This is the new venture working to develop and provide the clean energy
technology.
Marketer: This is a person or organization that markets and sells the clean energy technology.
This could be the new venture itself, a reseller, partner, or distributor.
Adoption Decision Maker: This is the most directly critical role. It is the individual or group at
a given facility having the authority to adopt the clean energy technology for use at that facility.
Though this person or group may consult with other stakeholders, the technology will not be
adopted without the approval of this decision maker.
Direct User: This is also a critical role. This is the individual or group at a facility that is the
prime user or adopter of the clean energy technology. The Direct User is likely to be the facility
manager who will configure the system and interact with the interface to the system on the most
frequent basis. Very often, Direct Users will also make or assist in making the adoption
decision. They are also likely to play the most significant role in whether the technology
receives positive or negative word of mouth.
Indirect User: This is an individual or group at a facility affected by the use of the clean energy
technology, but not the direct user. For example, the occupants of a facility that uses a clean
energy technology to manage energy use will be affected by changes in heating or cooling set
points or in quality of power, though they may not configure or interface with the system
directly. These users may also play a role in the adoption decision, and whether the technology
receives positive or negative word of mouth.
Enabler: This is an organization with the authority or ability to enable or support the adoption
of the technology. For example, the government could play the role of enabler by adopting
legislation providing incentives for facilities to adopt the technology.
Barrier: This is an organization with the authority or ability to create or strengthen barriers to
the adoption of a technology. For example, a utility distribution company can play the role of a
Barrier in the adoption of DG by making it time-consuming and expensive for a facility to
connect DG to the grid.
Proponent: This is an individual or organization that expresses support for the adoption of the
technology. Though a Proponent may not be in position to adopt the technology itself, it may
influence the decision makers, users, and enablers to support the technology.
Opponent: This is an individual or organization that expresses opposition to the adoption of the
technology. Though they may not be in position to erect barriers to the adoption of the
technology themselves, they may influence the decision makers, users, and enablers to oppose
the technology.
It is important to keep in mind the roles played by stakeholders, as their converging and
conflicting interests determine the role they will play in promoting wider distribution of clean
energy technologies developed by new ventures.
3.3 Factors in the Adoption of Clean Energy Technologies
To overcome the barriers to the adoption of clean energy technologies, it is critical to understand
what the barriers to adoption of clean energy technologies are today, as well as what barriers new
ventures may face when they attempt to commercialize these technologies. The many barriers
that have slowed the adoption of clean energy technologies include regulatory, economic,
institutional and behavioral, and technical reasons. The most prominent barriers to date have
been regulatory and market-based in nature (Congressional Budget Office, 2003; Hedman et al.,
2002).
3.3.1 Regulatory Factors
External forces resulting from regulation may have significant impacts upon the adoption of
clean energy technologies. These may include real time pricing regulations, regulations which
dictate the forms of power which are to be preferred (such as a carbon tax, or regulations that
encourage energy efficiency), and subsidies (such as existing subsidies for fossil fuels). This
section is a description of the regulatory factors and strategies that the technology provider may
use to mitigate risks and encourage opportunities. The regulatory factors include:
Carbon Taxes or Cap and Trade Regulations: Many policy makers have discussed
recognizing the cost of the externalities of carbon emissions (e.g. the danger of climate change)
by imposing taxes or tradable caps on the emission of carbon. These regulations, if enacted,
would likely increase the price of fossil-fuel based power, and encourage the adoption of clean
energy technologies, which, by definition, reduce carbon emissions. These kinds of policies and
their effects are discussed in Chapter 6.
Energy Efficiency Regulations: Regulators could also recognize the externalities of power
production or react to power shortages by enacting regulations that encourage or even mandate
the efficient use of energy or the adoption of specific classes of energy-saving technologies.
These regulations would also encourage the adoption of energy technologies that optimize the
efficient use of energy. The effects of policies that encourage adoption are also discussed in
Chapter 6.
Subsidies: Existing legislation and regulations provide subsidies for the development of fossil
fuel resources (such as oil, gas, and coal). If such regulations are enhanced, fossil fuel based
power production could become more economical, and clean energy technologies will become
comparatively less beneficial. On the other hand, legislation that provides encouragement
through subsidies for clean energy technologies could have a very beneficial impact on adoption.
These policies and their effects are discussed in Chapter 6.
Real Time Pricing: Distributed and intelligent clean energy technologies that react to changing
conditions are more warranted when pricing information is changing in real time. However, real
time pricing for electricity does not exist in most US markets. This does not mean that these
types of technologies will be unusable, but it will reduce the perceived benefit of these systems.
Many national level organizations have been touting the benefits of real time pricing for some
time:
"Lack of price responsive demand is a major impediment to the competitiveness of electricity
markets." (FERC 2000)
"[To] improve the reliability of electric supply, some or all electric customers will have to be
exposed to market prices." (NERC 2000)
If and when real time pricing is adopted in a given market, it will increase the benefits and
adoption of clean energy technologies such as DG, DSM, and intelligent energy management
systems. In the meantime, clean energy technologies that depend on real time pricing will have
to be sold on the basis of their other benefits or in other markets (perhaps internationally) that
have adopted real time pricing.
Utility Interconnection Regulations and Requirements: Utilities are permitted to prevent
customers from connecting small generators to the grid unless they meet a complex set of
requirements to ensure the safety and reliability of the grid. Though there is a strong rationale
behind this policy (the protection of the grid), utilities often force customers who wish to install
DG to incur unwarranted costs (National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2000).
Utility Surcharges for Stranded Costs and Standby Service: Regulations in most states allow
utilities to levy surcharges on customers who install and operate DG in order to cover the cost of
prior investments the utilities have made (stranded costs) and the cost to enable the provision of
standby service to the customer. However, many DG customers believe that they should not be
responsible for stranded costs, and that the surcharges for these costs are excessive
(Congressional Budget Office, 1998). In any case, the existence of these charges impedes the
adoption of DG.
Environmental Concerns (e.g. Siting Restrictions and Air Permitting Issues): Most
municipalities in the US (including states, counties, and cities) regulate the installation and
operation of electricity generating equipment for environmental, safety, and zoning purposes.
California alone has extensive regulations (California Energy Commission, 2000).
Unfortunately, these regulations are not consistent nationally, and make it difficult for the
manufacturers and users of DG equipment to know whether they comply.
3.3.2 Economic Factors: The Market
External market forces will have significant impacts upon the adoption of clean energy
technologies. These forces may include the price of power from various sources; knowledge and
degree of certainty regarding the economic benefits; and the existence, price and quality of
competing technologies. These factors include:
Price of Power: One of the key selling points of clean energy technologies is that they enable
the adopting organization to save money on power costs. If power costs increase or decrease
significantly, this may enable or disable the market potential for the product. For example, if a
shortage in fossil fuels caused electricity prices to raise dramatically, many organizations would
be more willing to adopt clean energy technologies that would reduce the impact of those
increased costs. However, if power prices were to decrease dramatically, the motivation to try
new technology would be decreased correspondingly.
It must be kept in mind that some forms of DG use natural gas as fuel, and therefore an increase
in the price of natural gas may decrease the adoption of DG. However, this may have a
beneficial impact on other forms of DG (such as wind power) and may have a beneficial impact
on the adoption of DSM systems and other clean energy technologies.
Prices for Power Sold to Utilities: DG is most cost effective when excess power generated can
be sold (or credited) at retail electricity rates. However, most states have no standardized rules
that allow all DG operators to do this. Though many states have net metering regulations' that
enable customers to run their meters backwards when they supply power, these regulations are
often restricted to small, renewable sources of generation. Even when a generator at a customer
site is able to produce power at a cost below the marginal wholesale cost of electricity from the
grid, it may not be permitted to do so.
Uncertainty Surrounding Economic Benefits: When an organization is deciding whether to
install or implement a new energy technology, generally the cost of the installation will be
known, and will be incurred up front. However, the amount of benefit or savings the system(s)
will provide will often be unknown. An organization may not know how much electricity they
will save by implementing DSM or even how much electricity they will generate with a DG
system. Even if they did, they may not be able to calculate the savings, since they will be
dependent upon the future cost of electricity from grid and of the fuel for the DG system (often
natural gas). Also, without long term contracts to purchase the power from renewable power
generation, developers of these projects will be uncertain as to their value over time. This may
" See www.awea.org/policy/netmeter.html for a summary of states net metering programs as of May
2001.
make the developers of renewable energy or decision makers adopting DG or DSM hesitant to
go ahead with the investment and creditors hesitant to finance it.
New Technology or Markets: Clean energy technologies may be designed to work within the
current system of power generation and transmission technology and markets. If radical new
energy technology is developed or the natures of the markets are significantly changed, the
adoption of the clean energy technologies will be affected.
3.3.3 Managing Regulatory Impacts
As seen above, regulations could have significant positive or negative effects upon the adoption
of new energy technologies. There is strong interest to make progress on regulatory barriers to
clean energy technologies. Interconnection standards have come into being (such as IEEE 1547)
and federal and state regulatory bodies are aware of these regulatory issues and are actively
working to resolve them.
However, regulations that favor entrenched interests can be notoriously hard to change.
Furthermore, these regulations, and efforts to update them vary across 50 states. Without
progress on the regulatory side, technological solutions may be insufficient to drive the adoption
of clean energy technologies. Though the forces that shape these regulations cannot be fully
controlled, nongovernmental activities in the civic and private sector can influence the regulatory
process, mitigate the risks of uncertainty, and encourage opportunities:
Participation in the political process: Focused, knowledgeable, and motivated participants in
the political process tend to have greater influence. By assuring that policy makers are informed
of the benefits and costs of different types of regulations, it may be possible to have a positive
impact.
Industry groups: Though knowledge alone is powerful, legislators are more likely to listen to a
large and organized coalition than to an individual or small group. The more that clean energy
technology providers and advocates band together, the greater influence on legislation they may
have.
Visibility of benefits of the technology: If clean energy technologies are deployed and used
successfully, and policy makers become aware of this success, they are more likely to support
regulations that encourage its use.
Good relationships with the organizations that implement regulations: Once regulations are
enacted, whether positive or negative, the nature of their implementation is likely to have a more
significant impact than the actual text of the regulation. Positive relationships with those who
have the authority to implement regulations are important.
3.3.4 Institutional and Behavioral Factors
Forces within institutions and the way people behave when evaluating new technology are
significant factors in any decision to adopt a technology. These factors include:
Lack of incentives for decision makers - agency problems: Sometimes decision makers do
not have an incentive to make an investment in order to save on energy costs. For example, the
architects and engineers who are designing and building a particular site may wish to avoid any
initial investments that would increase the cost of a project, even if they would ultimately
provide significant energy savings to the occupants. Similarly, the owner of a building for which
the tenants pay their own energy costs may have no incentive to make an investment to decrease
those costs. Or the users of power at an institution may not be responsible for paying for the use
of that power.
Advantages for delay: If similar clean energy technologies are not already commonly installed
within an industry or region, decision makers will perceive more risk associated with putting in
new technology, compared to "doing what everyone else is doing." Even when aware of the
benefits of these technologies, they may choose to delay installation due to an expectation that
price and functionality will improve over time.
Unwillingness to invest the time necessary to learn and use a new energy technology: Even
if a new energy technology is sold on a "share of savings" basis with no upfront financial
investment required, some upfront investment of time will be required. Users who are occupied
with other problems may not be willing to make this investment of time. Organizations face
many challenges today, and are often resource-constrained. Therefore, even when the economic
benefit of installing a new technology is clear, an organization may not have personnel with the
time and qualifications to manage the project and ensure that it operates in such a way to incur its
full economic benefit. To complicate matters further, the installations of energy systems are
often quite complex.
Chicken and egg problem with experience: Potential adopters of new technology are often
hesitant to accept it until they have directly observed its benefits and have personal experience
with the systems. However, they may not be able to gain such experience until they have
adopted the technology.
3.3.5 Technology Factors
Finally, the nature of the technologies themselves undoubtedly plays a role in whether they are
adopted or not. These factors include:
Lack of progress on clean energy technologies: Though it is enticing to assume that
technology in any given area will steadily advance, there is never a guarantee of this. For
example, the promise of inexpensive fuel cells and microturbines may never materialize, while
the price of renewable generation technologies may remain uneconomical for some time. And
efficiency gains may stop being made. And without progress on the 'hardware' side, energy
management software will have greatly reduced benefit.
Unexpected consequences: Even if new promising technology is developed, it may not work
under "real world conditions" the same way it works in the lab.
3.3.6 Summary of Factors
Figure 3-1 shows the interaction of many of the factors affecting the cost and value of
implementing and utilizing clean energy technology. Some factors are clearly more important
for particular technologies than others. (For example, siting regulations are important for DG but
not DSM.) Other factors would affect almost any clean energy technology (e.g. carbon taxes).
Some factors have more of an indirect effect (e.g., the political power of utilities allows them to
influence regulations that have a direct effect on the adoption of clean energy technologies).
Amount being
spent on power
Total expenses of Power expense
organization as percent of
total expenses
Cost of power
from grid
Cost of fuel Economic
value of clean
interruption
Value of load
Shiftability of_-- management
loads
Variability of Portic
loads
Interconnection
S Regulations PoliticalInfluence of
Distribution
Company
Siting restrictions/Air
permitting issues
for an~
Cost of Utility Charges for ,
implementing *--- Stranded Costs
for
:es
ction
ble
ndards
naker <Product
Attractiveness>
Figure 3-1: Factors Effecting Value of Clean Energy Technology
f
I
I
3.4 Feedbacks that Support Established Energy Technologies
Though a clean energy technology may be economically advantageous, many positive feedbacks
support established energy technologies and the companies that provide them. Figure 3-2 depicts
many of these loops.
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Figure 3-2: Loops Effecting the Adoption of Clean Energy Technology
Nobody Gets Fired: Existing energy technologies (primarily based on fossil fuel) have been
widely available for many decades and therefore are very familiar to the public and to
commercial enterprises that are heavy energy users. Therefore, when evaluating which energy
technology to use (or to continue using) a decision maker at a firm understands that he will not
be criticized (or fired) if the firm continue to use the same technologies that it has used for many
years, and which all other firms use. Furthermore, any new energy technology will be perceived
as risky (it has not been tried and true like existing technologies) and the perception of risk will
detract from the attractiveness of the new technology. Therefore, the "safe" decision is to
continue using and purchasing the existing technology, which reinforces its familiarity and
encourages further use in the future.
Public Awareness: The providers of existing energy technology have an incentive to reinforce
the public's familiarity with their technology and the perception of risk related to new
technology. They also have the financial resources to mount broad advertising campaigns that
tout the benefits (and familiarity) of conventional energy solutions and aggravate the perception
of risks (and fears) of newer clean energy technology. The success of these campaigns bolsters
the adoption of existing energy technologies, providing further resources to mount future
advertising campaigns.
Regulation Capture: Large energy firms tend to make very large political contributions and
exert considerable influence on policymaking and regulations that govern or are related to energy
production and use. They use this influence to shape regulations that favor or lower the cost of
production of their technologies (e.g. subsidies for fossil fuel exploration and development) and
that increase the cost of providing alternatives (e.g. onerous interconnection and siting
regulations for distributed generation technologies). These regulations result in increased profit
for these firms, which they, in part, reinvest to shape future regulations.
Learning and Price: Most technologies become less costly to produce over time. Given that
existing energy technologies have been produced and used for many years, firms understand
them well, which reduces the expense of providing them. Negotiating the learning curve for new
technologies may require a firm to invest in training and possibly new employees, thus adding to
the expensive of adopting a new technology. The lower price encourages further use of the
existing technologies, and inhibits the adoption of the new technologies and the cost reductions
that would allow them to compete better.
Built Infrastructure: One of the reasons that existing energy technology becomes less costly to
use over time is that once its supporting infrastructure built marginal costs are lower. A massive
infrastructure has been built to deliver electricity throughout the United States through the
centralized grid. Though electricity users pay charges associated with the creation and
maintenance of that infrastructure, its existence has lowered the cost of large-scale fossil-fuel-
generated power.
A developer of a large coal-powered plant does not have to worry about the cost of creating an
infrastructure to deliver the power generated by that plant to end users. However, the developer
of a plant meant to produce hydrogen for use in fuel cells must be very concerned about the cost
of infrastructure to deliver the hydrogen to end users. That cost would severely hinder the
construction of such a plant. Therefore, existing infrastructure supports the expansion of existing
technologies which then justify incremental improvements to the infrastructure and further use of
the existing technologies.
Insufficient "Word of Mouth": The reinforcing '"word of mouth" loop is often used to explain
an exponential increase in the adoption of a new technology as new users contact potential users
and encourage further adoption, therefore creating even more new users. However, this only
works if there are enough users to spread the word. If there are many factors inhibiting the
adoption of a new technology (as per above) there may not be enough new adopters to encourage
others to use the new technology. A lack of peers using the new technology may further
discourage any new users from adopting.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have disaggregated the complex web of stakeholders, roles, and factors that
can promote or inhibit the adoption of a clean energy technology. Clearly, there is serious
regulatory, market, institutional, behavioral, and technological challenges. This is why new
clean energy technologies must provide significant benefits over existing technologies in order to
be widely adopted and these benefits must be clearly and strongly communicated.
Some of the interviews on which the information in this chapter is based also contribute to the
in-depth case analyses in Chapter 4. These detailed studies demonstrate three instances in which
stakeholders interacted to affect the adoption of a new technology and the fate of the new venture
that developed the product.
Chapter 5 will describe a model with a direct sales-oriented perspective towards the adoption of
clean energy technologies (i.e. not only do attributes of the technologies and products have to
make them attractive to end users, but the technologies and products must be directly sold
through considerable sales and marketing effort).
Chapter 6 and 7 will then analyze the results of running the model and provide a discussion of
the effect that management strategies and government policies may have to increase the adoption
of clean energy technologies and overcome the barriers and challenges that were described in
this chapter.
4 Case Studies
This chapter presents case studies of three clean energy technology ventures. Over a dozen
ventures were evaluated in depth for this research, and these three were selected as a
representative sample. They are SoftTech Systems, whose products manage energy consumption
for buildings and who are profitable but have not yet achieved widespread adoption; Dharma
Power, who provide wireless technology and services to monitor power plant equipment and
who are working to achieve profitability; and Bluestone Power, whose plan was to assemble,
install, own and operate on-site combined-heat-and-power generation (CHP) systems, but was
not able to achieve significant revenue, and whose assets have been sold.
These companies differ in some significant ways, but also have some factors in common. Each
appeared to have great prospects-high quality and economically advantageous products,
excellent management, and sophisticated analyses of the market. Each failed to meet its goals.
The history of each company and the reasons for the difficulties they faced were distilled from
interviews with the CEOs. In retrospect, the CEOs understood many of the reasons that their
companies did not perform up to expectations. Each offers some lessons that should make it
easier for other start-up firms in the clean energy technology market to succeed.
The attributes of these firms and many other like them and the commonalities observed in their
capital requirements, business models, sales cycles and labor requirements contributed
significantly to the structuring of the system dynamics models developed in this study. And
many of the "lessons learned" will be echoed in Chapters 6 and 7 in the discussion of the
strategies new ventures should employ and the policies that would assist them.
- The names of the companies have been changed for discussion in this analysis.
4.1 SoftTech Systems
SoftTech (not the real name) was launched in late 2000, with four founders who had experience
in the energy and building industries, and in software development. Their original purpose was
to develop a company to optimize energy usage across all spectrums (transmission, distribution;
and generation). Their initial products were designed to monitor energy consumption for
buildings, aggregate the data and intelligently control and optimize equipment settings. By mid-
2001 they had developed a beta product that helped to manage energy use in buildings and tests
of this product resulted in reported savings of over 20% of the energy used at the government
facilities where it was installed. SoftTech had its commercial launch in the first quarter of 2002.
SoftTech was funded by venture capitalists and was provided with enough capital for the
company to afford a significant workforce and the time to develop a quality product as well as to
develop the market. Their business model is a "share of savings" model in which customers are
charged relatively little up front, but SoftTech is then paid a percentage of the customer's energy
savings over time. This model has appeared to work for SoftTech, as they were able to attract
large institutions to be their customers, and more than double their revenue every year to achieve
profitability.
SoftTech's CEO believes that several factors were critical to the success they have had. In the
first place, the venture was well-financed from the outset. With these resources, they were able
to hire and retain well-qualified personnel who were creative and persistent in developing the
company's products and finding a market for them. The principals further positioned the firm by
developing excellent public relations through winning awards, speaking at conferences, serving
on industry committees, etc.
External conditions were also favorable for SoftTech's launch. Increases in energy demand were
putting pressure on supply. This creates great incentives for energy efficiency. Customers
seeking greater efficiency are familiar with high tech solutions that intelligently collect and use
data. They are very hospitable to a high tech answer to an energy question.
Building on customers' confidence in technology, SoftTech provides an interface to their system
that enables customers to see how it works and interact with it. Customers can easily see the
quantifiable benefits of SoftTech's system. The firm's product provides a demonstrable return
on the customer's investment that differentiates SoftTech from competitors.
However, with all these successes and advantages, SoftTech has not been as successful as the
founders and investors originally envisioned. Adoption of its products and services has not been
widespread and has been much slower than the founders hoped. The CEO suggests a number of
factors that have hindered their success.
Utilities and ISOs (Independent System Operators) do not provide markets for energy efficiency
products and services. They are principally concerned with generation and are slow to change.
Deregulation, which held the promise of creating new markets, has not progressed significantly
over the last decade.
Customers and industries are conservative and slow to adopt new energy technologies.
According to the CEO, "on the commercial and industrial load size of the business, nobody gets
fired for not saving money, but they do get fired for failing when trying to adopt new
technologies and processes." The risk of potentially losing their job if the technology doesn't
work strongly discourages employees of potential commercial customers from adopting new
technologies when the only benefit they see is to save their employer money on energy use.
Furthermore, potential customers may not even be aware that options exist to lower their energy
usage and costs.
It is not just corporate culture that may discourage managers from seeking innovative technology
for energy conservation. Laws and regulations support generation over efficiency and fossil
fuels over other forms of energy or energy savings.
Another issue was that efforts to raise more capital were very difficult and time-consuming.
Even though SoftTech was initially well-financed, management miscalculated the length of the
sales cycle. SoftTech's management team was surprised at how slow and low adoption of their
products and services have been.
The lessons learned, and the advice the CEO would impart to other entrepreneurs in this business
include:
* understanding the lessons from "Crossing the Chasm" (see Chapter 2);
* minimizing the cost of the technology by having it do the least amount necessary to
accomplish its purpose and by developing additional innovations only as customers
demand them;
* emphasizing more strongly to potential customers regarding the benefits, including cost
benefits, of reducing energy usage;
* understanding the importance and impact of regulations and lawmaking;
* understanding the market and how to add value to customers;
* focusing on larger customers;
* understanding the importance of "holding their hands"; and
* recognizing how much time it takes to make a sale.
Though many of these points may appear to be obvious, Softech's experienced CEO did not fully
appreciate or take these into account until he learned them through the experience of running this
venture.
SoftTech's CEO believes that widespread adoption of "energy management" technology will be
achieved when 80% of enterprises have adopted it to cover over 80% of leasable square footage.
He believes this will take at least ten years, but that it is bound to happen.
4.2 Dharma Power
Dharma Power (not the real name) was founded in early 2003 to use wireless technology to
monitor equipment in power plants and thereby increase their reliability and efficiency. The
company's product is a clean energy technology because it reduces emissions by first reducing
outages and then by increasing the efficiency of equipment in power plants. Dharma's founders
had good connections with owners and operators of power plants, and the company's product
and service reduces their maintenance costs by an order of magnitude.
When the company was founded, there was no competing product or service at a comparable
price point, and the company had a strong competitive advantage through the special expertise of
one of the cofounders. Furthermore, Dharma was able to establish a relationship with the
electric power industry's research consortium. This relationship established the credibility and
underscored the value of Dharma's products.
The company's first customer and trial site was a nuclear power plant. This was considered a
very positive sign for the prospects of the company, as nuclear power plants are considered one
of the most difficult types of customers with which to establish trials. Furthermore, Dharma's
products performed well during the trial and the customer was very satisfied. As a result, the
founders were able to attract several million dollars of investment capital within two years and
build a strong management and engineering team.
Unfortunately, the nuclear power plant market turned out to be unattractive for Dharma. First,
there are relatively few nuclear power facilities. Also, while Dharma's product worked well in
the trial, the cost savings it produced was not significant compared to the budgets of these plants.
These plants are very conservative, reluctant and slow to try new technologies. Furthermore, the
companies running nuclear power plants could afford to create their own suite of the services
comparable to those offered by Dharma. It is possible that Dharma might have done better to
seek its first market among a greater population of companies in greater need of the value of its
services.
Dharma's CEO identified several other reasons why the company did not achieve the sales he
anticipated. These can be bundled into problems understanding the market, particularly the sales
cycle, and the wrong mix of personnel.
First, the market: Dharma initially targeted a single vertical market, which has, in the CEO's
words, the "longest sales cycle in world." And after having entered the nuclear power plant
market, management was unclear which markets to address next. Even in the new markets, the
sales cycle was much longer than anticipated-six to 12 months rather than the projected three
months. Regulations hindered the ability of power plants to quickly adopt new technologies.
And Dharma underestimated the level of inertia and impact of annual budget cycles on their
potential customers. Furthermore, unaware of the impact of these factors, Dharma's
management did not raise enough money to fund operations through long sales cycles.
Second, the personnel mix included too many technical employees and too few skilled sales
personnel. Dharma started off dominated by technical people, with only one person with
significant sales experience. The company was more focused on getting the technology to work
better and on supporting beta customers than on selling the product. Dharma's management
team was uncertain how best to sell their products and services, who would be good at selling, to
what level of management they should be selling, and how to price their product. Another
oversight was a failure to create and secure non-appropriable intellectual property (e.g. patents)
in the course of developing Dharma's technology. The building of such a resource might have
attracted additional investors.
According to the CEO, Dharma's prospect chain looks like that depicted in Figure 4-1. The
figure depicts each of the steps a potential customer must go through before becoming an adopter
of their product, with the time range and average amount of time spent in each stage.
Uninformed Prospects Qualified Sponsor Purchaser
Prospects 1-4wks Prospects 1-26 wks 1-13 wkss(2 wks) 1-26 wks (10 wks) (2 wks)
(4 wks)
Figure 4-1: Dharma's Prospect Chain
Dharma's CEO believes the following factors are most important in determining whether they
will make a sale:
* Meeting a need of the customer's and whether they're solving the customer's problem
* Having high quality sales people and continuously selling to the customer
* Quality of the product they're selling
* Pricing
* Brand recognition
* Having the trust of the customer and having demonstrated expertise in the customer's
business
* Recommendation from the customer's peers (references and word of mouth)
* Delivering the product on a timely basis with high quality service during the sales and
deployment process
* Conforming to the customer's budget process and cycle
Dharma has maintained a competitive advantage with respect to both price and features for its
product and service offerings and Dharma's management believes they should be able to achieve
wide adoption. Having learned the lessons from their early experiences and having developed a
better understanding of their market, coupled with positive feedback and good word of mouth
from their customers, Dharma's management has high hopes for the future...
4.3 Bluestone Power
Bluestone Power (not the real name) was launched in 2003 after the principals participated in an
elite business school's business plan competition. As articulated in their plan, their goal was to
"assemble, install, own and operate standardized, modular, on-site combined-heat-and-power
generation (CHP) systems designed specifically to supply commercial and institutional facilities
in the New England and Middle Atlantic states with reliable, economic, environmentally friendly
electricity and thermal energy." As discussed in Sections 1.1.3 and 2. 1.1, distributed generation
and CHP have many economic benefits.
Figure 4-2 shows a schematic of Bluestone's system, which was designed to use 80% of the
energy from natural gas, which is over twice the efficiency of grid based electricity. The
business model was to finance, install, and operate CHP units primarily at suburban office
buildings. Each CHP unit would deliver approximately 40% of a facility's electricity and
thermal energy. The facility owner would pay Bluestone standard retail prices for the power and
thermal energy. Bluestone would make a significant profit since its costs would be less than
wholesale due to the economies of CHP and to economy of scale. The building owner would
benefit from having the greater reliability of on site power in addition to a connection to the grid
and because Bluestone would pass on part of its profits to them. Everyone would win (except,
perhaps the local utility and owners of central generation).
Bluestone's founders were confident in the competitive advantages of their product. The CHP
system could be mass-produced, lowering the hardware and installation costs. They had a
relationship with a natural gas procurement and logistics company to provide the fuel at a
wholesale cost. Bluestone had a first-mover advantage in entering a large, growing, and
underserved market. In addition, their management team had experience in the critical elements
of energy, manufacturing, information technology, finance, real estate, and risk management.
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Figure 4-2: Bluestone CHP Diagram
Over time, Bluestone gained other advantages as well. They developed a relationship with an
energy project financing company that had the resources and expertise to finance its projects.
Their most significant competitor went out of business due to some strategic blunders, making
available experienced personnel Bluestone could hire and projects that it could take over. The
managers were able to enter negotiations with some large commercial property owners.
Bluestone projected that it would have over $14 Million in revenues and a net income of over
$850,000 within two years. See Figure 4-3.
Pro Forma Income Statement 2004 2005 2006
Revenues $ 235,909 $3,892,493 $14,390,428
COGS
Maintenance & Support $ 19,096 $ 315,084 $ 1,164,856
Insurance & Risk Management $ 8,000 $ 132,000 $ 488,000
Fuel $ 114,372 $1,887,133 $ 6,976,673
Gross Profit $ 94,441 $1,558,276 $ 5,760,899
Operating Expenses
G&A $ 238,456 $ 807,021 $ 1,150,812
Sales Expenses $ 59,188 $ 351,955 $ 1,192,480
EBITDA $ (203,203) $ 399,300 $ 3,417,607
Depreciation Expense $ 67,519 $ 677,715 $ 2,418,644
Interest Income $ 59,938 $ 231,085 $ 504,951
Interest Expense $ 202,407 $1,093,103 $ 3,071,260
Earnings Before Taxes $ (345,671) $ (462,718) $ 851,299
Taxes $ - $ - $ -
Net Income $ (345,671) $- (462,718) $ 851,299
Figure 4-3: Bluestone Financial Projections
However, after four years in business, Bluestone was not able to complete a single project and
had no significant revenues. What happened?
According to the founder and CEO, Bluestone faltered for several reasons. One major cause was
the already low price of retail energy; saving a portion of these expenses was not compelling to
the firm's potential customers. Furthermore, energy costs overall are a small portion of the costs
of most large real estate organizations. Lowering these costs is not perceived to provide a
significant competitive advantage. Therefore, there is no compelling reason to adopt a new
technology to do so.
As with Dharma and SoftTech, issues that stretched out the time required to complete a sale
proved significant. Regulations and policies that support utilities and the centralized grid, such
as standby tariffs and interconnection requirements and charges increased the time required and
raised the cost of doing projects, lowering the economic benefits. The sales cycle was too long
for Bluestone to manage.
According to the CEO their sales cycle looked like that depicted in Figure 4-4. The time ranges
provided are estimates based on their initial experience. However, he admits that even the high
sides of the time ranges proved to be optimistic. After two years of working on some deals,
terms still had not been negotiated.
Figure 4-4: Bluestone's Prospect Chain
Bluestone's management was surprised by "how long it takes," by the "commercial complexity"
of deals, and by the fact that making a sale was dependent more on having a strong and
motivated advocate for the deal within the customer's organization than by the financial
advantages of the deal itself. The founder says that if he were starting the business today, he
would change "most everything." He would have found more seasoned managers with
experience in the industry to join the Bluestone team. The founders would have raised more
initial capital to sustain them through the long sales cycles. They would have been more
strategic in finding their market and would have chosen a more workable business model
(namely, creating two entities, one to develop the projects and another to own the CHP assets).
Bluestone's CEO still believes that CHP is a good business, and that a 25% adoption rate for
economically advantageous projects is achievable (meaning that 150MW could be adopted in the
NY downstate region alone). However, he believes that for this to happen, the regulatory
environment has to be changed to support rather than impede the adoption of CHP.
Rather than the regulatory disincentives of interconnection charges and standby rates,
commercial facility owners should be given incentives to adopt CHP. Rather than subsidizing
fossil fuel production, governments should charge for the externalities of fossil fuel production
through either a cap-and-trade program or carbon taxes. He also notes that it would be
advantageous for interest rates to remain low to ease the financing of CHP projects.
This CEO offers the following advice for any entrepreneur getting into the business. Most
importantly, he emphasizes, "Do your homework." It is important to identify the major risk
characterizing one's specific business. Above all, recognize that "you don't know you don't
know." Among the factors determining business success is choosing the right combination of
markets. Dharma's principals learned this also in their first move into nuclear power plants.
Also, find the right personnel mix: once the markets are identified, pick people who know how to
sell to and serve those companies. An important strategy of good sales people is to find a
champion within any potential customer organization. This CEO also advises that a new firm
should raise sufficient working capital to sustain the business through much longer sales cycles
than expected.
At the end of 2006, Bluestone's assets were sold to a better capitalized venture focusing on a
wide variety of distributed generation and CHP projects and solutions. Bluestone's founder
believes that the lessons he learned through the Bluestone experience will serve him well as an
executive in the new enterprise.
4.4 Conclusion
These three energy technology companies each had some problems unique to its product,
objectives, and potential customer base. However, some common problems can be observed.
First, none of the three anticipated how long the sales cycles would be. Even a very well
capitalized and profitable company like SoftTech found itself surprised at how time consuming it
was to make sales. For this reason, the CEOs advise that a firm should be aware of the need for
sufficient funds to carry it through the first rounds of slow cycles. Second, the objective value of
a product is not enough to sell it. These experiences point to the fact that a start-up firm must
carefully calculate the influences of corporate culture, economic factors, and regulatory
environments to determine whether their product will be truly desirable. Third, the CEOs
counsel that sales ability is at least as important as technical competence once a firm enters the
marketplace. Given a limited amount of funds for salaries, a firm should hire skilled,
experienced sales staff and save the development of more product features until customers signal
that they need them.
5 Description of Simulation Model
This chapter presents a description of the new clean energy technology venture simulation
model. It first provides a clarification of the problem the model addresses and the model
boundaries. Then an overview of the model is provided which is divided into three components:
the firm, the market, and competition. Six sectors of the model will then be described in more
detail: cash flow, labor (including vacancies, hiring, and layoffs), product development, the
market and prospect chain (including sales and marketing effort and word of mouth), customer
support, and pricing. Since the focus of the model is the new venture, most of these sectors
apply primarily to the firm being modeled. The only exceptions are the product development
sector, which incorporates the product development of competition, and pricing, which
incorporates the costs and pricing of the competition. The structure, parameters, and
assumptions built into the model are supported by the literature discussed in Chapter 2 and by the
interviews, the case studies, and the personal experience of the author working with clean energy
technology ventures. The full documentation for the model, including all equations, is presented
in Appendix C.
Though a substantial portion of the model is based on standard system dynamics structures
which model the product development, labor, and market of firms, some aspects are uniquely
and specially adapted to modeling new clean energy technology ventures. To emphasize
attributes and strategies related to new ventures, the model focuses on the cash position of the
firm (working capital), and decisions about hiring and firing are made based on the current level
of working capital. To focus on qualities specific to technology, ventures, a significant portion of
the model is devoted to the product development process (R&D), including a provision for non-
appropriable features (i.e. technologies that have intellectual property protection). To focus the
model towards clean energy ventures, the market sector and prospect chain structure and
parameters of the model are based on the results of interviews with clean energy companies and
are specifically tuned to the market for clean energy products and services. Further, the effects
of clean energy policies are built into the model, and these are described in Chapter 6.
5.1 Clarification of Problem Statement and Model Boundaries
The first step in the development of a system dynamics model is to clarify the problem statement
and define the model boundaries (Hines, 2004; Sterman, 2000). Over the course of this research
and definition of the model, a number of aspects of the research came into focus and defined the
model boundaries:
Subject: The subject of the model is a prototypical clean energy technology venture, where clean
energy is defined as per Chapter 1. The venture is assumed to be an early stage company with a
product that has advanced features that are attractive to and economically beneficial to its
intended customer base, but has not yet been able to generate significant sales or adoptions.
Market: The customer base for the venture is assumed to be industrial or medium to large
commercial enterprises, which can economically make use of the clean energy technology. The
aspect of the power system and markets which will be addressed will be primarily the end users
and facilities, while taking into account the interface to the distribution and transmission
networks.
Geographical Focus: The intended geographical focus of the model and research is the United
States. The model is restricted to the U.S. since regulation and the nature of markets vary from
country to country and all the interviewees were based in the U.S. The model boundary is not
smaller than the U.S. since even small companies selling clean energy technologies often have
national markets, and the capital market is also national in scope.
Time Horizon: The time horizon of the model is a start time of anytime between 1995 and the
present, and duration of twenty years. This is the case since the vast majority of the relevant
experience of the interviewees occurred between 1995 and now, and the majority of changes in
the energy industry due to deregulation occurred before 1995. Due to the long timeframes of
adoption of energy technologies, the duration of the model needed to be as long as possible, but
describing the fortunes of a technology company beyond twenty years would enter into the realm
of pure speculation, as technologies and markets are likely to change significantly over that time
period.
Regulator
, 
Environment and Macro-economic Variables: The regulatory environment and the
effect of macro economic variables, such as the price of fossil fuels are adjustable, but
exogenous to the model. The goal here is to determine how the venture will perform given a
particular economic and regulatory context. The effects of policies that adjust the prices of fossil
fuels and of clean energy product development are examined in Chapter 6.
5.2 Model Overview
The purpose of the simulation model presented here is to better understand the parameters and
strategies that shape the early stage success or failure of a clean energy technology venture. The
focus of the model is a firm that starts with an attractive product, but no customers and few
employees. The model tracks the working capital of the firm, the development of features of the
product, the growth (and contractions) of the firm's labor force, and the status of each of its
prospective and current customers. Figure 1 is an overview of the model highlighting three
sectors: the firm, the market and the competition.
Firm
Positive cash
flow
Comp
Devl
Sale. Mlarketing
Sale's marketingr
efforts
+,
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Figure 5-1: High Level Overview of Model
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5.2.1 The Firm
The key parameter for the firm is its working capital. The firm's working capital determines
how much capability it can develop, and when working capital runs out, the firm fails. The
working capital is increased by investments and by revenue from selling products, and is used to
pay for COGS (the cost of goods sold) and to create and enhance the firm's capabilities,
primarily through hiring engineering and sales and marketing personnel (the salaries of these
personnel in the model incorporate all non-production operating expenses of the new venture).
The engineering personnel create and enhance the features of the firm's product. The sales and
marketing personnel expend effort (e.g. direct selling, creation of marketing material,
advertising, etc.) to increase the attractiveness of the firm's product to the market.
The firm's working capital is affected by two important loops. One is the "positive cash flow
loop" in which working capital spent to develop products and make them attractive to the market
results in sales and revenue to the firm. This process increases working capital and enables the
firm to make the product more attractive and generate even more revenue. The other important
loop is the "running out of money loop" in which working capital is spent to increase the firm's
capabilities, and the more capabilities the firm has, the more working capital it needs to spend.
The "running out of money loop" runs in a much shorter timeframe than the "positive cash flow
loop", creating some of the challenges we will explore in Chapter 6.
5.2.2 The Market
The market sector is composed of a series of stocks representing prospective customers at
various stages in the sales cycle. This structure is based on an extension of the Bass model
described in Chapter 2. Rather than focusing only on the stocks of potential adopters and
adopters, the model developed here disaggregates the stock of potential adopters into more
specific stocks including potential prospects, prospects, hot prospects, and purchasers.
The model also takes into account how the stock of potential prospects is replenished from the
total population ("market growth"). Also, in addition to the influence of advertising and word of
mouth, the model makes it possible to more clearly calibrate the influence of factors such as
price and product features that might make the product more attractive and drive the adoption
cycle. The "word of mouth" loop from the Bass model is still important, but the significance of
Bass's "market saturation" loop may be lessened if the size of the total population is large
relative to the stock of potential prospects, and if there is a positive rate of market growth to
replenish potential prospects.
5.2.3 The Competition
The competition sector of this model includes only a couple of ways in which the firm's
competitors directly affect the firm's behavior and the "competitor" represents an aggregate of
all competitors to the firm. Because the firm under consideration here is a clean energy venture,
it is assumed that the competition is comprised primarily of conventional fossil-fuel-based
energy firms.
The competition's working capital is presumed to be unconstrained compared to the new
venture, and the competition's costs, capabilities, etc., are exogenous to the model. The
endogenous parameters related to the competition are their prices and features. When the new
venture develops additional features, the competition may respond, usually after a delay, by
developing additional features themselves. Also, if the new venture's prices are lower, the
competition may respond by lowering their prices. However the model is parameterized so that
the competition has limited ability to adjust their prices, based on the assumption that the
competition cannot control the price of fossil-fuel-based energy. Of course, if the competition is
able to improve their prices or features, the new venture may respond in kind, creating positive
loops of price and feature competition.
The next sections detail six sectors of the overall model: cash flow, labor (including vacancies,
hiring, and layoffs), product development, the market and prospect chain (including sales and
marketing effort and word of mouth), customer support, and pricing.
5.3 Cash Flow
The cash flow sector of the model is based on aspects of the financial accounting module in
Oliva, Sterman, & Giese (2003).
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See Figure 5-2 for the diagram of the cash flow sector. The primary stock is Working Capital'
(which can be considered as cash). At the outset, its value is based on an Initial Investment, and
it may be increased by Follow On Investments, Grants, and Cash Received From Customers.
Working Capital is decreased by Total Salary Expense and COGS, which are the direct costs to
produce the products that are sold and to provide maintenance for the products. Cash Flow From
Operations is determined by subtracting these Outflows Of Capital from the Cash Received
From Customers. In the absence of investments or grants, these calculations determine whether
Working Capital increases or decreases in any given period.
The other stock represented in the cash flow sector is Accounts Receivable, the amount of cash
owed to the firm by its customers, which is increased by Billing and decreased by Cash Received
From Customers, and by Defaults on AR. The equation for Billing is:
(4) Billing = Quantity Per Purchase * Adoption Rate * Initial Payment +
Maintenance Billing
(5) Initial Payment = Price * Initial Payment Fraction
(6) Maintenance Billing = Adopters * Quantity Per Purchase * Price * Maintenance Fraction *
Maintenance Period
The Initial Payment Fraction is the fraction of the price the customer pays up front for the
product, and the Maintenance Fraction is the fraction of the price the customer pays per
Maintenance Period as long as that firm continues to use the product. These two fractions do not
need to sum to one, as in the case where the customer pays the full price of the product up front
plus an annual 20% maintenance charge, which are the default parameters based on the practice
of firms interviewed. Defaults On AR occur when a customer fails or refuses to pay a bill. The
equation is:
(7) Defaults On AR = Accounts Receivable * Default Rate
3 For ease of reference for the reader, parameters of the model (which can be seen in the diagrams and tables to
follow) will be capitalized in the text
(8) Default Rate = Normal Default Fraction *
Effect of Cust Support on Default Rate Fn(Normalized Cust Support) *
Effect of Cust Financial Condition on Default Rate Fn(Normalized Cust Fincl Condition)
The Default Rate is the Normal Default Fraction (the usual fraction of customers who would
default) modified by the current level of customer support and the financial condition of
customers.
See Figure 5-3 for the Effect of Cust Support on Default Rate Fn. With no customer support, a
very large percentage of customers default, with normal customer support the normal default
fraction applies, and with very high customer support only 25% of the normal default rate
applies.
Figure 5-3: Effect of Cust Support on Default Rate Fn
See Figure 5-4 for the Effect of Cust Financial Condition on Default Rate function. If customers
are bankrupt then a very large percentage of them default, if customers are in normal financial
condition, the normal default fraction applies, and if customers are in extraordinarily good
financial condition, then 1% of the normal default fraction applies.
S0.8 1 1.2
Nornadized Cust Fncl Condition
Figure 5-4: Effect of Cust Financial Condition on Default Rate Fn
See Table 5-1 for the parameters used in the cash flow sector of the model, their default values,
and the range of values used for sensitivity analysis in Chapter 6. As can be seen in Figure 2-3,
startup and seed VC investments have averaged approximately $3M the last 10 years (which
establishes the default Initial Investment). The model also includes placeholders for subsequent
investments and grants that are set to zero by default. The default parameters assume that
customers pay for the product up front (Initial Payment Fraction of 100%), and then pay a
standard 20% annual maintenance charge for as long as they are using the product (Maintenance
Fraction). Other models for payment are discussed in Section 7.2.4. The model assumes that
one unit of the product is purchased at a time (Quantity Per Purchase). The default receivable
delay (how long it takes for payments to be received once billed) is 45 days, which is a common
delay when working with larger customers. The Normalized Cust Fincl Condition represents
how capable customers are of paying their bills, and the value of one represents normal or
average conditions (during a recession this value could be less than one, and during a boom the
value could be greater than one). The Normal Default Fraction is the number of customers who
normally default on paying their bills per month and at 0.002 (-2.4% of customers per year), is
relatively low, but consistent with a strong commercial customer base.
The result of sensitivity analysis on the receivable delay and financial condition of customers is
in Section 6.3.4.
Parameter Value Units Min Max
Initial Investment 3.00E+06 Dollars 1E+06 1E+07
lnv2 Amt 0 Dollars/Month
Inv2 Time 12 Months
Inv3 Amt 0 Dollars/Month
Inv3 Time 24 Months
lnv4 Amt 0 Dollars/Month
Inv4 Time 36 Months
Grants 0 Dollars/Month
Initial Payment Fraction 1 Dmnl 0 1
Maintenance Fraction 0.2 Dmnl 0 1
Quantity Per Purchase 1 Units/Prospect
Avg Receivable Delay 1.5 Months 0.1 12
Normalized Cust Fincl
Condition 1 Dimensionless 0.1 10
Normal Default Fraction 0.002 1/Month
Table 5-1: Parameters Used in Cash Flow Sector
5.4 Product Development
The product development sector of the model is based on the inventory management sector
described in section 18.1 and figure 19-5 of Sterman (2000). The stocks and most of the
parameters in this sector of the model apply to both the firm and the aggregate competitor (i.e.
both the firm and the competitor have Features Under Development that are increased in
response to the activities of the other). See Figure 5-5 for a diagram of the product development
sector, and Table 5-2 for the parameter values for this sector.
5.4.1 Features
The primary stock of this sector is Features, which is a representation of the characteristics of the
firm's product that are attractive to customers. Features can be appropriable or non-
appropriable. Appropriable features are relatively easy for competitors to copy and tend to make
less of a difference to customers when they compare products. Non-appropriable features are
assumed to be protected in some way (e.g. through patents or trade secrets) and are assumed to
be much more valuable to customers. The numeric values for Features are arbitrary and are only
meaningful in comparison to each other. It is assumed that the venture starts off with superior
features compared to competition, and that translates in the parameters to a 10% advantage in
appropriable Initial Features and a 100% advantage in non-appropriable Initial Features.
The Feature Value is given by:
(9) Feature Value[company] = Features[company,appropriable] +
Features[company,nonappropriable] * Nonappropriable Feature Multiple
The default value of the Nonappropriable Feature Multiple is 100, which signifies the far greater
value and differentiation ability of non-appropriable features.
Normalized Features is a representation of how the firm's features compare to the competition,
and is simply:
(10) Normalized Features = Feature Value[self] / Feature Value[competitor]
All features obsolesce over time based on the Average Feature Lifetime, which is assumed to be
two years for appropriable features, and ten years for non-appropriable features:
(1 1) Feature Obsolescence Rate[company,featuretype] =
Features[company,featuretype] / Avg Feature Lifetime[company,featuretype]
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5.4.2 Desired Feature Completion Rate
To drive the development of new features, both the firm and the competitors have a Desired
Feature Completion Rate:
(12) Desired Feature Completion Rate[company, featuretype] =
Feature Shortfall[company,featuretype] /
Desired Time to Catch Up Features[company, featuretype] +
Perceived Feature Obsolescence Rate[company, featuretype]
(13) Feature Shortfall[company, featuretype] = Desired Features[company,featuretype]-
Features [company, featuretype]
(14) Desired Features[self, featuretype] = Features[competitor,featuretype] *
Desired Feature Ratio[self, featuretype]
(15) Perceived Feature Obsolescence Rate[company, featuretype] =
Feature Obsolescence Rate[company,featuretype]
As per equation (14), each firm desires its products features to be better than those of the
competition (assuming that the Desired Feature Ratio is greater than 1). The venture starts with
a desire to have features 25% better than competition and competition starts with a desire for its
features to be 10% better (reflecting that the competition is more mature and does not react
strongly to new participants in the market). If the features are not sufficiently better, a Feature
Shortfall is created (equation (13)), which the firm attempts to remedy in the Desired Time to
Catch Up Features. As per the Desired Feature Ratio, the new venture is much more reactive
than competition and by default wishes to catch up features in two or four months as opposed to
six or twelve months for the more conservative competition. In addition, each firm desires to
develop new features to compensate for features that management perceives to be obsolescing
(which for the purpose of this model we assume to be the actual rate of obsolescence - equation
(15)).
5.4.3 Desired Feature Development Rate and Desired Engineers
To achieve the Desired Feature Completion rate, the firm and competitors have a Desired
Feature Development Rate, which is the desired completion rate plus adjustments for features
already under development (FUD) and for features being abandoned (Abandonment Rate):
(16) Desired Feature Development Rate [company, featuretype] = MAX(O,
Desired Feature Completion Rate[company, featuretype] +
Abandonment Rate[company,featuretype] +
Adjustment for FUD[company,featuretype])
(17) Adjustment for FUD[company, featuretype] = (Desired FUD[company,featuretype] -
Product Features Under Development[company, featuretype]) /
FUD Adjustment Time[company, featuretype]
(18) Desired FUD[company,featuretype] =
Desired Feature Completion Rate[company, featuretype] *
Avg Feature Devl Time[company,featuretype]
The Desired Feature Development Rate determines the Desired Engineering Effort for Feature
Development for the firm. This is based in part on the Avg Feature Devl Time which by default
is two and 12 months for the venture and four and 24 months for the competition to reflect the
increased agility of a startup compared to entrenched competition. This result is the basis for
calculating the number of Desired Engineers that the firm would need on staff to develop the
features needed. Since we do not model the labor force of the competition endogenously, we
only calculate the Desired Engineers for the firm:
(19) Desired Engineers = (Desired Engineering Effort for Feature Development +
Desired Engineering Effort for Cust Support) / Productive Eng Work Month
(20) Desired Engineering Effort for Feature Development =
Feature Development Rate[self appropriable] *
Eng Hrs Required per Feature[self,appropriable] +
Desired Feature Development Rate[self,nonappropriable] *
Eng Hrs Required per Feature[self,nonappropriable]
Note that the number of Desired Engineers also takes into account those needed for customer
support and the productivity of the engineers. The Desired Engineering Effort for Feature
Development accommodates the different development times needed for appropriable and non-
appropriable features. It is assumed that non-appropriable features take considerably more
engineering hours to develop than appropriable features for both the venture and its competitors.
5.4.4 Product Features under Development
The Desired Feature Development Rate and the engineering resources available drive the input
to the stock of Product Features Under Development:
(21) Feature Start Rate[company,featuretype] = MIN
(Feasible Feature Devl Rate[company, featuretype],
Desired Feature Development Rate[company, featuretype])
(22) Feasible Feature Devl Rate[company,featuretype] =
Engineering Productive Effort for Development[company,featuretype] /
Eng Hrs Required per Feature[company, featuretype]
(23) Engineering Productive Effort for Development[self,nonappropriable]
Nonappropriable Devl Fraction *
(Effective Engineering Effort - Engineering Effort for Cust Support)
(24) Engineering Productive Effort for Development[self,appropriable]
(1-Nonappropriable Devl Fraction) *
(Effective Engineering Effort-Engineering Effort for Cust Support)
The Nonappropriable Devl Fraction models the management decision about what percentage of
engineering resources to devote to intellectual property development, and is by default, 50%.
The Effective Engineering Effort is discussed in Section 5.5.2
The Engineering Productive Effort for Development for the competition is exogenous to the
model, and is assumed to be very large compared to that of the firm being modeled (since the
competition is assumed to be a large incumbent company).
The Features Under Development stock is itself a third-order structure that represents a multi-
stage development process in which each of the three stages takes 1/3 of the total average feature
development time to complete and during which features may be abandoned at any of the three
stages. The total Feature Abandonment Fraction for all features is assumed to be 10%. See
Figure 5-6 for a depiction of this structure. The outflow of Product Features Under Development
is the Feature Completion Rate, which in turn is the inflow to the stock of Features.
Table 5-2 contains the parameters used in the product development sector of the model, their
default values, and the ranges of values used for the sensitivity analysis in Chapter 6.

Parameter Value Units Min Max
Initial Features[self,appropriable] 110 Features 0 200
Initial Features[self, nonappropriable] 4 Features 0 20
Initial Features[competitor,appropriable] 100 Features 0 200
Initial Features[competitor,nonappropriable] 2 Features 0 20
Avg Feature Devl Time[self,appropriable] 2 Months .25 12
Avg Feature DevI Time[self,nonappropriable] 12 Months 1 120
Avg Feature Devi Time[competitor,appropriable] 4 Months .25 12
Avg Feature Devi Time
[competitor, nonappropriable] 24 Months 1 120
Avg Feature Lifetime[self,appropriable] 24 Months .25 60
Avg Feature Lifetime[self,nonappropriable] 120 Months 2 240
Avg Feature Lifetime[competitor,appropriable] 24 Months .25 60
Avg Feature Lifetime[competitor,nonappropriable] 120 Months 2 240
Desired Feature Ratio[self,appropriable] 1.25 Dmnl 1 10
Desired Feature Ratio[self,nonappropriable] 1.25 DmnI 1 10
Desired Feature Ratio[competitor,appropriable] 1.1 Dmni 1 10
Desired Feature Ratio
[competitor, nonappropriable] 1.1 Dmnl 1 10
Desired Time to Catch Up Features
[self,appropriable] 2 Months .25 24
Desired Time to Catch Up Features
[self, nonappropriable] 4 Months 1 120
Desired Time to Catch Up Features
[competitor,appropriable] 6 Months .25 60
Desired Time to Catch Up Features
[competitor, nonappropriable] 12 Months 1 240
Eng Hrs Required per Feature
[self,appropriable] 350 Hours*Person/Feature 35 3500
Eng Hrs Required per Feature
[self,nonappropriable] 35000 Hours*Person/Feature 350 1820000
Eng Hrs Required per Feature
[competitor, appropriable] 350 Hours*Person/Feature 35 3500
Eng Hrs Required per Feature
[competitor, nonappropriable] 35000 Hours*Person/Feature 350 1820000
FUD Adjustment Time[self,appropriable] 2 Months .1 36
FUD Adjustment Time[self,nonappropriable] 2 Months .1 36
FUD Adjustment Time[competitor,appropriable] 2 Months .1 36
FUD Adjustment Time
[competitor,nonappropriable] 2 Months .1 36
Feature Abandonment Fraction[self,appropriable] 0.10 Dmnl 0 .9
Feature Abandonment Fraction
[self, nonappropriable] 0.10 Dmnl 0 .9
Feature Abandonment Fraction
[competitor, appropriable] 0.10 Dmnl 0 .9
Feature Abandonment Fraction
[competitor,nonappropriable] 0.10 Dmnl 0 .9
Table 5-2: Parameters for Product Development Sector
5.5 Labor
The labor sector of the model is closely based on the labor supply chain introduced in Section
19.1 of Sterman (2000). Two types of employees are represented in the model: engineers and
sales people. Engineers are considered to be employees with any technical or product
development responsibilities including customer and technical support, engineering or
technology management and strategy positions, etc. Sales people are considered employees with
any sales or marketing responsibilities, including sales or marketing management, production of
materials, etc. Administrative employees (from the CEO to support personnel) are considered to
be split up between the engineering and sales functions (e.g. a CEO who focuses on technical
strategy and product development, but spends 25% of her time meeting with prospective
customers may be considered 75% an engineer and 25% a sales person). The stocks in this
sector of the model are Engineering Vacancies, Sales Vacancies, Engineers, Engineer
Experience, Sales Force and Sales Experience. Two key parameters are Max Eng Hires and Max
Sales Hires, which are calculated based on the Working Capital available to hire or maintain the
workforce, and which constrain hiring or generate layoffs.
5.5.1 Engineering and Sales Vacancies
The engineering and sales vacancies structures are based largely on the Inventory-workforce
model in Sterman (2000). See Figure 5-7 for a diagram of the structure, which is the same for
engineers and for the sales force, and see Table 5-3 and Table 5-4 for the parameter values. In
summary, it is a stock management structure applied to human resources. In the case of
engineers, Desired Engineers (see Section 5.4.3), adjusted by the current stock of engineers, the
Engineering Attrition Rate, and constrained by Max Engineering Hires (see Section 5.5.3), and
influenced by the Engineers Adjustment Time and Expected Time to Fill Engineering Vacancies
determines the Desired Engineering Vacancies. As a simplification, the expected time to fill
vacancies is set to the average time to fill vacancies, which is 2.5 months (in line with the
experience of startup companies, though this can vary widely based on the state of the labor
market). The adjustment time is a management parameter, and is set to 6 months by default.
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The Desired Engineering Vacancies, adjusted by the current stock of Engineering Vacancies and
the Engineering Vacancy Adjustment Time, determines the Desired Engineering Vacancy
Creation Rate (or in the case of a desire to reduce vacancies, the Desired Engineering Vacancy
Cancellation Rate). These rates flow into (or out of) the stock of Engineering Vacancies which
is diminished by the Engineering Hiring Rate as vacancies are filled in the Average Time to Fill
Engineering Vacancies. An equivalent structure and logic applies to Sales Vacancies, which is
driven by the Desired Sales Force, and the "output" of which is the Sales Hiring Rate.
5.5.2 Engineers, Sales Force and Experience
The engineering and sales force labor structures, which take into account the experience of the
labor forces, is based on the labor coflow structure detailed in Section 12.2 of Sterman (2000).
See Figure 5-8 for a diagram of the structure, which is the same for Engineers and for Sales
Force. The case of Engineers is used here to describe the structure.
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As described in Section 5.5.1, the filling of vacancies drives the inflow to the Engineers stock.
The stock is diminished by the Engineering Attrition Rate, which is controlled by the Fractional
Engineering Attrition Rate, the average percent of Engineers that leave the firm every month. It
is also diminished by Engineer Lay Offs, which is driven by Max Engineering Hires, described
in Section 5.5.3.
The Engineer Experience stock is a coflow of the Engineers stock that represents the average job
experience of Engineers employed by the firm. When Engineers are hired, the Avg Experience
of New Eng Hires is added to the stock for each new hire, and when Engineers are laid off or
leave due to attrition, the current Avg Engineer Experience is removed from the stock for each
engineer lost. Engineering Experience increases over time as engineers gain experience from
working at the firm. Engineering Experience also increases for each adoption of the product,
assuming that the product development and customer support personnel gain valuable experience
from working with customers who are using the product in the field. In the experience of the
author and those interviewed for the research, the experience gain from working with customers
is considerably more valuable than experience gained from working on the product in isolation.
When working with customers, engineers learn which features, and which aspects of the features
are truly valuable, which are less necessary, and which additional features are needed most. That
information enables them to be much more effective at developing new features for the product.
That idea is reflected in the parameterization of the model.
The Effective Engineering Effort, referenced in Section 5.4.4, is derived from the Engineers and
Engineer Experience stocks:
(25) Effective Engineering Effort = Engineering Effort *
Engineering Experience Productivity Multiplier
(26) Engineering Effort = Engineers * Eng Work Month
(27) Engineering Experience Productivity Multiplier =
(Avg Engineer Experience / Engineering Experience Reference) ^
(LN (1 + Eng Productivity Change Per Double Experience) / LN(2))
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(28) Avg Engineer Experience = Engineer Experience / Engineers4
The equation for Engineering Experience Productivity Multiplier is based on learning curve
theory referenced in Section 12.2 of Sterman (2000) and derived in Zangwill & Kantor (1998).
The theory posits that productivity will rise by a given amount for every doubling of experience
from an initial reference value.
The Sales Force and Sales Experience structures are analogous to the Engineering structures,
except that extra sales experience is gained per purchase of the product rather than at the time of
adoption. The distinction between purchase and adoption is explained in Section 5.6. In an
analogous fashion to the above, based on the experience of the author and those interviewed for
the research, sales and marketing personnel gain much more valuable experience when they
interact with customers and achieve a sale (i.e. a purchase). And Sales Experience becomes the
basis for Sales & Marketing Effort:
(29) Sales & Mktg Effort = Sales Force * Sales Work Month *
Sales Experience Productivity Multiplier
(30) Sales Experience Productivity Multiplier = MIN(Max Sales Productivity Multiplier,
(Avg Sales Experience / Sales experience reference) ^
(LN(1 + Sales Productivity Change Per Double Experience) / LN(2)))
(31) Avg Sales Experience = Sales Experience / Sales Force&
As above, the Sales Experience Productivity Multiplier is derived from a learning-curve equation
based on Avg Sales Experience. The only distinction is that the multiplier is limited to a
maximum value. (There is only so much productivity gain the sales force can have based on
experience.)
5.5.3 Runway: Maximum Engineering and Sales Hires
An attribute that distinguishes this model from others is that hiring is constrained by, and layoffs
are generated by, the level of working capital in the firm. Given that this is an early stage
technology venture, it is assumed that the company cannot easily borrow money. If working
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Assuming Engineers > 0
5 Assuming Sales Force > 0
capital runs out, the company will not be able to pay its bills or its employees, and the firm will
be bankrupt. As long as the firm is not generating positive cash flow, management must be
aware of the firm's "runway" - the amount of time the firm has, given its working capital and the
rate of negative cash flow, before the firm will run out of money:
(32) Months of Runway = Working Capital / Burn Rate
(33) Burn Rate = -Cash Flow From Operations 6
The model assumes that management must have a minimum runway before it can allow any new
hires (Min Runway In Order To Hire). The default value is 12 months, meaning that the firm
must have more than 12 months worth of working capital at its current rate of negative cash flow
before it will allow any new hires. The model also assumes that at an absolute minimum
runway, management will lay off employees in order to maintain Min Runway. The default
value is three months; when the firm has less than three months of working capital left at its
current rate of burn, it must lay off employees to reduce burn enough to preserve a viable level of
working capital. The Max Hires per Month is then derived primarily from the Change in Burn
Rate Required and the current Avg Salary
(34) Max Hires Per Month = MIN(
Change in Workforce Required / Months for Runway Adjustment,
Total Labor * Maximum Workforce Growth Rate)7
(35) Change in Workforce Required = Change in Salary Required / Avg Salary
(36) Change in Salary Required = Burn Rate * (Change in Burn Rate Required-I)
(37) Change in Burn Rate Required = IF THEN ELSE(
Months of Runway > Min Runway In Order To Hire,
Months of Runway / Min Runway In Order To Hire,
IF THEN ELSE(Months of Runway < Min Runway,
Months of Runway / (Min Runway+ I), 1))
" When cash flow is negative Burn Rate will be positive. If cash flow is positive. Burn Rate is set to be a very small
number, and therefore Months of Runway will be a very large number
7 Hiring is constrained to not grow faster than a maximum rate
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The Change in Burn Rate Required is based on the notion that if the firm has more than enough
months of capital to burn, it can adjust the burn rate up. However, if the firm has less than Min
Runway months of capital, it must adjust the burn rate down. Otherwise it should not adjust the
burn rate at all. Once management knows how much to adjust the burn rate, and assuming that
the burn rate is primarily driven by salaries (which take into account all the operating costs of the
firm), managers will know how much to adjust salary expenses, and therefore how much to
adjust the workforce (Max Hires Per Month can be positive or negative).
Once management knows how much to adjust the workforce, it is necessary to split the
constraint into Engineering and Sales. If the firm is hiring, the split will be based on the amount
of engineering or sales people management wants to hire; if the firm is laying employees off, the
split will be based on the current stock of engineers and sales people:
(38) Max Eng Hires = IF THEN ELSE(Max Hires Per Month>0,
Max Hires Per Month * Desired Eng Proportion,
Max Hires Per Month * Eng Proportion)
(39) Desired Eng Proportion = Desired Eng Hiring Rate / Desired Hiring Rate"
(40) Eng Proportion = Engineers / Total Labor
(41) Desired Hiring Rate = Desired Eng Hiring Rate + Desired Sales Hiring Rate
(42) Total Labor = Engineers + Sales Force
(43) Max Sales Hires = IF THEN ELSE(Max Hires Per Month>0,
Max Hires Per Month * Desired Sales Proportion,
Max Hires Per Month * Sales Proportion)
(44) Desired Sales Proportion = Desired Sales Hiring Rate / Desired Hiring Rate9
(45) Sales Proportion = Sales Force / Total Labor
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Assuming Desired Hiring Rate > 0
Assuming Desired Hiring Rate > 0
Sections 5.5.1 and 5.5.2 show how the Max Eng Hires and Max Sales Hires constrain the
respective hiring rates. These calculations may increase vacancies, or set vacancies to zero and
increase the number of layoffs if the maximum hiring values are negative:
(46) Constrained Eng Hiring Rate = MIN(Desired Eng Hiring Rate, Max Eng Hires)
(47) Desired Eng Vacancies MAX(O, Expected Time to Fill Eng Vacancies *
Constrained Eng Hiring Rate)
(48) Desired Eng Lay Off Rate = MAX(0, -Constrained Eng Hiring Rate)
This formulation represents a rational management strategy that improves the chances that the
firm will survive a negative cash flow for an extended period of time. It enables the firm to cut
down on expenses during lean times, and then increase expenses (and production) when the cash
is available. Of course, this assumes that management is willing to engage in layoffs
preemptively, but when the alternative is bankruptcy, layoffs are the better alternative.
See Table 5-2 for the parameters used in the labor sector of the model, their default values, and
the minimum and maximum values used for sensitivity analysis in Chapter 6.
Parameter Value Units Min Max
Initial Avg Engineering Experience 10000 Hours 1000 40000
Avg Experience Of New Eng Hires 2000 Hours 450 20000
Eng Productivity Change Per Double Experience 0.33 Dmnl 0.01 0.67
Engineering Experience Reference 2000 Hours 450 20000
Exp Gain Per Adoption 910 Hours*Person/Prospect 0 4000
Initial Engineers 4 Persons 0 20
Eng Work Month 175 Hours/Month 100 300
Eng Vacancy Adjustment Time 1 Months 0.10 6.00
Eng Vacancy Cancellation Time 1 Months 0.10 6.00
Engineers Adjustment Time 6 Months 1.00 12.00
Fractional Eng Attrition Rate 0.02 1/Month 0.00 0.20
Avg Time to Fill Eng Vacancies 2.50 Months 0.25 12.00
Average Layoff Time 2.00 Months 0.10 4.00
Table 5-3: Engineering Labor Parameters
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Parameter Value Units Min Max
Initial Avg Sales Experience 1,500 Hours 0 10,000
Avg Experience Of New Sales Hires 1,000 Hours 0 10,000
Exp Gain Per Purchase 910 Hours*Person/Prospect 0.00 4,000
Sales experience reference 2,000 Hours 450 5,000
Max Sales Productivity Multiplier 10 Dmnl 2.00 20
Sales Productivity Change Per Double Experience 0.40 Dmnl 0.01 0.80
Initial Sales Force 2 Persons 0.00 20
Sales Work Month 175 Hours/Month 100 300
Avg Time to Fill Sales Vacancies 2.5 Months 0.25 12
Sales Average Layoff Time 2 Months 0.10 4
Sales Force Adjustment Time 6 Months 1.00 12
Sales Fractional Attrition Rate 0.02 1/Month 0.00 0.20
Sales Vacancy Adjustment Time 1 Months 0.10 6
Sales Vacancy Cancellation Time 1 Months 0.10 6
Table 5-4: Sales Labor Parameters
Parameter Value Units Min Max
Avg Salary 17000 Dollars/(Month*Person)
Maximum Workforce Growth Rate 0.25 1/Months 0 1
Min Runway 3 Months 0 36
Min Runway In Order To Hire 12 Months 0 48
Months for Runway Adjustment 2 Months 0.1 12
Table 5-5: Runway Parameters
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5.6 The Market and Prospect Chain
As discussed in Chapter 2 and in the introduction to this chapter, the market sector of the model
is based on the Bass diffusion model (F. M. Bass, 1969). The model has been extended to more
closely approximate the sales cycle of the clean energy technology companies investigated in the
interview phase of this research, and those presented in the case studies in Chapter 3. The
parameters for this sector of the model are presented in Table 5-6 and described below. See
Figure 5-9 for a depiction of the stocks and flows of the prospect chain.
The stocks of prospects along the chain are based on the sales experiences of the companies
interviewed; the research indicated points at which prospects get "stuck" and where prospects are
lost. The units of the stocks, which are "prospects," represent commercial enterprises that are
capable of purchasing and adopting the product of the clean energy venture being modeled. The
primary driver for prospects to move along the prospect chain is the sales and marketing effort of
the new venture, which is made more or less productive by the attributes of the firm's product as
compared to the products of competitors, marketing effort, word of mouth, and customer
support.
Following Figure 5-9 is a description of the stocks.
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Prospect stocks include:
* Total Population: This is the group of firms that can possibly adopt the clean energy
product or a variation of the product at some point in the future. It is assumed that there
are many firms that fit in this category, and this is a much larger stock than the initial
market for the product. If firms continue to flow from this stock to become "Potential
Prospects" (market growth) then market saturation will not become a factor for the
purposes of this model. The rise and fall of Total Population as firms are created and fail
are factors exogenous to the model. This will have little effect as long as the resulting
percent change in total population remains low.
* Potential Prospects: These are firms that are capable of adopting the current version of
the product. The new venture has identified these firms and chosen to apply sales effort
to persuade them to learn more about the product.
* Prospects: These are firms that are capable of adopting the product and have been made
aware of the product by the venture, and have not ruled out adopting it. The new venture
has decided to apply sales effort to persuade these firms to trial the product or otherwise
to learn enough about it to be able to make the decision to adopt it or not.
* Hot Prospects: These are firms that have expressed interest in adopting the product and
are either actively trialing it or evaluating it in some other fashion.
* Purchasers: These are firms that have purchased the product, but have not yet started
using it.
* Adopters: These are firms that have purchased and are actively using the product.
* Lost Prospects: These are firms that were prospects (anywhere from potential prospects
to adopters), but then lost interest in adopting the product or actively made the decision
not to adopt.
The nature and descriptions of the flows between the stocks are primarily based on Rogers'
innovation-decision process (Rogers, 2003). The only distinctions are that the units of adoption
for the new model are firms instead of individuals, and a flow from total population has been
added at the first stage of the process.
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5.6.1 Increase in Potential Prospects
The flow out of Total Population into Potential Prospects ("Increase in Potential Prospects") is
governed by the rate of firms becoming capable of adopting the clean energy technology product
and by efforts of the new venture to extend its addressable market.
(49) Increase In Potential Prospects = Total Population *
Increase In Addressable Market * Fraction Of Firms Capable Of Adopting
(50) Increase In Addressable Market =
Effect of Marketing Effort on Market Size Fn(Normalized Marketing)
(51) Normalized Marketing = Marketing Effort / Desired Marketing Effort
(52) Fraction Of Firms Capable Of Adopting = Initial Capab of Firms to Adopt *
Effect Of Features On Capab of Adoption Fn(SUM(Features [company! ,featuretype!]) /
SUM(Initial Features[company!, featuretype!])) +
Increase Of Capab Of Firms To Adopt Due To Policy
The increase in addressable market for the venture is dependent on the firm's marketing effort.
See Figure 5-10 for Effect of Marketing Effort on Market Size Fn. With no marketing effort,
there is no increase in the addressable market due to marketing, with normal marketing effort the
increase is 0.1%, and as marketing effort increases the effect on the market size increases at a
decreasing rate.
Figure 5-10: Effect of Marketing Effort on Market Size Fn
111
The Fraction Of Firms Capable Of Adopting is dependent on the sum of the features of the new
venture and its competitors since this is when the potential customers are not looking at any one
firm's products, but are just becoming capable of adopting the technology in general. And as the
ratio between the current level of features and the initial features increases, the effect on the
fraction of firms capable of adopting increases on a linear basis. The features of the product of
the particular venture being modeled only become more important than the features of
competitors when the firm becomes a Prospect of the venture.
5.6.2 Knowledge Rate
The flow from Potential Prospects to Prospects ("Knowledge Rate") is based on the knowledge
stage of Rogers' innovation decision process. At this point, the prospective customer gains an
understanding of the clean energy technology product. This rate is dependent on sales and
marketing effort and attributes of the product that affect the productivity of the sales effort:
(53) Knowledge Rate = Norm Knowledge Rate *
Prospect Conversion Fn(Potential Knowledge From Sales Effort / Norm Knowledge Rate)
(54) Potential Prospect Loss Rate = MAX(O, Norm Knowledge Rate - Knowledge Rate)
(55) Norm Knowledge Rate = Potential Prospects / Avg Potential Prospect Lifetime
(56) Potential Knowledge From Sales Effort = Knowledge Sales Effort *
Knowledge Productivity Of Sales Effort
(57) Knowledge Sales Effort = Fraction effort for knowledge * Sales Effort
(58) Sales Effort = Sales & Mktg Effort - Marketing Effort
(59) Knowledge Productivity Of Sales Effort = MIN(Max Knowledge Productivity From Sales,
Sales Experience Productivity Multiplier * Max Knowledge Productivity From Sales *
Effect Of Features On Knowledge Efficiency *
Effect Of Price On Knowledge Efficiency * Effect Of Marketing On Knowledge Efficiency
* Effect Of Word Of Mouth On Knowledge Efficiency)
The Norm Knowledge Rate is the rate at which prospects leave the stock of Potential Prospects
(where they stay, on average, the Avg Potential Prospect Lifetime). As per equation (54), if the
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Knowledge Rate is less than the Norm Knowledge Rate (i.e. Potential Prospects are becoming
Prospects at too slow a rate), they become Lost Prospects at the Potential Prospect Loss Rate.
When the value of the Potential Knowledge From Sales Effort rate is low compared to the Norm
Knowledge Rate, the Knowledge Rate will equal the Potential Knowledge From Sales Effort.
However, as the rate of Potential Knowledge From Sales Effort approaches the Norm
Knowledge Rate, the Prospect Conversion Fn tempers its rise so that the Knowledge Rate will
not equal the Norm Knowledge Rate until the Potential Knowledge From Sales Effort is 150% of
the Normal Rate (See equation (53) and Figure 5-11).
Figure 5-11: Prospect Conversion Fn
The Potential Knowledge From Sales Effort is the productive effort being applied by the new
venture to convert Potential Prospects to Prospects. As per equation (56), it is simply the product
of the sales effort being applied towards this step in the sales cycle and the productivity of that
effort. As per equations (57) and (58), the Knowledge Sales Effort is the portion of the total
sales effort that is being applied to convert Potential Prospects to Prospects; the total sales effort
is the total sales and marketing effort (equation (27)) minus the Marketing Effort.
The Knowledge Productivity Of Sales Effort can be no larger than the Max Knowledge
Productivity From Sales--the maximum number of Prospects that can be gained per person hour
of sales effort. The Sales Experience Productivity Multiplier (equation (28)) can increase or
decrease the productivity of sales effort, depending on the experience of the venture's sales
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force. Four additional attributes of the venture's product and efforts can affect how well the
product can be sold:
(60) Effect Of Features On Knowledge Efficiency =
Effect Of Features On Knowledge Efficiency Fn(Normalized Features)
(61) Normalized Features: = Feature Value[self] / Feature Value[competitor]
(62) Effect Of Price On Knowledge Efficiency =
Effect Of Price On Knowledge Efficiency Fn(Normalized Price)
(63) Normalized Price: = Price / Competitor Price
(64) Effect Of Word of Mouth On Knowledge Efficiency =
Effect Of Word of Mouth On Knowledge Efficiency Fn(Normalized Word of Mouth)
(65) Normalized Word of Mouth: = (Contact Rate * Potential Prospects * Adopters /
Total Population) / Word of Mouth Reference
(66) Effect Of Marketing On Knowledge Efficiency =
Effect Of Marketing On Knowledge Efficiency Fn(Normalized Marketing)
(67) Normalized Marketing: = Marketing Effort / Desired Marketing Effort
The selection of these attributes, their default values, and the functions that translate the
normalized values to efficiency values are based on the interviews with clean energy
entrepreneurs. Extremely poor values of important attributes (such as a product with no
attractive features or a price that is many times that of the competition, or no marketing effort)
result in extremely low efficiency, and therefore an extremely low number of prospects. Very
good values for these parameters such as a product with better features than the competition, a
lower price, a good marketing effort, and good word of mouth result in very high efficiency,
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which can result in achieving close to the maximum productivity of converting Potential
Prospects to Prospects.
See Figure 5-12 for the Effect Of Features On Knowledge Efficiency Fn. The effect has a
classic S-shaped curve. If the product has no features, the sales productivity will be zero. Then
as features increase, the effect on sales productivity will rise at an increasing rate until when
normalized features are one (product has same features as competition), and sales productivity
will be 50% of its value. Then as features increase, the effect on sales productivity will increase
at a decreasing rate until the product has twice the features of the competition at which point
sales productivity will not be reduced at all.
See Figure 5-13 for the Effect Of Price On Knowledge Efficiency Fn. The effect is analogous to
that of features, except in the reverse direction. If the price is zero, then sales productivity will
be at its maximum value. Then as the price increases, the sales productivity falls at an increasing
rate until the point at which the normalized price is one (product has the same price as
competition), where sales productivity is reduced by 50%. Then as price increases further, sales
productivity falls at a decreasing rate, until a point at which the price is 10 times that of the
competition and sales productivity is zero.
The effect of word of mouth (Figure 5-14) and marketing (Figure 5-15) on sales productivity are
linear. If there is no word of mouth, sales productivity is reduced by 85%, and if there is no
marketing sales productivity is reduced by 90%. The selections of these values are based on the
fact that word of mouth and marketing will have a significant impact on sales productivity, but
that complete lack of these efforts will not cut off sales completely. And marketing has a slightly
larger impact than word of mouth. Sales productivity rises linearly with increased word of
mouth or marketing until the point at which they reach their normal values and sales productivity
is not affected. The "normal" values of word of mouth and marketing are defined as the points at
which additional efforts in these areas will no longer have an effect on sales productivity.
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Figure 5-15: Effect Of Marketing On Knowledge Efficiency Fn
5.6.3 Persuasion Rate
The flow from Prospects to Hot Prospects ("Persuasion Rate") is based on the persuasion stage
of Rogers' innovation decision process. At this point, the prospective customer forms a
favorable opinion of the clean energy technology product. In a manner analogous to the
Knowledge Rate, the flow is dependent on sales effort, the price and features of the product,
marketing effort, and word of mouth.
The only difference between this structure and the structure and equations detailed in Section
5.6.2 is the parameterization. For example, the Avg Prospect Lifetime is only one month, while
the Avg Potential Prospect Lifetime is six months. This reflects the fact that while it may take a
long time to find and contact Potential Prospects, once a potential customer has become a
Prospect, they will form a favorable or unfavorable opinion relatively quickly, and become either
a Hot Prospect or a Lost Prospect. However, the Max Persuasion Productivity From Sales is
only half the rate of the Max Knowledge Productivity From Sales because it takes considerably
more effort to persuade a prospect to have a favorable opinion of a product than it does to simply
impart the knowledge to them of what the product is.
The effect of features and price on persuasion productivity is the same as they are on knowledge
productivity (as the potential customer is still considering the price and features of the product to
determine whether or not to trial it). Word of mouth and marketing, however, have less of an
effect. The persuasion efficiency with no word of mouth is 33% and with no marketing is 50%,
and as before linearly rise to 100% as these attributes reach their normal values. These attributes
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have less of an impact on persuasion as they do on knowledge, as the customer is already aware
of the product at this point. And word of mouth has more of an impact than marketing as the
customer seeks to validate the value of the product with peers.
5.6.4 Purchase Rate
The flow from Hot Prospects to Purchasers ("Purchase Rate") is based on the decision stage of
Rogers' innovation decision process. At this point, the prospective customer decides to adopt or
reject the clean energy technology product. In a manner analogous to the Knowledge and
Persuasion Rates, the Purchase Rate is dependent on sales effort, and the features and price of the
product (Figure 5-12 and Figure 5-13). It is also affected by word of mouth, though to a lesser
degree (no word of mouth results in 50% of sales productivity). However, while marketing is no
longer a factor at this point in the sales cycle, Customer Support becomes important:
(68) Effect Of Customer Support On Decision Efficiency =
Effect Of Customer Support On Decision Efficiency Fn(Normalized Cust Support)
(69) Normalized Cust Support = Engineering Effort for Cust Support / Cust Support Needed l0
The Effect Of Customer Support On Decision Efficiency Fn reduces sales productivity by 50% if
there is no customer support, and then raises sales productivity linearly until Normalized Cust
Support is one (at which point increasing customer support no longer increases sales
productivity).
The Avg Hot Prospect lifetime is four months, reflecting the length of time needed to convince
the average customer to purchase the product. The Max Decision Productivity From Sales rate is
half the Max Persuasion Productivity From Sales rate, reflecting that it takes twice as much
effort again to convince an interested prospect to actually decide to purchase.
5.6.5 Adoption Rate
Once a customer has purchased the product, it is still not certain that the customer will adopt the
product. Clean energy technology products typically take considerable time and effort to install
and to put into operation. During that period of time, a Purchaser may still choose not to adopt
the technology. The flow from Purchasers to Adopters ("Adoption Rate") is based on the
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10 Assuming Cust Support Needed > 0
implementation stage of Rogers' innovation decision process-the point at which the prospective
customer actually puts the technology into use. In a manner analogous to the Purchase Rate, the
Adoption Rate depends on sales effort, the features of the product, and the level of customer
support. At this point, price and word of mouth are no longer relevant, as the purchase decision
has already been made. However, customer support is now critical for implementation. With no
customer support, the adoption efficiency will fall to zero. And as customer support improves,
the adoption efficiency rises linearly, until customer support is its full normal value at which
point adoption efficiency will not be reduced.
The Avg Purchaser Lifetime is one month, reflecting the amount of time it takes to begin using
the product, and the Max Adoption Productivity From Sales is very high because once the
purchase is made, sales effort no longer necessary. However, considerable customer support
effort is now required (see Section 5.7).
5.6.6 Adopter Loss Rate
A customer may not remain an adopter forever. The Adopter Loss Rate captures the rate of
Adopters who stop using the product and become Lost Prospects:
(70) Adopter Loss Rate = Adopters * Adopter Loss Fraction
(71) Adopter Loss Fraction = Normal Adopter Loss Fraction *
Effect of Customer Support on Adopter Loss Fraction(Normalized Cust Support) *
Effect of Features on Adopter Loss Fraction(Normalized Features)
As per equation (71), the features of and customer support for the product affect the Adopter
Loss Rate. If the features become deficient compared to competing products, or if customer
support falls below the needed level, the Adopter Loss Rate will increase significantly.
However, even with the best of features and customer support some (though relatively fewer)
customers will stop using the product.
5.6.7 Word of Mouth
As more Adopters use the product personnel at those firms will come in contact with personnel
from other firms and spread word about the product. In fact, some firms will not adopt the
product without having seen it in use, or heard about its use, at other similar firms. The word of
mouth equation is restated here:
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(72) Normalized Word of Mouth: = (Contact Rate * Potential Prospects * Adopters /
Total Population) / Word of Mouth Reference
Word of mouth is based on the number of Adopters and Potential Prospects and how often they
come into contact (the Contact Rate) based on the Total Population. Sales will be affected
positively or negatively depending on whether the calculated value is above or below the
reference value.
See Table 5-6 for all the parameters used in the market sector of the model, their default values,
and the minimum and maximum values used for sensitivity analysis in Chapter 6.
Parameter Value Units Min Max
Avg Potential Prospect Lifetime 6 Months 0.01 24
Avg Prospect Lifetime 1 Months 0.01 12
Avg Hot Prospect Lifetime 4 Months 0.01 12
Avg Purchaser Lifetime 1 Months 0.01 12
Initial Adopters 0 Prospects
Initial Capab of Firms to Adopt 0.05 Dmnl 0 1
Initial Hot Prospects 0 Prospects
Initial Potential Prospects 100 Prospects 0 1E+05
Initial Prospects 0 Prospects
Initial Purchasers 0 Prospects
Initial Total Population 100000 Prospects
Lost Prospect Lifetime 12 Months
Max Knowledge Productivity From 0.25 Prospects/
Sales (Person*Hour)
Max Persuasion Productivity From 0.13 Prospects/
Sales (Person*Hour)
Max Decision Productivity From 0.06 Prospects/
Sales (Person*Hour)
Max Adoption Productivity From 1 Prospects/
Sales (Person*Hour)
Normal Adopter Loss Fraction 0.01 1/Months
Normal Default Fraction 0.002 1/Month
Contact Rate 0.25 1/Month 0.01 100
Word of Mouth Reference 0.1 Prospects/ Month 0.01 10
Table 5-6: Market Sector Parameters
5.7 Customer Support
As detailed in Section 5.6, customer support is critical to convince customers to purchase and
adopt the product. Normalized customer support is calculated as follows:
120
(73) Normalized Cust Support = Engineering Effort for Cust Support / Cust Support Needed"
(74) Engineering Effort for Cust Support = MIN(Cust Support Needed,
Effective Engineering Effort(22) * (I - Min Development Fraction))
(75) Cust Support Needed = Adopters * Cust Support Needed per Adopter +
Purchasers * Cust Support Needed Per Purchaser
The model presumes that a minimum fraction of engineering effort will be applied towards
product development (the default value is 50%). Out of the engineering effort that remains
available, the amount of customer support applied will be based on the number of purchasers and
adopters and how much support they need. But if the effort available is not enough to fill the
need, sales and adoptions will be reduced, and as per Section 5.6.6, Adopters will be lost.
Table 5-7 contains the customer support parameters, which are measured in how many person
hours of sales effort are needed per prospect per month. Note that purchasers (who have not yet
adopted) require five times as much effort, as this includes the effort required for installation,
initial maintenance of the system, and to help new customers learn to operate the system
correctly.
Parameter Value Units
Cust Support Needed per Adopter 8 Person*Hours/ (Month*Prospect)
Cust Support Needed Per Purchaser 40 Person*Hours/ (Month*Prospect)
Table 5-7: Customer Support Parameters
5.8 Pricing
A key factor in the decision to purchase the product, and for the profitability of the new venture,
is the pricing of the product. The price is determined based on the cost to produce the product
and on the price the competitor charges:
(76) Price = MAX(Target Price, Min Price)
(77) Min Price = Cost Per Unit / (1-Min Gross Margin)
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' Assuming Cust Support Needed > 0
(78) Cost Per Unit = (Initial Cost Per Unit*
(Cumulative Purchases / Reference Production for Initial Cost) ^
(LN(1 - Decrease in Costs per Double Purchases) / LN(2))) *
Cost Adjustment Fraction Due To Policy
(79) Cumulative Purchases = INTEGRAL(Purchase Rate)
(80) Target Price = Target Norm Price * Competitor Price
(81) Competitor Price = (Initial Competitor Cost Per Unit *
Competitor Cost Adjustment Fraction Due To Policy) / (1-Competitor Margin)
(82) Competitor Margin = Max Competitor Margin -
Competitor Margin Adjustment Fn(Delay3i(Normalized Price,Competitor Margin Adjust
Time, 1)) * (Max Competitor Margin - Min Competitor Margin)
The new venture wishes to charge a price based on its costs to produce the product and which
will undercut the competitor's price. To assure that the venture will not lose too much money, it
charges the maximum of the price it wishes to charge to undercut competition (Target Price) and
a Min Price which reflects the venture's costs (equation (76)). The Min Price is calculated by
charging the Min Gross Margin above its cost to produce the product (equation (77)). The Min
Gross Margin could be negative if the venture is willing to lose money to gain market share, but
is zero by default so that the venture can at least recoup its costs (See Table 5-8).
Over time, the learning curve reduces the cost to produce the product as described in Section
5.5.2 (equation (78)). The initial cost is $100,000, which is the same as the competitor's initial
cost, but it is assumed that cost is reduced by 10% for every doubling of production from the first
unit. Many studies have shown that production costs are reduced between 10% and 30% over a
wide range of industries for every doubling of experience (P. Ghemawat, 1985), and 10% was
chosen here as a conservative estimate. The production cost may also be affected by government
policies that provide subsidies to the venture to apply towards its development and production
costs. This is discussed further in Chapter 6.
If the competitor is charging more than the Min Price, the venture can raise its price to the Target
Price, which is a fraction of the price the competitor is charging. The default fraction is 75%.
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The competitor does not benefit from a learning curve to reduce its costs, since it is presumed
that its product is mature or perhaps a commodity. However, the competitor can reduce its
margin in response to price pressure from the new venture. By default, the competitor will
charge their maximum margin, but if the new venture has a lower price, then, after a delay, the
competitor may respond by lowering its margin, down to the minimum margin they are able to
charge. The Competitor Margin Adjustment Fn is shown in Figure 5-16. The competitor does
not lower their margin at all if normalized price is one (venture and competitor charging same
price). As the venture's price becomes lower in comparison to the competitor's price, the
competitor lowers their margin at an increasing rate until the normalized price is 75%. Then the
competitor lowers their margin at a decreasing rate until their price reaches its minimum level
when the venture is charging half the price of the competitor. The competitor price may also be
affected by government policy, which is also discussed in Chapter 6.
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Figure 5-16: Competitor Margin Adjustment Fn
See Table 5-8 for the parameters used in the pricing sector of the model, their default values, and
the minimum and maximum values used for sensitivity analysis in Chapter 6.
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Parameter Value Units Min Max
Competitor Margin Adjust Time 3 Months 0.1 36
Decrease in Costs per Double 0.1 0.001 0.90.1 0.001 0.9Purchases Dmnl
Initial Competitor Cost Per Unit 1E+05 Dollars/Unit 1.E+04 2.E+05
Initial Cost Per Unit 1E+05 Dollars/Unit 1.E+04 2.E+05
Maintenance Margin 0.8 Dmnl 0.01 0.99
Max Competitor Margin 0.3 Dmnl 0 1
Min Competitor Margin 0.3 Dmnl -0.5 0.5
Min Gross Margin 0 Dmnl -0.5 0.5
Reference Production for Initial Cost 1 Prospects 0.01 1000
Target Norm Price 0.75 Dmnl 0.1 1
Table 5-8: Pricing Parameters
5.9 Conclusion
This chapter presented a detailed overview of the important sectors of the clean energy
technology venture simulation model. For a complete listing of the equations and parameter
values of the model please see Appendix C.
The next chapter will present the results of running the model with default parameters for a
prototypical clean energy technology venture. The results of sensitivity analysis on the
parameters will be presented, and analysis of the simulation will be used to determine what
factors have the greatest impact on the success or failure of the venture.
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6 Analysis of Simulation Model
This chapter presents an analysis of the new venture simulation model. Observing the behavior
of the model will provide insights into the real world scenarios the model represents.
The model will be used to uncover the factors most important to the success of a new clean
energy technology venture. While many of these factors will be intuitive to some readers, others
may not be, and there is value in verifying the importance of these factors in a new way and
using the model to identify their relative strength. Further, it is instructive to observe the
sensitivity of the simulated venture's success to the initial value of parameters in the model.
The chapter starts by setting the stage for the simulated venture.
6.1 The Base Case Venture
Table 6-1 presents business projections taken from the investor presentation for a clean energy
technology startup (and is fairly typical for a business plan projection of the ventures examined
for this research). In each of the following scenarios, the "base case" venture is based on
attributes of this and the other startups that were studied for this research.
The base case venture is planning to sell a high value product (cost of over $100,000) into a
conservative market. We assume that the new venture starts out with a product that has better
features at lower cost than competitors, with the bulk of its feature advantage non-appropriable
(e.g. protected by patents). Furthermore the new venture starts out with at least S3,000,000 of
investment capital. The amount of initial capital invested is based on management's projections
of how much capital is needed, and how much the investment market is willing to provide this
particular management team.
The venture starts with six employees, four focused on engineering and support, and two on sales
and marketing. The engineering-focused employees in the firm have above average experience
(having already developed the product), but the sales employees are at an experience
disadvantage, given that the product has never been sold before. However, the employees learn
and become more productive over time and in particular after working with customers by making
sales and installing the product. There are 100,000 firms that could conceivably adopt the new
product, and initially 100 of them are reachable by the startup and would consider the prospect of
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purchasing the new product (potential prospects). The CEO of this typical firm strives to
maintain at least a 25% feature advantage of their products over the competition and attempts to
maintain sufficient working capital to operate by instituting a hiring freeze whenever the venture
has less than twelve months of capital left at the current burn rate, and laying off employees as
necessary to maintain at least three months of working capital.
The venture whose projections are in Table 6-1 secured a $4M initial investment and an
additional $1.5 M investment in Year 2 when the venture began running out of capital. Given
these investments, and the simplifying assumption that all revenues go directly to working
capital in the year they are recognized, and all working capital is retained, then Figure 6-1 shows
a graph of the working capital based on the projections in Table 6-1. Note that this graph looks
distinctly like a hockey stick.
Indeed, if we remove delays in the sales cycle, triple the default capability of firms to adopt the
technology (and therefore to become prospects), and assume that all engineers are hired with the
same experience as the founding engineers (assumptions in Table 6-2), then the simulation
model comes close to replicating the pro forma performance (See Figure 6-2).
Year 1 2 3 4 5
Revenues $189 $4,126 $16,712 $32,106 $51,925
COGS $174 $3,535 $8,457 $9,311 $10,413
Gross Margin $15 $591 $8,255 $22,795 $41,512
Operating
Exp $2,324 $3,177 $6,496 $10,316 $14,508
EBITDA ($2,309) ($2,586) $1,759 $12,479 $27,004
Total Installs 6 69 235 435 713
Employees 7 16 31 46 63
($ amounts in 000's)
Table 6-1: Business Plan
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Figure 6-1: Projected Working Capital from Business Plan ($1,000s)
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Figure 6-2: Working Capital from Model with Relaxed
Avg Prospect Lifetime 0.1
Avg Hot Prospect Lifetime 0.1
Avg Purchaser Lifetime 0.1
Initial Capab of Firms to Adopt 0.15
Avg Experience of New Eng Hires 10,000
Assumptions
Table 6-2: Assumptions Necessary to Replicate Business Plan Projections
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6.2 The Valley of Death
Our base case firm expects the results seen in Figure 6-1 or Figure 6-2. Unfortunately, the
assumptions in Table 6-2 are not realistic. Though the founders are probably not making these
assumptions explicitly, they are necessary to achieve those results given the nature of the market.
Given more realistic assumptions, things do not work out as the founders of the venture firm had
planned. Figure 6-3 shows the simulation model results of the performance of the firm for the
first seven years of its existence. The venture spends almost all of the initial $3M of working
capital in the first 18 months. Assuming the venture is not able to attract additional investments,
management needs to lay off employees, and continue with a total of only about seven
employees for most of the firm's existence. The firm does not go bankrupt, but barely ekes out
an existence by attracting just enough adopters to pay for its few employees. Unfortunately, the
average of one sale every two months is not enough to enable the new venture to grow. After an
excessive amount of persistence and patience the entrepreneurs and/or investors are likely to pull
the plug on the venture after the seventh consecutive year of no significant positive cash flow.
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Figure 6-3: Fate of Firm after 7 Years
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Figure 6-5 presents the cumulative probability of the investors or entrepreneurs giving up on the
venture over seven years of its operation based on the accumulation over time of a hazard rate of
failure (Figure 6-4). The hazard rate of failure is the inverse of the expected life of the venture at
any point in time and is based on the cash position of the venture, its features compared to the
competition, the current number of prospects compared to the initial prospects, and the length of
time the firm has been in operation:
(83) Hazard Rate of Failure = MAX(O, (
Hazard Rate from Current Ratio / Hazard Rate from Current Ratio Ref +
Hazard Rate from Features / Hazard Rate from Features Ref+
Hazard Rate from Prospects / Hazard Rate from Prospects Ref) *
(Normal Hazard Rate / 3)) *
(Time / Hazard Rate Time Reference)
(84) Hazard Rate from Current Ratio = I/Current Ratio
(85) Current Ratio 2 = ((Working Capital + Hazard Rate AR Perc*Accounts Receivable)/
-Cash Flow From Operations) / Current Ratio Timeframe)
(86) Hazard Rate from Features = 1/Normalized Features - 1
(87) Hazard Rate from Prospects = 1/Effective Prospects - 1
(88) Effective Prospects = Total Prospects/Initial Potential Prospects
As any of the working capital, features or total prospects approach zero, the hazard rates from
these terms will approach infinity (i.e. the expected lifetime of the firm will be very small).
Conversely, when cash flow is positive, or the features or prospects have favorable values, the
contribution of the corresponding term to the overall hazard rate will be negative (e.g. better than
normal prospects will increase the expected lifetime of the venture). However, the overall
hazard rate will always be greater or equal to zero.
12 If the firm is bankrupt (Working Capital < 0), the Current Ratio is set to a very small number instead of this
equation, and therefore the Hazard Rate from Current Ratio will be very large, and bring the Cum Prob of Failure to
>= 1 (i.e. the firm has failed)
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The overall hazard rate is scaled according to the length of time the venture has been in
operation. It is very unlikely that investors or entrepreneurs will give up on a firm after just a
few months of operation. However, if the firm has negative characteristics after many years of
operation, the investors or entrepreneurs are much more likely to lose their patience.
Hazard Rate of Failure
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Figure 6-4: Hazard Rate of Failure for Base Case Venture
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Figure 6-5: Cumulative Probability for Firm to Fail
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The natural way to help the base case venture succeed appears to be an additional infusion of
cash to prevent the minimization of working capital and reduction of the work force at around 18
months. Given that this new venture has a product with better features at lower cost than
competitors do; it would seem that if the venture has enough capital to maintain their
engineering, support and sales force, they will succeed. Yet, as we see in Figure 6-6, even with a
cash infusion of another $1.5M after 12 months, the additional money is spent and the venture is
left with little working capital and no record of positive cash flow after five years (a long time
for investors to be patient, especially after having made two investments). Given the same
hazard rate assumptions as before, approximately 80% of firms would fail under those
conditions.
Of course, the story doesn't really end there. If we never give up, and allow the new venture in
the base case scenario 14 years to find its footing, it develops a strongly positive cash flow. See
Figure 6-7. The additional cash infusion enables the firm to develop a strongly positive cash
flow after "only" about nine years (Figure 6-8). However, in the experience of the entrepreneurs
and investors interviewed for this research, most startup companies that have investors to pay
back do not get that many years before they need to start showing results. Hence the new
venture in this example is likely to fail since it will not have nine to 14 years to show results.
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Figure 6-6: Fate of Firm with Additional Investment
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Figure 6-7: Fate of Firm with Single Investment after 18 Years
Working Capital
40 M
30M
20 M
lOM
10M
0
0 16 32 48 64 80 96 112 128 144
Time (Month)
Working Capital: _BaseCase(3+1.5M Invest)
Figure 6-8: Fate of Firm with Additional Investment after 12 Years
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The "valley of death" refers to a period of time during which a startup company may not have
sufficient capital to grow and is not able to attract new investments. The valley is clearly visible
in Figure 6-7 and Figure 6-8. In fact, it appears over a wide range of scenarios for clean energy
technology companies. Figure 6-9 shows a sensitivity analysis of working capital over the first
seven years of the firm's existence given a uniform distribution of initial investments between
$1M and $10M. Figure 6-10 shows a sensitivity analysis of working capital over a uniform
distribution of initial production costs and initial features from 50% less to 50% greater than the
default values. Note that in all cases, the valley is evident, and lasts at least through four years.
It is called the valley of death because small companies that are not growing and not able to
attract investment dollars often "die" during this period of time.
Of course, these simulations all assume that the new venture starts out with a product having a
significant feature advantage to the competition. If the product is no better than the competition,
the story is very different (and much simpler since the firm is almost certain to fail). Figure 6-11
presents a sensitivity analysis of a uniform distribution of initial investments between $1M and
$10OM with the product of the new venture being the same as that of the competition.
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Figure 6-9: Sensitivity Analysis Over Range of Initial Investments
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Figure 6-10: Sensitivity Analysis over Initial Costs and Features
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Figure 6-11: Sensitivity Analysis Assuming Product is Same as Competitor's
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The valley of death is an especially pronounced problem for clean energy technology startup
companies for two reasons. First, for companies that will eventually succeed given enough time,
the time in the valley is considerably longer than other technology companies with similar
advantages in features and price. While an innovative enterprise software company may
experience six to twelve months in the valley before catching on in the market, a clean energy
technology company may experience six to twelve years in the valley due to the significant
barriers to adoption that these companies face.
Second, the stakes are much higher for the products of these companies to be adopted on a
widespread basis. There are not likely to be strong negative repercussions to society if a new
venture with more effective corporate accounting software fails before its time. However, there
are very strong environmental reasons for clean energy technologies to be adopted on a
widespread basis. As discussed previously, new ventures may be the best option for introducing
disruptive technology that will enable a new clean energy industry to emerge.
Given the prevalence of the valley of death, and the importance for innovative clean energy
technology companies to emerge from the valley, we will now address the factors that are most
likely to make that possible.
6.3 Emerging from the Valley
What is the difference between the state of the venture and its market between the points in time
when the venture starts its dip into the valley and when it leaves? Assuming no new sudden
infusion of capital or breakthrough in technology during that period, what changes allow the firm
to seemingly suddenly become very profitable and rapidly increase its working capital after so
many years of operation? It would be instructive to look at the state of the model at three points
(See Figure 6-7 for reference):
* Month 0, when the venture has working capital due to the initial investment, but has not
yet entered the market;
* Month 90, when the venture has spent most of its capital, is in the middle of the valley of
death, and is surviving, but with no significant positive cash flow; and
* Month 180, when the venture is leaving the valley with strong and accelerating positive
cash flow.
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Analysis was performed to determine which of the stocks in the model make the most difference.
Table 6-3 shows the stocks that distinguish between negative, neutral, and positive cash flow.
The values of these parameters at month 0 result in negative cash flow, at month 90 in relatively
neutral cash flow, and at month 180 in accelerating positive cash flow. The fact that these
parameters are sufficient to generate the desired cash flow is demonstrated by setting their initial
values to their month 180 values and observing the behavior of the model. Setting these values
results in instant positive cash flow, with a similar trajectory to the arc that occurs after 15 years
in the base case model (See Figure 6-12).
Time (Month) 0 90 180
Working Capital $3,000,000 $82,889 $1,671,947
Accounts Receivable $0 $288,831 $3,327,312
Engineers 4 5.6 79.1
Avg Engineer Experience 10,000 15,112.4 9,298.0
Avg Sales Experience 1,500 43,102.2 42,201.3
Cumulative Purchases 1 94.2 607.5
Potential Prospects 100 44.2 101.7
Hot Prospects 0 4.2 59.7
Purchasers 0 1.0 14.6
Adopters 0 49.2 420.6
Features [self,appropriable] 110 50.3 385.1
Features [self,nonappropriable] 4 2.7 6.0
Features
[competitor,nonappropriable] 2 3.4 5.3
FUD [self,appropriable] 13  0 5.0 59.7
FUD [self,nonappropriable] 0 0.3 2.3
FUD [competitor,nonappropriable] 0 0.0 3.7
Table 6-3: Conditions Needed to Achieve Profitability
13 FUD stands for Features Under Development - see Chapter 5 for more details
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Figure 6-12: Performance of Firm with Month 180 Values Set at Time 0
These parameters are not only sufficient, but are necessary to reach the state of an accelerating
positive cash flow. Sensitivity testing shows that a significant reduction in the value of any of
these parameters from its Month 180 value results in negative cash flow for at least some period
of time. Table 6-4 summarizes what happens when any of these parameters are reduced by 50%
at Time 0 of the "Monthl80_ValuesMonth O al es atMonth0" model run shown in Figure 6-12. The table
shows the percent reduction in working capital at one, three, and five years into the run. The
values during the first few years are important because we want to know how much the
immediate accelerating positive cash flow is interrupted by a reduction in each parameter.
Because we are beginning with the Year 15 values, and the model duration is 20 years, we also
look at the five-year values of the parameters. Percent reductions of greater than 50% are
highlighted in the table. Note that engineering experience, number of adopters, and non-
appropriable features tend to make the most difference. However, all of the parameters listed in
Table 6-4 are essential to achieving the positive cash flow shown in Figure 6-12.
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Time (Month) 12 36 60
Accounts Receivable 37% 29% 12%
Engineers 9% 67% 33%
Avg Engineer Experience 65% 83% 45%
Avg Sales Experience 6% 2% 1%
Cumulative Purchases 12% 13% 7%
Potential Prospects 38% 64% 34%
Hot Prospects 44% 40% 21%
Purchasers 21% 14% 7%
Adopters 58% 87% 68%
Features [self,appropriable] 65% 19% -14%
Features [self,nonappropriable] 68% 44% 76%
Features [competitor,nonappropriable] -18% 55% 56%
FUD [self,appropriable] 49% 20% 8%
FUD [self,nonappropriable] 66% 54% 42%
FUD [competitor,nonappropriable] -11% 32% 21%
Table 6-4: Percent Reduction in Working Capital from 50% Reduction in Parameter
There are two notable omissions from this list of parameters. The number of sales employees is
not included, since a very large sales experience gain coupled with a fdll pipeline is sufficient for
profitability. The stock of Prospects is not included since a sufficient number of Potential
Prospects and Hot Prospects, coupled with the relatively short Avg Prospect Lifetime is
sufficient to keep the sales pipeline full.
Because in reality it would not be possible for a venture to start off with the Month 180
parameter values, an initial negative cash flow is unavoidable. A venture cannot start with a
positive accounts receivable, a full pipeline, and existing customers. The question then is how
long it will take for a new venture to reach a sustainable positive cash flow, and what must
happen for this to be achieved.
The below sections describe what the model tells us a venture needs to achieve profitability and
emerge from the valley.
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6.3.1 Working Capital
First and foremost, the venture requires enough working capital to maintain and augment its
work force and cover the costs of production and other necessary costs of doing business.
A new venture may have every advantage in the world, but if the venture does not have enough
working capital, it cannot grow. Working capital is the lifeblood of a small company. In Figure
6-9 we saw the effect of initial investment (the initial stock of working capital) over the first
seven years of the venture. Figure 6-13 shows the sensitivity to initial working capital over the
20-year duration of the model. Note that the results range from bankruptcy (negative working
capital) to a working capital stock of nearly $700M at Year 20. The large 50% band
demonstrates that the results of the model are sensitive to changes in initial working capital
within the range of $1M and $10M.
As subsequent sections will show, sufficient working capital is a prerequisite for any other
parameter or management or policy intervention to have a positive effect.
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Figure 6-13: Sensitivity to Initial Working Capital
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6.3.2 Full Pipeline
As discussed in previous chapters, the customers for clean energy technologies will rarely
purchase and adopt a technology without an extensive introduction to it. If sufficient potential
prospects have not progressed down the sales cycle to become prospects, hot prospects, and
purchasers, the time required to accumulate enough adopters to drive revenue for the new
venture will be lengthy. Note that when the firms is accelerating its profitability in month 180, it
has nearly 15 times the number of hot prospects as it does when it is struggling in month 90.
Figure 6-14 presents the result of a sensitivity analysis of the durations of the various stages in
the sales cycle. As per Table 5-6, the Avg Potential Prospect Lifetime is varied between 0. 1 and
24 months, and each of Avg Prospect Lifetime, Avg Hot Prospect Lifetime, and Avg Purchaser
Lifetime are varied between 0.1 and 12 months. Note that the 50% band is not visible, as most
of the runs are with sales cycle durations that are too long and result in bankruptcy. As can be
seen, the duration of the sales cycle determines whether the venture will have between zero and
over five times the working capital of the base case venture by Year 20.
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Figure 6-14: Sensitivity Analysis of Sales Cycle Delays
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An initial condition that is critical to the pipeline and hence to the success of the venture is the
number of initial potential prospects (all of the prospects that start out in the pipeline). Figure
6-15 graphs the line between success 14 and failure based on the number of initial prospects (on a
log scale) and the initial investment. Note that a number of initial potential prospects are needed
for the venture to succeed, regardless of the initial investment. And if the venture has very large
numbers of initial prospects, it can succeed with a much smaller initial investment.
Figure 6-15: Initial Potential Prospects vs. Initial Investment
6.3.3 Feeding the Pipeline with New Firms Capable of Adopting the Technology
Whether or not the new venture's pipeline is full, in order to maintain and increase the number of
adopters and the new venture's revenue, new potential prospects have to replace the potential
prospects who have become adopters or who have been lost. For that to happen, new firms have
to become capable of adopting the new venture's product and the new venture has to be able to
access those firms (e.g. the firms have to be in the geographical market the new venture serves).
14 For the Base Case firm, where success is defined as a positive NPV at Time 0 with a 10% discount rate, and
taking into account 20x multiple of monthly cash flow in addition to the value of working capital at Month 240.
This is not a perfect measure of success, but is a better measure than lack of bankruptcy.
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In short, assuming the market of potential prospects starts relatively small compared to the total
population, it needs to grow.
The Initial Capability to Adopt determines the rate at which firms in the general population will
become potential prospects. Figure 6-16 presents a sensitivity analysis for a uniform distribution
of values of initial capability to adopt between 0 and 100%. Figure 6-17 graphs the line between
success and failure based on values of the initial capability to adopt and the initial investment.
Note that some capability to adopt is required for the venture to succeed, regardless of the initial
investment. With very high percentages of adoption capability, the venture can succeed with a
smaller initial investment, and the base case firm can end up with over 100 times the working
capital of the base case venture by Year 20.
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Figure 6-16: Sensitivity to Initial Capability to Adopt
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Figure 6-17: Initial Capability to Adopt vs. Initial Investment
6.3.4 Payment of Accounts Receivable
Assuming that there are enough firms adopting the new venture's products, in order for the
venture to succeed, it needs to be paid in a reasonably timely fashion. If too many customers
default or take too long to pay, the venture may not generate sufficient cash flow to maintain its
workforce. For the new venture to emerge from the valley, a steady stream of its customers need
to be paying their bills. Furthermore, though the new venture may be tempted to "give away" its
product at low cost to grow the market, unlike software companies that have low costs and high
margins, energy technology companies generally cannot afford to do this for very long.
Figure 6-18 presents a sensitivity analysis of the average receivable delay and normalized
customer financial condition over a uniform distribution of the ranges of values provided for
these parameters in Table 5-1. Note that most of the range of values result in bankruptcy (e.g.
from customers taking too long to pay), but advantageous values for these parameters result in
over triple the baseline working capital at month 240.
145
1.00
0.90
0.80
0.70
0.60
0.50
0.40
0.30
0.20
0.10
0.00
~_____
Sens RecvDly_CustFincl
50% 75% 95%I 100%I
Working Capital
I3A• Q2 nJt'.OJ lvI
312.14 M
277.46 M
242.78 M
208.09 M
173.41 M
138.73 M
104.04 M
69.36 M
34.68 M
On AA
- V.V9
0 48 96 144 192 240
Time (Month)
Figure 6-18: Sensitivity Analysis of Accounts Receivable Parameters
6.3.5 Enough Experienced Sales People (but not too many)
Unfortunately, clean energy technology products do not sell themselves. If the new venture does
not have enough sales and marketing personnel who are skillful and experienced enough to
effectively market to and sell into their target market, then the venture will not escape the valley.
The venture should also avoid an overabundance of sales and marketing personnel, as that would
put a drag on their cash flow. Figure 6-19 presents a sensitivity analysis of all parameters related
to the size and experience of the sales force over a uniform distribution of the ranges of values
provided in Table 5-4. Figure 6-20 and Figure 6-21 graph the line between success and failure
based on the initial investment and the size of the initial sales force and the initial average sales
experience respectively. Note that the firm fails with too few or too many sales people for a
range of initial investments.
With too few sales people, the firm is unable to fill the pipeline and build up revenue, and with
too many sales people, the firm is unable to afford their salaries. However, with a large
proportion of its labor force made up of sales people the venture can succeed with a much
smaller initial investment.
146
Sens SalesForce
50% 75% 95% 100% i
Working Capital
0 48 96
Figure 6-19: Sensitivit
144 192
Time (Month)
ty Analysis of Sales Force Parameters
Initial Sales Force
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Initial Investment $M
7 8 9 10
Figure 6-20: Initial Sales Force vs. Initial Investment
147
/787.07/ M
708.36 M
629.65 M
550.94 M
472.23 M
393.52 M
314.81 M
236.11 M
157.40 M
78.69 M
_1 1 nn
240
Initial Avg Sales Experience
Figure 6-21: Initial Avg Sales Experience (log scale) vs. Initial Investment
6.3.6 Enough Experienced Engineers (but not too many)
Though the new venture may start with a feature advantage, it will still require a skilled and
experienced technical staff to provide a high level of support for its products and to develop new
features to keep ahead of the competition. Experience is important, as experienced employees
are significantly more efficient and therefore are significantly more cost effective to employ. If
the staff of the new venture is too inexperienced or too large, the venture may be unable to
generate sufficient positive cash flow.
Figure 6-22 presents a sensitivity analysis of all parameters related to the size and experience of
the engineering labor force over a uniform distribution of the ranges of values provided in Table
5-3. Note that the 50% and 75% bands are barely visible, meaning that most of the simulation
runs result in little to no working capital at month 240. However, for some combination of the
engineering-related parameters, the firm can end up with over 10 times the working capital of the
base case venture. We will explore in Chapter 7 what can be done to help the firm come closer
to this level.
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Figure 6-23 and Figure 6-24 graph the line between success and failure based on the initial
investment and the size of the initial engineering staff and the initial average engineering
experience respectively. Note that the firm fails with too few or too many engineers for smaller
initial investments. For the smallest initial investments, the firm will only succeed with
approximately one engineer on staff. As the initial investments rises, the number of engineers
the venture can initially employ rises linearly. The base case firm fails with a lesser amount of
initial average engineering experience, but the firm will succeed regardless of initial engineering
experience with higher initial investments. Also, the firm can succeed with a smaller initial
investment given sufficiently high engineering experience.
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Figure 6-22: Sensitivity Analysis of Engineering Labor Force Parameters
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Figure 6-24: Initial Avg Engineering Experience (log scale) vs. Initial Investment
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6.3.7 Feature Advantage
In order for potential customers to choose to adopt the new venture's products, they must
perceive them to have significant advantages compared to the current solution and to competitive
solutions. This is especially true for the conservative customers of clean energy technology
products, for whom a small or even medium advantage may not be sufficient to provoke action.
As we saw in Figure 6-11, if the venture does not start with a feature advantage, it will fail.
Figure 6-25 illustrates that if a competitor has a non-appropriable feature value of two, the new
venture must begin with a non-appropriable feature value of greater than two in order to succeed.
Higher non-appropriable feature values enable the venture to succeed with a smaller initial
investment. Initial appropriable feature values do not have as large an effect (see Figure 6-26).
The venture succeeds with higher initial investments even with no appropriable features. This is
because appropriable features can be developed fairly quickly and have less of an impact on
customers' purchase decisions.
Figure 6-27 presents a sensitivity analysis of all parameters related to product development for
both the venture and its competitors over a uniform distribution of the ranges of values provided
in Table 5-2. Note that almost all combinations of values of these parameters result in little to no
working capital at month 240 (not even the 95% band is visible). However, a combination of
these parameters results in the firm achieving over 15 times the working capital of the base case
venture by month 240. This combination is likely a case where the competitor has very few
features, and the venture achieves a very high level of features with little effort and is therefore
unlikely to occur in reality. However, product development strategies that will optimize the
success of the new venture under realistic conditions will be discussed in Chapter 7.
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Figure 6-26: Appropriable Features vs. Initial Investment
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Figure 6-27: Sensitivity Analysis of Product Development Parameters
6.3.8 Price Advantage
Customers always consider a feature advantage in the context of price. Absent a compelling
reason for the customer to adopt the product (such as a regulation compelling them to adopt, or if
the product meets an essential function for which there is no substitute), customers compare the
price of the new product to competitive solutions, and strongly take into account the payback
period (how long it will take for the advantages of the product to pay back its initial cost) and
their return on investment for purchasing the product. A firm with strong brand recognition may
be able to justify a higher price than its competition, but new ventures rarely have that advantage.
Figure 6-28 shows the sensitivity of the model to price parameters over a uniform distribution of
the ranges of the parameters provided in Table 5-8. There is tremendous variability in the
response, as over 75% of the simulation runs end in bankruptcy.
One simulation run results in working capital of over $14B by Month 240. If the venture has an
order of magnitude advantage or more in cost to produce the product and is able to extract most
of that difference as margin, given the feature advantage it starts with, the venture should
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become very profitable. However, this is not a realistic scenario, given the market forces that
would address such a pricing imbalance, and given limits to growth of a new venture.
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Figure 6-28: Sensitivity to Price Parameters
6.3.9 Positive Word of Mouth
Regardless of price or feature advantage, conservative customers often will not consider a new
technology or product unless their peers have tried it and recommend it. For a clean energy
technology venture to overcome this barrier, the venture must convince initial customers to trial
the product and make sure the trials go extremely well. In this way, it may it may be possible to
get some initial adopters and then build positive word of mouth from their experience. It is
critical, in this strategy, that there be no justification for negative word of mouth. In a relatively
small community of conservative customers, negative reactions could kill the prospects for the
product and perhaps for the entire new venture.
Figure 6-29 presents the sensitivity analysis for the word of mouth parameters (contact rate and
word of mouth reference) over a uniform distribution of the ranges provided in Table 5-6. As
can be seen, for certain values of these parameters, the venture will fail, but for most values the
firm will end up with between -$150M and $450M at month 240.
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Figure 6-29: Sensitivity to Word of Mouth Parameters
6.3.10 Summary of Factors
Note that for each of these sectors of analysis, the "valley of death" is evident on the sensitivity
analysis graphs. This demonstrates that optimal conditions in one area alone (whether it is price,
features, sales cycle delays, etc.) will not be enough to avoid the valley. As described in the
introduction to this section, it takes a combination of factors to emerge from the valley.
Table 6-5 summarizes the month 240 results of the sensitivity analyses. As can be seen, each of
these analyses contains some (and usually most) scenarios in which failure is near certain. This
follows from intuition since the base case firm has an 88% cumulative probability of failure, so
setting any important parameters to values that make it more difficult for the firm to succeed are
likely to result in failure. Also note that, with the exception of very favorable pricing, even the
most favorable conditions for each sector result in at least a 30% chance of failure. On the
positive side, favorable parameter values result in at least 3.5 times the baseline working capital.
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Table 6-5: Summary of Month 240 Results of Sensitivity Analyses ($M)
In addition to the essential factors discussed here, there are likely to be others that are important
for the success of clean energy technology ventures in particular instances. Because it is not
possible for a new venture to start with all of these attributes in place (in particular, having a full
pipeline; having the requisite experience selling and working with the product and technology;
and having earned positive word of mouth), it is important that the venture develop these
attributes as quickly as possible. In the next chapter we will explore strategies the entrepreneurs
and investors may employ to do so.
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High Min Max
Min Low end end of Max Cum Low end Low end Cum
Working of 50% 50% Working Prob of 50% of 50% Prob
Capital band band Capital Failure band band Failure
Baseline $100 $100 $100 $100 88% 88% 88% 88%
Initial
Investment $0 $106 $689 $717 56% 60% 87% 100%
Sales Cycle $0 $0 $2 $537 35% 88% 100% 100%
Init Capab $0 $3,500 $11,000 $1,362 30% 32% 56% 100%
to Adopt
Receivables $0 $0 $1.40 $347 87% 95% 100% 100%
SalesForce $0 $0 $708 $787 30% 45% 100% 100%
Engineers $0 $0 $0.065 $1,000 32% 100% 100% 100%
Features $0 $0 $0.002 $1,698 48% 100% 100% 100%
Price $0 $0 $0 $14,000 2% 100% 100% 100%
Word of
Mouth $3 $170 $425 $619 53% 77% 87% 95%
6.4 Public Policy Factors
Even though a clean energy technology venture may do everything right, it still may have
difficulty succeeding if government policies discourage adoption. U.S. government policies
currently provide substantial subsidies to the fossil fuel industries, and present substantial
barriers to the adoption of distributed generation and other clean energy technologies (California
Energy Commission, 2000; Lillis, Eynon, Flynn, & Prete, 1999; National Renewable Energy
Laboratory, 2000). Coupled with a conservative customer base this presents an uphill battle for
any clean energy technology venture.
Many policies have been proposed to encourage the development and adoption of clean energy
technologies (Barringer & Revkin, 2007; Center for Clean Air Policy, 2006; Stavins, Jaffe, &
Schatzki, 2006; Stern, 2006), and these policies generally fall into three categories:
6.4.1 Carbon Policy
Most climate change or global warming legislation attempts to impose a cost to the emissions of
CO 2 (the most common greenhouse gas emitted by humankind). The Kyoto Protocol, legislation
recently passed by the state of California, the Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic states' Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), and climate change legislation before the U.S. Senate all
attempt to create CO 2 emissions trading systems that would impose costs on companies emitting
CO 2. Other proposals have suggested simply placing a tax on the emission of CO 2 in order to
impose a cost. Any of these regulations would impose a cost on any fossil-fuel-based
competition (or on not adopting the new clean energy technology). For this reason the model
represents a carbon policy as an increase in the costs of the competition.
(89) Competitor Price = (Initial Competitor Cost Per Unit *
Competitor Cost Adjustment Fraction Due To Policy) ' (1-Competitor Margin)
(90) Competitor Cost Adjustment Fraction Due To Policy = I +
(Carbon Policy Switch *
RAMP(Carbon Policy Effect on Comp Cost / Carbon Policy Ramp Time,
Carbon Policy Start Time, (Carbon Policy Start Time + Carbon Policy Ramp Time)))
As per Table 6-6, the default Carbon Policy Effect on Comp Cost is 20%, and is implemented
over a period of 10 months starting at time 0. Sensitivity analysis is performed on these
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parameters below. The Carbon Policy Switch is used to turn the effects of the carbon policy on
(1) or off (0) in the model.
An increase in the competition's prices due to a carbon policy enables the new venture to charge
a higher price and extract higher profits while retaining a price advantage.
6.4.2 Subsidy Policy
Another common type of policy is to subsidize the development or purchase of clean energy
technologies. For example, the federal government provides grants to cover a portion of the
research and development costs for some clean energy technologies. An example is the Small
Business Innovation Research Program (SBIR)." The result of this policy is to lower the cost of
providing the clean energy technology, enabling higher profits for the firm without raising the
price to the consumer.
(91) Cost Adjustment Fraction Due To Policy = I +
(Subsidy Policy Switch *
RAMP( Subsidy Policy Effect on Cost/Subsidy Policy Ramp Time,
Subsidy Policy Start Time, (Subsidy Policy Start Time + Subsidy Policy Ramp Time)))
As per Table 6-6, the default Subsidy Policy Effect on Cost is -20%, and is implemented over a
period of 10 months starting at time 0. Sensitivity analysis is performed on these parameters
below. The Subsidy Policy Switch is used to turn the effects of the subsidy policy on (1) or off
(0) in the model.
6.4.3 Increasing Adoption Capability
The final classes of policies are those policies that either remove regulatory barriers or provide
regulatory incentives for the adoption of clean energy technologies. Examples of regulatory
barriers that can be removed are those that impose high additional costs on companies that
connect and utilize distributed generation. And examples of regulatory incentives are ones that
provide tax breaks for companies that implement energy efficiency measures, or tax credits for
the development of wind farms. These policies increase the number of firms that are capable of
adopting clean energy technologies and therefore increase the rate at which the number of
potential prospects increases.
5 See http://www.science.doe.gov/sbir/ for information on SBIR grants for energy technology development
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(92) Increase Of Capab Of Firms To Adopt Due To Policy = Increase Adoption Capab Switch *
RAMP( Increase of Adoption Capab/Adoption Capab Increase Ramp Time,
Adoption Capab Increase Start Time, (Adoption Capab Increase Start Time +
Adoption Capab Increase Ramp Time))
As per Table 6-6, the default Increase of Adoption Capab is 5%, and is implemented over a
period of 3 months starting at time 0. Sensitivity analysis is performed on these parameters
below. The Increase Adoption Capab Switch is used to turn the effects of the policy on (1) or off
(0) in the model.
Parameter Value Units Min Max
Carbon Policy Switch 0 Dimensionless
Carbon Policy Effect on Comp Cost 0.2 Dimensionless 0.01 10
Carbon Policy Start Time 0 Months 0 120
Carbon Policy Ramp Time 10 Months 0.01 240
Subsidy Policy Switch 0 Dimensionless
Subsidy Policy Effect on Cost -0.2 Dimensionless -0.9 0
Subsidy Policy Start Time 0 Months 0 120
Subsidy Policy Ramp Time 10 Months 0.001 240
Increase Adoption Capab Switch 0 Dimensionless
Increase of Adoption Capab 0.05 Dimensionless 0.001 0.95
Adoption Capab Increase Start 0 0 120
Time Months
Adoption Capab Increase Ramp 3 0.01 240
Time Months
Table 6-6: Policy Parameters
6.4.4 Effects of Policies
The following figures assume all the baseline parameter values, with a $3M initial investment
and no follow on investments. Figure 6-30 illustrates a comparison of three policies: a carbon
policy that causes competing solutions to be 20% more expensive than the base case; a subsidy
policy that reduces production costs for the new venture by 20%; and a policy that enables 5%
more firms to become capable of adopting the product. Note that the carbon policy and the 5%
increase in adoption capability have nearly the same effectiveness. Figure 6-31, Figure 6-32, and
Figure 6-33 show sensitivity analyses of each of the policies performed over a uniform
distribution of the ranges of values in Table 6-6. Note that the maximum effectiveness of the
carbon policy is the greatest, followed by the increased adoption policy, and finally by the
subsidy policy.
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Figure 6-34 demonstrates the effect on working capital of implementing all three policies
together, and Figure 6-35 presents the effect on probability of failure. Note that each of the
policies in isolation reduce the probability of failure by approximately a third, and all three
policies together reduce the probability of failure by about half..
Figure 6-36 presents a multivariate sensitivity analysis of all the policy parameters, and Table
6-7 presents a summary of the sensitivity analyses. These show the potential synergistic effect of
implementing these policies together. Their effectiveness together has the potential to be far
greater than their individual effects combined.
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Figure 6-30: Comparison of Policies
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Figure 6-31: Sensitivity Analysis of Policy to Increase Adoption Capability
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Figure 6-32: Sensitivity Analysis of Policy to Increase Cost of Carbon
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Figure 6-33: Sensitivity Analysis of Policy to Subsidize Costs
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Figure 6-34: Effect of All Policies Implemented Together
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Figure 6-35: Probability of Failure with Policies
Sens Policies
50% 75% 95% IOO 100%
Working Capital
48.03 B
43.23 B
38.42 B
33.62 B
., 28.82 B
24.01 B
19.21 B
14.41 B
9.607 B
4.803 B
-2.427
48 96 144 192
Time (Month)
Figure 6-36: Sensitivity Analysis of Combined Effect of Policies
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Min Low end High end Max Cum end of end of Cum
Working of 50% of 50% Working Prob 50% 50% Prob
Capital band band Capital Failure band band Failure
Policy to Incr $112 $377 $1,315 $4,543 50% 80% 86% 100%Capab to Adopt
Policy to Incr $105 $1,100 $4,266 $1,260 9% 72% 86% 87%
Carbon Cost
Policy to $101 $120 $180 $795 40% 84% 87% 90%
provide Subsidy
All Policies $256 $3,400 $12,000 $48,000 5.00% 67% 83% 100 O
Table 6-7: Summary of Month 240 Results of Policy Sensitivity Analyses
6.4.5 New Competition Brought on by Policies
The above scenarios assume that the clean energy technology venture is competing only with
companies that offer fossil-fuel-based solutions. But what if the creation of these policies causes
competitors to offer non-fossil-fuel-based solutions that compete with the new venture? There
would be two principal competing effects:
* The price advantages to the new venture created by the policy may be negated or even
reversed as larger, more capable firms enter the market.
* The market may expand as the new competitors market the new technology and increase
the total number of potential prospects for the product.
If the new venture does not have a significant non-appropriable feature advantage compared to
the new competitors, under this scenario it may be doomed if its price advantage erodes and
competitors have as good or better brand recognition. In this case, though the policies may have
the intended effect of encouraging the development and adoption of clean energy technologies,
the new venture may not share in that success.
However, if the venture does have a significant non-appropriable feature advantage (or
established brand), the entrance of competitors may help the firm by feeding its pipeline with a
larger market of potential prospects (assuming that the market is in an early stage and not close
to saturation). Given the time delays inherent in developing non-appropriable features that are
attractive to the market, and in establishing positive word of mouth, the new venture will have a
significant competitive advantage if it is far ahead of competitors along these dimensions. This
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suggests that it may be advantageous for clean energy technology ventures to enter the market in
advance of the implementation of favorable policies in order to establish an early lead.
6.4.6 Why the "Free Market" May Not Be Sufficient
Another question that may be posed is why government intervention should be necessary if a
technology is truly advantageous. Won't the free market decide'? The first answer to this
question is that the market for energy products and services has never been truly free of
government intervention. Fossil fuel exploration and development, and the security of its supply,
has been heavily subsidized by governments (Lillis et al., 1999). So, for a new energy service to
compete on a level playing field, either government support for fossil-fuel-based solutions has to
be diminished, or an equivalent amount of support has to be provided for the new technology.
Furthermore, it is often in society's interest for governments to support the development and
commercialization of beneficial new technologies that otherwise would take too long (or are too
expensive) for the market to develop on its own. For example, the Internet started as a
government research project. It is unlikely that the current level of the benefits the Internet has
brought to the U.S. economy would have occurred without the initial government support.
Because the nation's current energy infrastructure has been shaped by government policies, it is
reasonable that government policies should be used to accelerate beneficial innovations
including those needed to address climate issues. A strong case can be made that the
government should play a very active role in creating policies that will spur the development of
clean energy technologies and the growth of new clean energy technology ventures.
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6.5 Sources of Danger: Oscillatory and Exponential Growth
As can be seen in Figure 6-2 and Figure 6-8, when the venture succeeds, some oscillation occurs
in the working capital before it grows at an exponential rate. Both of these behaviors are sources
of danger: downturns in the oscillatory growth may be mistaken as signs of failure, and
exponential growth may not be sustainable.
6.5.1 Oscillatory Growth
The oscillatory growth of working capital is more evident in Figure 6-37. What causes working
capital to fall several times after it starts to grow? As can be seen in Figure 6-38, several factors
may cause working capital to fall once it begins to rise.
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Figure 6-37: Oscillatory Growth of Working Capital
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Figure 6-38: Loops that Cause Oscillatory Growth
The first is due to salary expense. As working capital increases, the venture is able to hire more
personnel. Though these workers will eventually be able to make the product more attractive
and therefore generate more sales and working capital, their salaries are, at first, a drain on
working capital.
The second is due to the cost of goods sold. When customers order products from the venture,
the venture must incur the costs of producing and delivering them. The venture then bills the
customer. Only after a delay proportional to the average receivable delay does the venture
receive the payment that increases its working capital.
In some cases, as employees' efforts pay off and bills are paid, the reinforcing loop of sales
growth dominates, causing exponential growth, but only after a few downturns caused by the
balancing loops. The downturns can be eliminated by weakening the balancing loops and
strengthening the reinforcing loop. If we extend the time it takes to increase the labor force after
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working capital increases, we weaken all the loops, as increases in working capital have less
immediate effect. This can be achieved by increasing the Engineer Adjustment Time and the
Sales Force Adjustment Time. Decreasing the time it takes to receive cash from purchases by
decreasing the Avg Receivable Delay will strengthen the sales growth reinforcing loop.
These actions combine to create the behavior in Figure 6-39, with the parameter values provided
in Table 6-8. Note that the oscillations have been dampened. Lowering the receivable delay
improves the performance of the venture, and increasing the labor adjustment time (particularly
for the sales force) hurts the performance of the venture, and the result is slightly better
performance than the base case venture, as it escapes the valley of death at month 172 as
opposed to month 188.
Conversely, increasing the receivable delay and decreasing the sales force adjustment time
exacerbates the oscillations. Figure 6-40 compares the increased oscillations to the base case
results, and Table 6-9 presents the parameter values necessary to cause the increased oscillations.
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Figure 6-39: Growth Of Working Capital with Oscillation Dampened
Avg Receivable Delay 0.1
Engineers Adjustment Time 120
Sales Force Adjustment Time 120
Table 6-8: Parameter Values to Dampen Oscillation
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Working Capital: _BaseCase(3M Invest) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Figure 6-40: Growth Of Working Capital with Oscillation Exacerbated
Avg Receivable Delay 4.2
Engineers Adjustment Time 6
Sales Force Adjustment Time 0.5
Table 6-9: Parameter Values to Exacerbate Oscillation
The parameter values in Table 6-8 are not realistic; in real life, the venture is likely to go through
some oscillatory growth. In fact, the parameter values in Table 6-9 and therefore the exacerbated
oscillations shown in Figure 6-40 are much more feasible. In any case, it is helpful to understand
the reasons behind this phenomenon, and how slower hiring and shorter receivable delays may
dampen the oscillations.
6.5.2 Exponential Growth
As most of the figures in this chapter show, once working capital begins to rise, it follows a
roughly exponential arc. The positive loops of additional working capital enabling additional
resources and experience lead to better product development and sales that contribute additional
working capital. Furthermore, the more engineers and sales people are working for the firm, the
more experience they gain in aggregate, and the more effective they become at developing and
selling their products. See Figure 6-41 for a simplified depiction of these positive loops.
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Figure 6-41: Positive Loop Diagrams
Of course, once any firm reaches a period of exponential growth, it may encounter many
dangers. These include, but are not limited to:
* Obtaining more customers than the firm is able to service well, leading to loss of
customers and a poor reputation (see Sterman 1988);
* Being unable to hire and train enough well qualified engineers and sales people, and
therefore lowering the productivity of the firm;
* Inspiring competition to poach experienced employees, thereby increasing the cost of
labor (to reduce poaching) and enabling competitors to catch up more quickly;
* Inspiring new competitors to enter the market and existing competitors to step up
production, leading to pressure to reduce prices (and therefore reduce profitability); and
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Saturating one or more segments of the market (for example, early adopters), and
enduring a period of time when sales growth is unsustainable but costs remain high.
Since the purpose of our model is primarily to determine whether an early stage clean energy
technology firm can achieve exponential growth, and not what it should do once it gets there,
these scenarios, though important to acknowledge, are outside the scope of this model and
research. Furthermore, these scenarios have been studied before (Oliva et al., 2003).
6.6 The Investment Market
An important question is how important the state of the investment market is for clean energy
technology ventures. As mentioned previously, venture and other early stage investments move
in cycles. The factors that control these cycles (the state of public markets, capital availability,
experience of venture and early stage investors) are exogenous to the model, but the level of
investment has a significant impact on the results.
Table 6-10 and Figure 6-42 shows investment returns at 5, 10, 15, and 20 years for the base case
venture with initial investments ranging from $3M to $100M. (The base case initial investment,
$3M, is close to the smallest investment that will enable the base case company to survive.) The
investment returns are calculated as the annual IRR of the initial $3M investment over the given
period of time, with the capital at the end of the period being the sum of the working capital of
the venture and five times annualized positive cash flow. These returns are not necessarily
indicative of the actual returns an investor would receive given that the model does not contain
enough detail to accurately value a business. However, the differences between the returns for
various levels of investment, and the patterns of the returns over time can provide us with
meaningful insights. Note that most returns are negative after five years (due to the valley of
death), but other than the $3M base case, returns are positive after ten years.
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60 120 180 240
3M Invest -42.8% -7.4% 0.4% 25.7%
3.5M _1nvest -15.8% 29.3% 36.2% 31.3%
4M Invest 10.5% 39.4% 37.2% 31.6%
5M Invest -7.3% 41.4% 36.6% 30.8%
IOM Invest -10.1% 37.0% 31.9% 27.1%
50MInvest -13.1% 19.3% 19.5% 17.8%
lOOM Invest -16.3% 13.1% 14.7% 14.0%
Table 6-10: Investment Returns by Initial Investment and Month
Figure 6-42: Investment Returns by Initial Investment
The additional $500,000 investment between $3M and $3.5M makes a significant difference in
investment returns. Figure 6-43 shows the month 60, 120, 180 and 240 returns with the initial
investment along the x-axis. The best returns are for initial investments between $3.5M and
$5M. This pattern indicates that up to a point providing the venture with greater initial capital
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makes a very large difference in performance, but that it is not in the interest of the investor to
invest significantly more capital than is necessary. Note that returns generally go down the
higher the initial investment rises above $5M.
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Figure 6-43: Investment Returns by Month
Figure 6-44 shows the probability of failure for the various initial investments. Note that
generally larger investments result in a lower probability of failure. However, this is not always
the case, as the probability of failure is based on the cash position of the company as compared
to the initial investment.
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Figure 6-44: Probability Of Failure based on Initial Investment
Clearly investment size by itself will not determine whether the company will be successful.
However the investment market and other factors that determine investment size will have a
significant impact on the company's fortunes. Once the venture has enough capital to succeed,
relatively small percentage larger investments may make a significant difference, but much
larger investments are unlikely to pay off for the investors.
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6.7 Conclusion
This chapter showed how a clean energy technology venture with superior technology at an
attractive price can fail as it traverses the "valley of death." This occurs because the venture
needs many years to develop a sales pipeline and gain experience, during which time its working
capital is depleted. Looking at the state the venture and its market needs to be in for the venture
to achieve profitability, we saw that among the list of 15 critical parameters the ones that made
the most difference were engineering experience, the number of customers, and non-appropriable
features. The analysis also showed how the amount of initial potential prospects, capability of
new market entrants to adopt a new technology, and non-appropriable features determine
whether the venture can be successful regardless of the initial investment. Too many or too few
sales or engineering personnel can result in failure of the venture. Optimal values of any one
parameter do not enable the venture to avoid the valley of death. It takes a combination of all the
critical factors discussed to achieve profitability and emerge from the valley.
Government policies that increase the cost of carbon emissions; reduce barriers and increase
incentives for adoption of clean energy technologies; and subsidize the development of clean
energy technologies have a substantial effect on the fortunes of the venture. Advantageous
public policy can reduce a firm's chance of failure by more than half.
Given what we know about the factors that determine success or failure, what can and should be
done to increase the adoption of clean energy technologies commercialized by new ventures'?
This will be the focus of the next chapter.
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7 Conclusion and Strategy Suggestions
This chapter presents a summary of the research and analysis, presents strategy and policy
recommendations to foster the success of clean energy technology startups, summarizes the
contributions of this work, and discusses directions for future research.
7.1 Summary of Research
Clean energy technology can be defined as any technology that reduces harmful emissions
resulting from the production and use of energy. Examples of clean energy technologies include
renewable and/or efficient distributed generation (e.g. solar, wind, geothermal, fuel cells,
cogeneration); energy efficiency technologies which enable the use of energy services at lower
cost to users; intelligent energy management; efficient energy storage; green building
technologies; biofuels; and ancillary products and services that reduce emissions associated with
power generation, transmission and distribution.
The wide adoption and use of these technologies is critical to reduce the emissions of greenhouse
gases (most notably CO2) from energy production in order to address the serious risks of climate
change. Furthermore, the use of many of these technologies is economically efficient.
Numerous advantages to end users include lower and less volatile energy costs and a more stable
and reliable energy supply. However, clean energy technologies have not been as widely
adopted as may be presumed from these benefits, and new ventures formed to commercialize
these technologies have failed to do so.
We focus on new ventures because only new ventures have been able to commercialize
disruptive new technologies. And only disruptive technologies have the potential to restructure
the current global energy regime. In every other case in which new technology created a new
industry by replacing a standard commonly used technology, such as when electricity replaced
gas lighting, or automobiles replaced horse-drawn vehicles, new ventures led the way. However,
over the last several decades, as the importance and value of clean energy technologies have
become widely accepted, new clean energy technology ventures have not been able to achieve
success and wide adoption for their products and technologies. Why?
There is an extensive body of literature on how and why new innovations are diffused, but less
research has been done on what leads to success or failure for new technology ventures. In the
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most substantial work to date, Roberts (1991) found that larger investments of initial capital; the
sales experience of the founders; a marketing orientation of the firm; and a strategic focus of the
firm on its core technology and markets were correlated with success. Utterback, Meyer, Tuff,
and Richardson (1992) found that lasting commitment and persistence were critical for
technology ventures and Hilmola, Helob, and Ojalac (2003) found that reducing product
development time was important. Joglekar and Levesque (2006) determined that allocations of
resources to R&D and marketing should account for the anticipated productivity of those
functions, and that a new venture is better off obtaining a single large investment than multiple
smaller ones. However, prior to this research effort, it was not clear whether these results would
be true for clean energy technology ventures that have not been specifically studied or modeled
before now.
7.1.1 Methods
Interviews were conducted with a wide variety of stakeholders related to the adoption of clean
energy technologies, including clean energy entrepreneurs, the customers of clean energy
technology, energy service providers, investors in clean energy ventures, and participants in
policymaking processes related to clean energy technologies. A number of factors were
identified that affect the adoption of clean energy technologies. These include regulatory factors
such as subsidies for fossil-fuel based energy and/or clean energy technologies; real time pricing
(or the lack thereof) for electricity use; utility interconnection requirements and surcharges for
stranded costs or standby service; siting restrictions for distributed generation; and carbon taxes
or cap and trade regulations, and regulations to promote energy efficiency. Also important are
market factors such as the price of fossil fuels and of electricity, lack of certainty regarding the
economic benefits of new technologies, and the impact of new technologies on markets.
Institutional and behavioral factors, such as the agency problem in which decision makers do not
receive the benefits of adoption, risk aversion, the learning curve for users to understand new
technologies and the effects of word of mouth (or the lack thereof) regarding new technologies
cannot be underestimated. Finally, the technologies themselves need to work as advertised and
to improve over time.
The history of three clean energy technology firms were studied, including the details of their
sales cycles and the particular challenges they faced (as well as the successes they had) in
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achieving wide adoption of their products and services. Leaders of these ventures, and others
that were interviewed, found themselves facing much longer sales cycles and much more
conservative prospective customers than anticipated. They found that low prices for
conventional energy decreased the attractiveness of their technology and that regulations
hindered the adoption of their products.
7.1.2 Model Development
A simulation model was developed to better understand the factors that would most contribute to
the success or failure of any new clean energy technology venture. The model was also designed
to help uncover strategies and policies that would increase the odds of success and of wider
adoption of clean energy technologies. The modeling methodology used was system dynamics,
a powerful tool for studying and understanding complex real world systems that makes use of
feedback loops, accumulation of flows into stocks, and time delays. The stocks of the model
include the working capital of the new venture, its labor force, the product development pipeline
of the venture and competitors, and the various stages of prospective customers in the venture's
sales pipeline.
The model was structured and tuned to focus on issues important to new clean energy technology
ventures and was based on the information collected in the interviews. The simulated venture is
market driven. For example, a desire to develop feature-rich products and intellectual property
that is attractive to prospective customers drives a desire to hire engineers, yet the amount of
working capital constrains hiring. Sales and marketing effort drives prospective customers
through the sales cycle, and is more effective when the price and features and word of mouth
about the product are attractive and as the sales force gains experience. Engineers also become
more effective with experience, and in particular, after working with customers.
The stages and time delays of the sales cycle reflect the experience of the companies
interviewed. Levers are included which reflect policies that would affect clean energy
technology ventures, such as carbon cap and trade regulations, clean energy subsidies, or policies
that would remove barriers to adoption. The model represents an idealized venture in which
management always follows the strategy set forth, no personality conflicts disrupt the firm, etc.,
and is therefore meant to be reflective a venture with an extremely effective and experienced
management team.
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When the values of the parameters in the model are set to reflect the parameters of the clean
energy technology ventures interviewed, the behavior of the model reflects the experience of
those firms. Even with a product with very attractive pricing and features compared to that of
the competition, the output of the model shows a long sales cycle that drains the working capital
of the venture. With a sufficiently large initial investment, and pruning of the workforce, the
venture may survive and eventually achieve great success and wide adoption of their technology,
but only after many years spent struggling in "the valley of death" as the management team and
employees of the venture gain the experience and develop the sales pipeline necessary for
success.
7.1.3 Analysis
The attributes that determine the profitability of the clean energy technology venture and enable
it to emerge from the valley of death in the simulation model are summarized in Section 6.3.
Working capital is critical to enable the firm to maintain its workforce and produce its products.
A full sales pipeline (potential prospects, prospects, hot prospects, etc.) is necessary in order for
the venture to make sales and generate revenue. The market for the venture's products must be
growing in order to sustain growth of the venture and the venture's customers must be paying
reasonably promptly for their purchases. The venture needs enough sales people and needs them
to be experienced and effective at selling the firm's product. And the venture needs engineers
who are effective at maintaining the features of the product and keeping it ahead of competition.
The venture must be able to sell the product at an attractive price and still make a profit. And the
product must generate positive word of mouth in the market. Government policies designed to
reduce emissions and support clean energy technologies play a significant role in the fortunes of
the venture and may make the difference whether it succeeds or fails.
Unfortunately, the venture does not have direct control over most of these parameters. New
ventures generally have little say over the design and implementation of government policies.
And entrepreneurs cannot start a venture off with a full pipeline, employees experienced
producing and selling the product, and with positive word of mouth. If they could, perhaps they
could achieve the instant positive cash flow shown in Figure 6-12. But since they cannot do
these things, what can they do realistically to achieve these conditions as soon as possible and
maximize their cash flow? The next section will answer this question.
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7.2 Strategies to Make a Clean Energy Technology Venture Successful
We know from prior research, from the sources interviewed from this research, from direct
experience and from analysis of the model that the following three attributes are critical to
success for any new technology venture; management, market, and sustainable competitive
advantage. These factors are already well established in the literature (Eesley & Roberts, 2007;
Michael E. Porter, 1985; Roberts, 1991; J. Utterback et al., 1992), and are briefly summarized
here:
Right Management Team
Experienced investors state that the first and most important attribute of any new venture are the
talents, experience and attitudes of the management team. Prior startup experience and sales
experience are strongly correlated with success. The importance of personal characteristics, such
as persistence and flexibility in the face of adversity, and the appropriate need for and use of
personal power cannot be underestimated. It is challenging for an analytical simulation model to
reflect the impact of these personal characteristics, but the model reflects in several ways that
greater experience leads to greater success (Section 6.3.5 and Section 6.3.6).
Right Market
Another well established success factor for technology ventures is that the venture is addressing
a market need they understand well in a way that is a good match for the size and capabilities of
the venture, and that the target market has high growth potential. The simulation model capture
this by taking into account the sales and marketing effectiveness of the venture, the growth
potential of the market, and the nature of the sales cycle. And as we see in Section 6.3.5, Section
6.3.3, and Section 6.3.2 these factors indeed play a significant role in whether and how
successful the venture will be.
Sustainable Competitive Advantage
For a new technology venture to succeed, it needs to offer a technology-based product that not
only meets a market need, but also is different from and better than competing alternatives at an
attractive price. Further, the venture must be able to sustain these advantages over time in the
face of determined and resourceful competition and establish a good reputation by 'word of
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mouth". We can see how the simulation model captures the importance of both appropriable and
non-appropriable features in Section 6.3.7, of price in Section 6.3.8, and of word of mouth in
Section 6.3.9.
It is a validation of the simulation model that it captures well-known factors for the success of
new technology ventures. But, more importantly, what new insights does the model provide us
about clean energy technology ventures? The model offers some answers to important questions
regarding capital investments, the right mix of employees, product development goals, selling
versus leasing of the product, pricing in relation to competitors' prices, and the significance of
government policy.
7.2.1 Capital Investments
Is it better to have a single initial investment of $3M, or three investments of $2M each, at 0, 12
and 24 months?
Given the amount of capital that clean energy technology companies typically burn through, it is
generally in their interest to take in as much capital as possible. Even though some of the
investments come in the future, if we assume a 20.5% discount rate based on the average long
term performance of early stage venture investments (Thomson Financial/National Venture
Capital Association, 2007), the staged $2M investments have a NPV of $4.18M, which is still
considerably higher than a $3M initial investment. It would take a very high 45% discount rate
for the two alternatives above to be equivalent on a NPV basis.
All else being equal, a venture with an investment having an NPV of over $4M should have a
much better chance of succeeding than a venture with an investment of $3M. Staging the
investments also has advantages for both the entrepreneur and investor.
At the earliest stages of a new venture, the value of the venture is minimal, and the entrepreneur
must sell the equity of the venture at a relatively low price in order to attract capital. The
entrepreneur's need for capital is tempered by a desire not to "give away" too much of the
company. If the venture's management believes it will be able to attract additional capital after a
year or two of operation, gaining experience, and establishing a presence in the market, the
venture might wait, and sell the equity at a higher price at that time. In this case, putting off
additional investments is preferable.
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From the investor's perspective, the initial investment is very risky. The investor may be
intrigued enough by the technology and management team to "put a toe in the water" but will
likely want to keep the initial investment as small as possible. Only after the venture has proven
itself to at least some degree, will investors be more willing to invest additional capital.
It is therefore very common for technology ventures to receive a series of investments over time.
And most entrepreneurs would rationally choose to receive three $2M investments spaced over
two years rather than a single investment of $3M. However, if their firm behaved like the
prototypical clean energy technology venture simulated in the model, they would be wrong.
As can be seen in Figure 7-1, the model shows that a venture that would succeed with a $3M
initial investment would go bankrupt with three $2M investments spread over two years. The
reason the venture goes bankrupt is because the venture never has sufficient working capital and
enough of a runway to hire the engineers needed to keep the product better than the competition.
More importantly, the venture will never have the sales and marketing resources and experience
needed to build up a strong enough pipeline. A $3M initial investment provides enough working
capital over the first 18 months to fund the product development and sales and marketing
resources and develop the experience needed to build up a pipeline that will enable the venture to
survive and eventually to thrive.
Working Capital
13.03 M
6.517 M
-2,348
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
Time (Month)
Working Capital :_2M Invest_3 I I I I I I I 1 I
Working Capital: _BaseCase(3M Invest) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Figure 7-1: Comparison of $3M Investment vs. Three $2M Investments
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Given that clean energy technology ventures take a long time to develop a market, and that labor
and production costs must be paid over that period, clean energy technology companies may
require and justify a higher initial investment than other technology companies. For example,
software ventures usually have a product that can easily be trialed and adopted if the customer
finds its features and price attractive. These ventures usually do not need years to develop a
pipeline and revenue if they have a product demonstrably better than the competition. Therefore,
there is less risk that a delayed investment will irreparably damage a software venture. Such a
company is likely to perform better with three $2M investments rather than a single $3M
investment.
In contrast, biotech companies take a very long time to develop a market. For them, factors
critical to their success are based on the outcomes of product tests and the decisions of regulatory
agencies that are largely beyond the control of the sales force. A larger initial investment to
build up a sales force may not make the difference between success and failure, and investors are
well advised to reduce their risks by staging their investments.
However, investors who follow a staged investment strategy that is rational for early stage
software or biotech ventures may fail with the same strategy for clean energy technology
ventures. For the energy ventures, the market takes a long time to develop and development of
the market can be proportional to the early stage resources of the venture.
Given that clean energy technology ventures may require a risky larger initial investment, how
do investors decide which ventures are worth the risk'? Investors would be well served to
consider the attributes addressed at the start of this section, and the factors detailed in Chapter 6
that the model shows have the largest effect on the fortunes of a clean energy technology venture
(Table 6-4) and that may be evident at the start of the venture. The more a venture can
demonstrate that it has a non-appropriable technology that makes its product attractive to
customers, that a large number of prospective customers already exist, and that its market will
grow quickly over time given the resources to develop it, the more that company may justify a
relatively large initial investment. Given the size of the energy market, a truly innovative energy
company with many potential prospects has the potential to grow very big, rewarding the
investment made by the early investors.
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7.2.2 Make Up of Labor Force
What should the ratio be between the engineering staff'and sales staff?
The base case clean energy technology venture starts with four engineers and two sales persons.
It is assumed that the engineers played a role in the development of the product which is now
ready for market, and that the sales persons are new to the firm. Given that this is a technology
venture, this would seem a reasonable ratio. The engineers are needed to maintain the product
and develop it further, and to support the early customers. The sales people still need to learn the
market before they become effective. In fact, this is a common ratio for technology startups.
However, it turns out that this common ratio is suboptimal. If the venture is constrained to six
employees, it would do much better with four sales people and two engineers (See Figure 7-2).
This is because initially the most important task for the company is to develop a market and fill
the pipeline; sales resources are needed for those tasks. Only later on, when customers begin to
adopt the product and competitors begin to catch up, are additional engineers needed to shore up
customer support and product development.
A venture is more likely to be successful if it hires more sales people up front. Though lack of
capital ultimately constrains the size of the labor force, we saw in Figure 6-20 that the venture
can support an initial sales force as large as 16 with a relatively small initial investment (This is
because a sales force can start paying for itself by generating additional revenue). Figure 7-3
shows the impact of doubling the sales force three times from two to four to eight to 16. As the
number of sales personnel is increased from two to 16 the results significantly improve. And
note that the venture does better with fewer engineers (two rather than four), given four sales
people. This tells us that once the venture has a product that is attractive to the market it should
maximize sales and marketing staff, and minimize engineering and product development staff to
cut costs if necessary in order to do so.
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Figure 7-2: Sales vs. Engineering Focus
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Figure 7-3: Results of Adding Initial Sales Persons
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7.2.3 Product Development Goals
How much better than the competition should the venture strive for its products to be?
In the base case of the simulation model, the simulated venture desires its product features to be
25% more attractive than the competition. In reality, it is difficult to know exactly how much
more attractive a product is than the competition, since each customer will value the features of
the products differently. However, management of the venture must decide how much resources
to allocate to product development. An argument can be made that the venture should devote
resources so that its product is at least 50% better than the competition. After all, greater
features do lead to more sales, and many technology ventures focus on maximizing the features
and functionality of their products.
For the simulated venture, that approach would be wrong. In fact, that decision would bankrupt
the company. Conversely, if the venture de-emphasizes product development and only strives
for 10% more attractive features, the simulated venture will be much more successful. See
Figure 7-4 for a comparison of results from striving for 10% better features, 250/0 better features,
or 50% better features. Naturally, these results depend on the assumption that a 10%
differentiation is sufficient to motivate sales for the product. Working in isolation, the product
development staff cannot know how many features are needed, and the bias is often to develop
too much. The new venture needs to work with current and potential customers to determine
which features are important and which are not. The optimum strategy is to develop only the
features that customers confrrm will most differentiate the product.16
16 Note that this is in reference to the improvement of an existing product that customers do or can have experience
with and not the creation of a new product
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Figure 7-4: Comparison of Desired Features
7.2.4 Selling vs. Leasing
Should the venture prefer up front payments or recurring revenue?
The sample firm we are modeling charges the full price of their product up front, and also
charges a 20% annual maintenance fee as long as the customer remains an adopter. One might
wonder how the firm would fare if it adopted a leasing price policy, charging little to nothing up
front, but receiving significantly higher recurring revenue per customer. Assume a very high
lease rate of 30% of the purchase price annually 17 as long as the customer is using the product in
addition to the 20% maintenance charge, and compare the following two scenarios:
(93) Base Case Revenues = New Adopters * Price + Existing Adopters * Price * 20%
(94) Leasing Revenues = Existing Adopters * Price * (30% + 20%)
Assuming they could find customers to accept this, most entrepreneurs would choose the leasing
model, which yields significant additional revenue per customer over time, and has a payback
period of only a little over three years. But in the life of a new venture, those three years are
17 A typical annual rate for a five year general equipment lease is -25%. See
http://www.unistarleasing.com/calculator.html for an example.
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critical, and that choice would be wrong. Under the leasing scenario, the venture would go
bankrupt.
Figure 7-5 graphs the line between success and failure for the base case venture based on the
percent of the product price paid up front and the percent paid annually as either a leasing or
maintenance charge. Note that the firm will not succeed unless it charges both. The graph also
shows how much a customer that has a 10% cost of capital would be willing to pay for a lease in
addition to the 20% maintenance charge. Note that the regions of customer preference and
venture success only intersect at the default 100% up front price. For any reasonable cost of
capital, the customer would not be willing to pay a high enough annual fee in exchange for a
reduction in the up-front cost to enable the venture to succeed. This is because the implicit
discount rate for the venture is extremely high. Up front cash is much more valuable than future
payments.
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Figure 7-5: Up Front Payment vs. Annual Lease and Maintenance Payment
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7.2.5 Pricing vs. Competition
What percent of the competition's price should the venture charge?
We assume that one advantage that the new venture has is that it can learn to produce its product
at a lower cost over time, while competitors with much more mature technology have already
reached the end of their learning curve. Therefore the new venture will have lower production
costs over time and can choose to sell its product at a lower price or to extract higher margins.
Given that lower prices drive additional sales, entrepreneurs often strive to charge as low a price
as possible. This is often a good strategy. In the base case simulation, the venture strives to
charge 25% less than the competition. The model results show that these lower prices result in
higher sales over the first years of the venture's existence when we compare the base case
against a simulation in which the venture is charging the same price as the competition (Figure
7-6).
Purchase Rate
2
0
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
Time (Month)
Purchase Rate : SamePrice I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Purchase Rate: _BaseCase(3M Invest) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Figure 7-6: Comparison of Purchase Rate over 18 Months
However, if we assume for the clean energy technology business that other factors (such as
features and word of mouth) play significant roles in a purchase decision, and that relatively low
quantities of the product are sold at relatively high prices and high margins, then the advantages
of a lower price diminish over time. Furthermore, a new venture is likely to lose a pricing war
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against competitors with significantly greater resources and cash reserves if the competitors
choose to respond by lowering their prices. Therefore, the simulated venture performs best when
it charges the same price as competition and maximizes its margins.
Figure 7-7 shows a comparison over the 20 years of the simulation of purchase rate and working
capital between the base case, in which the venture charges 25% less than competition when its
costs allow it to do so, and the case in which the venture always charges the same price as the
competition. Note that the increased purchase rate from a lower price over the first years turns
out to be temporary. Counter to what might be expected, after about eight years the purchase
rate in the case in which the venture charges a higher price exceeds the lower price case.
Naturally, working capital increases at a higher rate when the venture is selling more of its
product at a higher price. In this simulation, the additional resources (more sales persons and
engineers) gained from the higher margins outweigh the increased attractiveness from a lower
price. Clean energy technology entrepreneurs need to keep in mind when pricing their products
that sometimes charging a higher price will ultimately result in more customers.
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Figure 7-7: Charging Same Price as Competitors vs. Charging 25% Less in Base Case
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7.3 Effect of Government Policies
The preceding section examined the effect that various management strategies would have in
improving the performance of a clean energy technology venture. This section will explore the
effect of combining the above management strategies with the government policies described in
Chapter 6.
Can a clean energy technology venture succeed without government policies in place to
support clean energy technologies?
The answer to this question is both yes and no. If we implement the above management
strategies in the simulation model by reducing the desired feature ratio from 1.25 to 1.1,
increasing the initial sales force from two to 16, and increasing the target price from 75% to
100%, the base case venture does significantly better. As shown in Figure 7-8, these strategies
enable the simulated venture to leave the valley of death sooner, and result in nearly $1B of
working capital by year 20, for an annual IRR on the initial $3M investment of over 33%. By
most measures, that would be considered successful.
Working Capital
962.66 M
481.35 M
37,156
0 24 48 72 96 120 144 168 192 216 240
Time (Month)
Working Capital: 
_MgtPolicies i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Working Capital: 
_BaseCase(3M Invest) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Figure 7-8: Results of Implementing Management Strategies
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However, Figure 7-9 shows that the venture still has a significant chance of failure during the
four years before it achieves a consistently positive cash flow and begins to rise out of the valley
of death. Though this firm will eventually be very successful, this is by no means obvious by
year four. Investors or entrepreneurs may become disenchanted after facing several years of
losses with minimal revenue, customers or working capital, and give up before realizing
increasing profitability in year five.
Cum Prob of Failure Based on Hazard Rate
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
0 24 48 72 96 120 144 168 192 216 240
Time (Month)
CumProb of Failure Based on Hazard Rate :_MgtPolicies I i 1 1 1 1
Cum Prob of Failure Based on Hazard Rate: _BaseCase(3M Invest) 2 2 2 2 2
Figure 7-9: Cumulative Probability of Failure with Management Strategies
The implementation of the government policies described and analyzed in Section 6.4 can
change this story. As shown in Figure 7-10, the venture leaves the valley of death much sooner
in the presence of favorable policy than it might with the management strategies alone. Most
importantly, the venture's probability of failure has been reduced substantially (see Figure 7-11).
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Figure 7-10: Results of Government Policies in Addition to Management Strategies
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Figure 7-11: Probability of Failure with Govt Policies in Addition to Mgmt Strategies
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A clean energy venture with superior technology and the ideal management strategy can succeed
without government policies in place to support clean energy technology. However, the model
shows that such a venture would have less than a 50% chance of doing so. Supportive
government policies provide the venture a much higher chance of succeeding and achieving wide
adoption of clean energy technology.
Note, however, that though the combination of strategies and policies reduces the probability of
failure, they by no means assure success. As noted previously the model developed here is
meant to be used as a learning tool, and is not predictive. Therefore the numerical values of a
10% probability of failure and nearly $2B of working capital after 20 years for the simulated
venture will not necessarily come to pass for any real company. Though it is possible a real
company could do better than the simulated one, there are many factors that are not taken into
account in the model that could cause a real venture to do worse, and to have a higher probability
of failure. These factors include:
* Macro economic factors, such as an economy-wide recession, or a slowdown in the
industry of the venture's customers
* Energy economic factors, such as a decrease in the price of fossil fuels or other
alternative energy technologies
* A new innovation that is more attractive than the venture's technology
* New regulations that negatively impact the venture
* Stochastic disruptions in the acquisition of new prospects or customers that significantly
disrupt the firm's revenue stream
* Personnel issues within the venture that cause management and/or employees to be less
effective (e.g. personality conflicts, health problems, etc.)
* Incompetence or theft on the part of management or employees
* Negative word of mouth (whether justified or not)
Clearly, the success of a new venture is never assured. However, the key lesson is that the
combination of the above management strategies and government policies may significantly
increase the odds of success (and the widespread adoption of the technologies) from what they
would have been otherwise. Whereas an industry slowdown or disruption to the venture's labor
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force may cause some ventures to fail, those with the above management strategies and policies
in place are more likely to weather these inevitable storms and survive.
Given that policies make such a significant difference, governments wishing for new clean
energy technology ventures to succeed have a rationale to act. And it is in the interest of the
ventures themselves to exert as much influence as possible on governments to promote the
policies discussed (perhaps by forming industry lobbying groups).
7.3.1 Investment Returns
Given the challenges that clean energy technology ventures face, and the results and probabilities
of failure shown at the beginning of Chapter 6, it's a valid question to ask whether it is rational
for private investors to invest in these companies at all. For the base case venture, which takes
15 years before achieving profitability, the answer is likely no. Though the investment in the
base case venture does pay off after 20 years, too many hazards could occur over that period of
time that would cause the company to fail. However, if the above management strategies are
followed and the referenced government policies are in place, then it would be a good decision to
invest in a clean energy technology venture with attributes similar to the one modeled.
Figure 7-12 shows the investment returns at five, 10, 15 and 20 years for the base case venture
for scenarios in which only management strategies are implemented; only government policies
are in place; or when both the management strategies and government policies are in place. The
investment returns are the IRR of the initial $3M investment over the given period of time, with
the capital at the end of the period being the sum of the working capital of the venture at that
time and five times annualized cash flow.
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Figure 7-12: Investment Returns with Mgmt Strategies and Govt Policies
Note that with the management strategies or policies in place, the investment has strong positive
returns after five years and 10 years. However, the results shown in Figure 6-35 and Figure 7-9
must be kept in mind. These show that if investors are not patient, the venture may fail under
these scenarios as it takes at least four years before the venture leaves the valley of death and
starts to show positive returns. However analysis of the model shows us that the combination of
the management strategies and policies produces much higher potential investment returns after a
relatively short period of time.
It must be emphasized that the simulation is not reality, and actual investment returns will vary
quite widely and be sensitive to factors outside the scope of this model. However, the simulation
model does provide evidence that the combination of the recommended management strategies
and government policies will both significantly reduce the probability of failure of clean energy
ventures (Figure 7-11) and significantly increase the return on investments in these companies
over shorter investment horizons.
7.3.2 Aggressive Competitor Scenarios
The base case parameters used for analysis in this and the prior chapter assume that the aggregate
competitor to the clean energy technology venture behaves like a large and bureaucratic firm that
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is relatively slow to respond and has relatively long development cycles. What if we relax these
assumptions and assume a more competent and aggressive competitor? Under the base case, if
the competitor starts with better features, shorter development times, and larger desired feature
ratios, a shorter desired time to catch up to the venture's features, or with greater development
resources, the venture will fail (these parameter values are shown in Table 7-1). However, with
the above management strategies in place the only individual parameter changes that will result
in bankruptcy are if the venture starts with significantly worse features than the competition
(either appropriable or non-appropriable). And with the government policies in place, the
venture would have to start with its features even further behind in order to fail (values in Table
7-1).
Default Default Bankrupt Bankrupt Bankrupt
Value w/ParameterValue Value for in w/ Mgmt Strategies
Venture Competition BaseCase Strategies & Policies
Initial Features(NA) 4 2 2.62 4.6 6
Initial Features(A) 110 100 122.5 450 630
Avg Feature Devl Time(NA) 12 24 14.5 -
Avg Feature Devl Time(A) 2 4 0.1 - -
Desired Feature Ratio (NA) 1.25, 1.1 1.1 1.3 - -
Desired Feature Ratio (A) 1.25, 1.1 1.1 1.8 - -
Desired Time to Catch up Features (NA) 4 12 8.3 - -
Desired Time to Catch up Features (A) 2 6 0.1 - -
Eng EffTort for Development(NA) Variable 8,750 16,500 -
Eng Effort for Development(A) Variable 8,750 - - -
NA = Non-appropriable, A = Appropriable
Table 7-1: Competitor Attribute Values that will Bankrupt Venture
If the competition has both large enough development resources and the desire and ability to
catch up to the features of the new venture quickly enough, the new venture will fail under every
scenario. However, the management strategies and government polices described above make
the venture significantly more robust to failure. See Figure 7-13 for a depiction of the regions of
success vs. failure depending on the competition's development resources, desired time to catch
up features, and whether the management strategies are in place, or both the strategies and
government policies are in place.
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Figure 7-13: Success vs. Failure Depending on Attributes of Competitor
Clearly, if the new venture has inferior features and inferior development resources compared to
competition, the new venture will fail. However, if the new venture has superior features
coupled with a cost advantage due to learning (see Section 7.2.5), the strategies and policies
outlined above will provide the venture with a greater chance of success even in the face of
resourceful and aggressive competition.
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7.4 Contributions Of This Research
The contributions of this research effort include the development of an empirically based
simulation model for clean energy technology ventures; a better understanding of the challenges
faced by these companies and the factors that most contribute to their success or failure; the
determination of management strategies and government policies that would dramatically
improve the odds of success of these ventures, and the effect that each of these strategies and
policies has. The analysis shows that even optimal management strategies may not be sufficient
for a clean energy technology venture with a superior technology to succeed. A combination of
these strategies and government policies may be needed to overcome the barriers to success.
7.4.1 Simulation Model
An empirically based simulation model of a prototypical new clean energy technology venture
was developed that reflects the experience of the ventures interviewed for this research. The
model is based on prior research on the dynamics of technology ventures and the adoption of
new technologies, and incorporates a number of novel attributes:
Market sector for clean energy technologies
General new product diffusion models work well for goods being sold into a mass market, but do
not adequately represent the dynamics of adoption of high value technology products into a
conservative customer base. Based on interviews and case studies of clean energy technology
ventures, the "potential adopter" stock was disaggregated into potential prospects, prospects, hot
prospects and purchasers, each of which could be lost before becoming an adopter. The time
delays and most important factors for transition (e.g. price, features, marketing, word of mouth,
customer support) were identified for each stage of adoption.
Product development sector including intellectual property issues
Technology ventures often depend on their ownership of and ability to develop intellectual
property that is not easily appropriable by competitors. Since technology products usually
contain both appropriable and non-appropriable features, a product development sector was
developed that takes into account varying values and development resources needed for
appropriable and non-appropriable features for both the modeled venture and for the aggregate
competitor.
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Runway
New ventures are often constrained by working capital in ways that larger ventures are not.
These ventures usually do not have the ability to borrow money to cover expenses; a single hire
or layoff could make or break the firm. The simulation model reflects these ventures' focus on
their runway - the amount of time they have before they run out of capital - and bases hiring and
layoff decisions on this parameter.
Effect of government policies on new clean energy ventures
Most venture simulation models consider government policies to be outside the boundaries of the
model. The model developed here considered the effect various government policies related to
clean energy technology would affect the modeled venture, and includes parameters that allows
one to adjust the existence and effect of those policies.
7.4.2 Factors that Contribute to Success or Failure
As a result of extensive interviews of clean energy technology entrepreneurs and related
stakeholders, and of analysis of the simulation model, a better understanding was developed of
why clean energy technologies are not as widely adopted as their benefits suggest they should be,
and of the challenges faced by new clean energy technology ventures. Analysis of the simulation
model uncovered factors that are most likely to contribute to the success or failure of clean
energy technology ventures and detailed the strength and sensitivity of those factors. It is
extremely valuable to become aware of and understand the relative strength of these factors in
order to improve the odds of success of these firms.
7.4.3 Management Strategies that Increase Odds of Success
Further analysis of the simulation model, coupled with insights from the interviews and direct
experience working with ventures enabled the development of a number of management
strategies that would significantly increase the odds of success of a clean energy technology
venture. These strategies may appear to be obvious in hindsight, but are counter-intuitive in
many ways and generally have not been followed by new ventures. This research may help
future new clean energy technology ventures to adopt these strategies and therefore accelerate
their profitability and the adoption of clean energy technologies.
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7.4.4 Importance of Government Policies to Success
There has been considerable focus on how policies that impose a cost to carbon emissions or that
remove barriers to the adoption of clean energy technology affect existing firms, but relatively
little focus and understanding of how these policies affect new clean energy technology ventures.
The model developed here provides new insights into this issue. The model shows that policies
that impose a cost to existing energy firms may provide great benefit to new energy ventures and
their investors, and can result in very strong economic growth. It is critical for policy makers to
be aware of this.
7.5 Opportunities for Further Research
Much more work could be done to understand how best to increase the odds of success of clean
energy technology ventures and to increase the adoption of clean energy technologies. In
particular, more data, particularly quantitative data, is needed on the attributes and outcomes of
clean energy technology ventures; the simulation model developed here can be enhanced in
many ways; and the theories outlined here should be tested.
7.5.1 Quantitative Data on Clean Energy Technology Ventures
During the course of this research, quantitative data on over 1,000 clean energy technology-
related ventures was gathered, but the level of detail and quality of the data was too sparse for
much of it to be of use. Research is needed to determine the actual success and failure rates of
clean energy technology ventures based on a better sample of data. It would also be instructive
to gather detailed quantitative and qualitative attributes of these firms, and to establish statistical
correlations between the attributes and the level of success of the firms.
7.5.2 Further Development of Model
The simulation model developed here could be enhanced in many ways.
* As detailed in Section 6.4.5, policies meant to promote the adoption of clean energy
technologies may spur additional competition to the venture being modeled. Competition
may expand the market, but may also make it more difficult for the venture to succeed.
The model does not address this interaction.
* Competition in the model could be disaggregated (in particular between fossil-fuel-based
competitors and other clean energy competitors).
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* As detailed in Section 6.5, the model does not take into account factors and feedbacks
that would limit exponential growth of the new venture.
* The workforce in the model could be further disaggregated (with potentially separate
stocks for product development, customer support, sales, marketing, management,
administrative). Overtime, burnout and other important factors that shape the
effectiveness of the workforce could be modeled.
* The cash flow sector of the model could be expanded and improved to incorporate more
of the factors important to the balance sheet and income statement of a new venture.
* The existence and impact of equity and debt investments could be more explicitly
modeled.
* The modeling of the impact of policies could be expanded and improved to include other
policies that affect the venture, and to incorporate more of the resulting effects and
feedbacks from the implementation of these policies.
* The modeling of intellectual property (IP) development (non-appropriable features) could
be improved to more accurately reflect the value, costs and time delays inherent to the
development of IP
* The determination of desired sales effort could be improved to better reflect the hiring
decisions for sales and marketing personnel of actual firms.
For every sector of this model, more detail and additional feedback loops could be added and
new estimates could be made for values of the parameters (perhaps based on a more extensive
data set for clean energy technology ventures). However, it must be kept in mind that the model
cannot fully reflect reality. Any improvements should be made with the purpose of learning
about the performance and attributes of these ventures in general and not of predicting the future
for any one.
7.5.3 Use of the Model for More General Analysis of New Ventures
Though the simulation model here was developed based on data collected from and about new
clean energy ventures, it is quite possible that the lessons learned from analysis of the model can
be applied to other kinds of new ventures. In particular, when not taking the clean energy
policies into account, the model is very likely to apply to the commercialization of any new
energy technology. More generally, lessons from the model with the parameters described here
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may apply to a new venture in any industry that faces conservative customers and long sales
cycles. Finally, with a different set of parameters, the model possibly can be used to explore the
commercialization and adoption of any new technology. However, it must be kept in mind that
the model is not meant to be predictive of any particular real company's experience, and the
lessons learned from analysis of the model will only be as valuable as the parameterization of the
model enables it to be.
7.5.4 Behavioral Analysis of New Ventures
If new ventures were aware of the benefits of the management strategies outlined in this research
but chose not to follow them, it would be interesting to find out why. Is it because they do not
trust the results, or because implementations of these strategies are too difficult? Are there other
psychological or practical reasons'?
7.5.5 Testing of Theories
This research used empirical information and the development of a simulation model to
substantiate theories on which management strategies and policies would best promote the
adoption of clean energy technologies. However, these theories have not been tested for their
effect on real world clean energy technology ventures. The long time frames and costs involved
add to the challenges of accomplishing this goal. However, it would be extremely instructive to
test the validity and strength of the theories developed here.
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7.6 A Final Word
As noted in the introduction, climate change is one of the most serious challenges of our time,
and the wide adoption of clean energy technologies is critical in order to address it.
Considerable focus has been appropriately devoted to the development of these technologies, to
improving their features, and to reducing their costs to make their wide adoption possible.
However, there must be commensurate focus on strategies and policies to enable the wide
adoption of the clean energy technologies once they are ready. History shows that the wide
adoption of disruptive new technologies is driven by new ventures. It is very much in the
interest of society to promote strategies and policies that will help clean energy technology
ventures successfully distribute their products and technologies.
Neither the private sector nor the public sector can address this problem alone. Private
investments coupled with optimal management of clean energy technology ventures may fail and
have failed without policies in place that address the impediments to the adoption of clean
energy technologies. The technologies already exist to address climate change, and
entrepreneurs and private investors are committing their resources to promote their adoption.
However, particularly in the U.S., policies must also be put in place to help enable wide
adoption. There is little time to waste.
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Appendix A: Consent Form
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN INTERVIEW
New Venture Commercialization of Clean Energy Technologies
You have been asked to participate in a research study conducted by David Miller from the Laboratory
for Energy and the Environment at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (M.I.T.). The purpose of
the study is to better understand and improve the adoption of clean energy technologies. The results of
this study will be included in David Miller's PhD thesis. You were selected as a participant in this study
because of your knowledge of, experience in and participation in the industry. You should read the
information below, and ask questions about anything you do not understand, before deciding whether or
not to participate.
* This interview is voluntary. You have the right not to answer any question, and to stop the interview at
any time. We expect that the interview will take about 2 to 3 hours.
* You will not be compensated for this interview.
* If you give permission for the interview to be taped, the tape will be kept confidential.
* Unless you give me permission to use your name or any identifying information in any publications that
may result from this research, your identity and the identity of your company will be kept anonymous.
I understand the procedures described above. My questions have been answered to my satisfaction, and I
agree to participate in this study. I have been given a copy of this form.
(Please check all that apply)
[] I give permission for the interview to be taped
[] I give permission for the following information to be included in publications resulting from this study:
[]my name [] my title [] direct quotes from this interview
Name of Subject
Signature of Subject Date
Signature of Investigator Date
Please contact David Miller at (877)531-9017 with any questions or concerns.
If you feel you have been treated unfairly, or you have questions regarding your rights as a research
subject, you may contact the Chairman of the Committee on the Use of Humans as Experimental
Subjects, M.I.T., Room E32-335, 77 Massachusetts Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, phone 1-617-253 6787.
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Appendix B: Interview Questions
Intro & Consent Form
Permission to tape record?
When do we need to finish'?
Background
History of company'?
General
Define Clean Energy Technology
Has your company been successful?
How do you define success?
Why has your company been successful or not?
What are the factors that most brought on success'?
What are the factors that most hindered success'?
What have been the most significant surprises?
If you were starting business today, what would you focus on to make it successful?
What are the most valuable lessons you've learned through this business'?
What are your priorities in running the business?
When things went wrong, what caused the problems and what did you do to solve the problems'?
Business Model
What is your business model/strategy?
How has your business model/strategy changed over time?
Markets
Tell me about your market(s)?
How has the market response been different than expected over time'? Why?
How would you define "wide adoption" for your product? When do/did you expect to attain this'?
Describe your competition
Sales
How long is your sales cycle, and how does that break down?
Describe your prospect chain
What factors determine whether you'll make a sale?
Regulations
Do regulations have an impact on your business?
What government policies and regulations would be helpful'?
Other factors
What factors outside of your control affect the prospects of your business'?
How is an energy technology business different from other technology businesses?
Personnel
Have you had the right personnel'? Why or why not'?
How experienced is your team'? In the industry'?
Has your team worked together before'?
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How experienced/good are your advisors and/or board?
Products/Technology
What value does your product or service provide to your customers'?
How does your product compare to competitive solutions? (in cost and value)
How valuable is your IP and how have you protected it?
How much does it cost (in time and money) to maintain your product'?
How much have you spent in time and money on supporting your product(s)?
How much have you spent in time and money on R&D?
Customers
How much expertise do your customers have to have to use your product'?
What does it cost your customers to acquire and use your product, in terms of time and money?
How difficult is it for your customers to learn and to use your product?
How do your customers find out about you?
What level of the organization needs to approve the purchase of your product'?
Financial
How long before you expect to be profitable'?
What is your exit strategy'?
Conclusion
Anything I should have asked you but didn't'? Anything to add'?
Who else to interview??
Would it be possible to obtain historical financial data (to be kept confidential)?
210
Appendix C: Model Documentation
Note: The parameters are listed below in alphabetical order. Many of these equations are placed into
context and described in detail in Chapter 5, and the entire model is available as a computer file.
Abandonment Ratc[company,featuretype] = Abandonment Rate 1 [company,featuretype] +
Abandonment Rate 2[company,featuretype] + Abandonment Rate 3[company,featuretype]
Units: Features/Month
Rate at which feature ideas are abandoned
Abandonment Rate I [company,featuretype] = Feature Devl Rate I [company,featuretype] *
Feature Abandonment Fraction 1 [company, featuretype]
Units: Features/Month
Rate at which feature ideas are abandoned in Ist stage of product development
Abandonment Rate 2[company,featuretype] = Feature Devl Rate 2[company,featuretype] *
Feature Abandonment Fraction 2[company, featuretype]
Units: Features/Month
Rate at which feature ideas are abandoned in 2nd stage of product development
Abandonment Rate 3[company,featuretype] = Feature Devl Rate 3[company,featuretype] *
Feature Abandonment Fraction 3[company,featuretype]
Units: Features/Month
Rate at which feature ideas are abandoned in 3rd stage of product development
Accounts Receivable = INTEG( Billing - Cash Received From Customers - Defaults on AR , 0)
Units: Dollars
Revenue waiting to be received in cash
Addl Investments = Follow On Investments
Units: Dollars/Month
New investments to add to Total Investments
Adjustment for Eng Vacancies = ( Desired Eng Vacancies - Eng Vacancies ) /
Eng Vacancy Adjustment Time
Units: Persons/Month
Adjusts eng vacancy creation to have the desired number of vacancies.
Adjustment for Engineers = ( Desired Engineers - Engineers ) / Engineers Adjustment Time
Units: Persons/Month
Adjusts the desired hiring rate of engineers to bring the number employed to the desired level.
Adjustment for FUD[company,featuretype] = ( Desired FUD[company,featuretype] -
Product Features Under Development[company,featuretype] ) /
FUD Adjustment Time[company,featuretype]
Units: Features/Month
How many features per month we need to add (or subtract) from FUD
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Adjustment for Sales Force = ( Desired Sales Force - Sales Force ) / Sales Force Adjustment Time
Units: Persons/Month
Adjusts the desired hiring rate of sales people to bring the number employed to the desired level.
Adjustment for Sales Vacancies =( Desired Sales Vacancies - Sales Vacancies ) /
Sales Vacancy Adjustment Time
Units: Persons/Month
Adjusts sales vacancy creation to have the desired number of vacancies.
Adopter Loss Fraction = Normal Adopter Loss Fraction * Effect of Customer Support on Adopter Loss
Fraction ( Normalized Cust Support ) * Effect of Features on Adopter Loss Fraction ( Normalized
Features )
Units: 1/Months
What fraction of adopters we lose every month
Adopter loss rate = Adopters * Adopter Loss Fraction
Units: Prospects/Month
Rate at which adopters stop using the product
Adopters = INTEG( Adoption Rate - Adopter loss rate, Initial Adopters )
Units: Prospects
Prospects who are now using the product
Adoption Capab Increase Ramp Time = 3
Units: Months
Time it takes for policy to take full effect
Adoption Capab Increase Start Time = 0
Units: Months
Time at which policy starts having an effect
Adoption Productivity Of Sales Effort = MIN ( Max Adoption Productivity From Sales, Sales
Experience Productivity Multiplier * Max Adoption Productivity From Sales * Effect Of Customer
Support On Adoption Efficiency * Effect Of Features On Adoption Efficiency )
Units: Prospects/(Person*Hour)
The decision rate of sales effort as effected by price, features, cust support (for trials), and word-
of-mouth
Adoption Rate = IF THEN ELSE ( Norm Adoption Rate > 0, Norm Adoption Rate * Prospect Conversion
Fn ( Potential Adoption From Sales Effort / Norm Adoption Rate ) , 0)
Units: Prospects/Month
The rate at which purchasers start to use the product
Adoption Sales Effort = Fraction effort for adoption * Sales Effort
Units: Persons*Hours/Month
Total number of hours spent by the sales force on decisions per month
Allow Layoffs = 1
Units: Dmnl
Whether or not to allow layoffs to occur (O=no, l=yes)
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Average Layoff Time = 2
Units: Months
The average time required to lay off an engineer
Avg Engineer Experience = ZIDZ ( Engineer Experience, Engineers )
Units: Hours
How many hours of experience the avg engineer has
Avg Experience Of New Eng Hires = 2000
Units: Hours [0,10000,35]
Average relevant experience of new engineering hires
Avg Experience Of New Sales Hires = 1000
Units: Hours
Average relevant experience of new sales hires
Avg Feature Devl Time[company,featuretypc] = 2, 12; 4, 24;
Units: Months [0,20]
How long, on average, does it take to develop a feature, regardless of how many engineers are
working on it
Avg Feature Lifetime[company,featuretypc] = 24, 120; 24, 120;
Units: Months
Avg amount of time a feature is useful for
Avg Hot Prospect Lifetime = 4
Units: Months [1,?]
Mininum amount of time it takes to persuade a prospect to trial the product
Avg Potential Prospect Lifetime = 6
Units: Months [I,?]
Average amount of time it takes for a potential prospect to become aware of product and become
a prospect
Avg Prospect Lifetime = 1
Units: Months [1,'?]
Average amount of time it takes to persuade a prospect to seriously consider purchasing
Avg Purchaser Lifetime = 1
Units: Months [1,'?]
Mininum amount of time it takes to persuade a purchaser to start using product
Avg Receivable Delay = 1.5
Units: Months [0.1,12,0.1]
How long it takes on average to get paid
Avg Salary = 17000
Units: Dollars/(Month*Person)
Average loaded salary across all employees (includes office and admin costs)
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Avg Sales Experience = ZIDZ ( Sales Experience, Sales Force )
Units: Hours
Avg hours of experience of sales force
Avg Time to Fill Eng Vacancies = 2.5
Units: Months
The average time required to fill an engineering vacancy
Avg Time to Fill Sales Vacancies = 2.5
Units: Months
The average time required to fill a sales vacancy
Bankrupt Switch = IF THEN ELSE ( Working Capital <= 0, 1, 0)
Units: Dmnl
If cash goes to 0 (or less!), then company is bankrupt
Billing = Quantity Per Purchase * Adoption Rate * Initial Payment + Maintenance Billing
Units: Dollars/Month
Amount of money customers obligated to pay
Burn Rate = IF THEN ELSE ( Cash Flow From Operations < 0, -Cash Flow From Operations , le-007)
Units: Dollars/Month
If cash flow is negative, burn rate is simply the inverse, otherwise we're not burning money, but
set the burn rate to very low number so as not to divide by 0...
Carbon Policy Effect on Comp Cost = 0.2
Units: Dimensionless [0,1,0.01]
What fraction initial competitor cost will change based on carbon policy (0. = 10% increase, I
double, -1 means it goes to 0)
Carbon Policy Ramp Time = 10
Units: Months
Time it takes for carbon policy to take full effect
Carbon Policy Start Time = 0
Units: Months
Time at which carbon policy starts having an effect
Carbon Policy Switch = 0
Units: Dimensionless [0,1,1]
Whether's there's a carbon policy or not that will effect competitor's prices
Cash Flow From Operations = Cash Received From Customers - Outflows Of Capital
Units: Dollars/Month
Amount of cash coming in or out of the company from operations per month
Cash Received From Customers = Accounts Receivable / Avg Receivable Delay
Units: Dollars/Month
Amount of cash coming in from customers
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Change in Burn Rate Required = IF THEN ELSE ( Months of Runway > Min Runway In Order To Hire,
Months of Runway / Min Runway In Order To Hire, IF THEN ELSE ( Months of Runway < Min
Runway, Months of Runway / ( Min Runway + 1) , 1) )
Units: Dmnl
If we have more than enough months of capital to burn, we can adjust the burn up, but if we have
less than the min runway months of capital, we must adjust the burn down, otherwise don't adjust the burn
Change in Salary Required = Burn Rate * ( Change in Burn Rate Required - 1)
Units: Dollars/Month
How much to adjust salary payments to make the required adjustment in burn rate
Change in Workforce Required = Change in Salary Required / Avg Salary
Units: People
How many people do we need to lay off to change salary payments by the required amount
COGS = Product COGS + Maintenance COGS
Units: Dollars/Month
Total cost of goods sold
Competitor Cost Adjustment Fraction Due To Policy = I + ( Carbon Policy Switch * RAMP ( Carbon
Policy Effect on Comp Cost / Carbon Policy Ramp Time, Carbon Policy Start Time , ( Carbon Policy
Start Time + Carbon Policy Ramp Time ) ) )
Units: Dimensionless
If there's a carbon policy, then effect on competitors cost will ramp up to it's full effect starting at
start time and taking the amount of time specified by ramp time.
Competitor Margin = Max Competitor Margin - Competitor Margin Adjustment Fn ( Delay3i (
Normalized Price, Competitor Margin Adjust Time, 1)) * ( Max Competitor Margin - Min Competitor
Margin )
Units: Dmnl
Competitor will charge their max margin unless our price is below theirs in which case the
Competitor Margin Adjustment Fn will determine how far to move towards the min margin they could
charge
Competitor Margin Adjust Time = 3
Units: Months [0.1,36,0.1]
How long it takes for competitor to adjust their margin in response to venture's change in price
Competitor Margin Adjustment Fn ( [(0.5,0)-
(1,1 )],(0,1 ),(0.5,1 ),(0.620795,0.907895),(0.69419,0.754386),(0.75,0.5),(0.799694,0.232456),(0.874618.0.
109649)( 1,0),(1000,0) )
Units: Dimensionless
Input is ratio between price and competitor's price and output is how much to adjust competitor's
margin. If ratio >= 1, then no need to adjust at all, and if ratio <=0.5 (competitor is charging twice as
much) then adjust the maximum amount, and s-shaped curve in between
Competitor Price = ( Initial Competitor Cost Per Unit * Competitor Cost Adjustment Fraction Due To
Policy ) / ( 1 - Competitor Margin)
Units: Dollars/Unit
How much competitor charges (reference price)
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Constrained Eng Hiring Rate = MIN ( Desired Eng Hiring Rate, Max Eng Hires )
Units: People/Month
If we want to hire more people than we could afford, then if we don't want to hire anyone else, we
can hire the maximum allowed number of engineers, otherwise we hire the proportional number we're
allowed
Constrained Sales Hiring Rate = MIN ( Desired Sales Hiring Rate, Max Sales Hires )
Units: People/Month
If we want to hire more people than we could afford, then if we don't want to hire anyone else, we
can hire the maximum allowed number of sales people, otherwise we hire the proportional number we're
allowed
Contact Rate = 0.25
Units: i/Month
Rate of contact between adopters and potential prospects (relatively high)
Cost Adjustment Fraction Due To Policy = 1 + ( Subsidy Policy Switch * RAMP ( Subsidy Policy Effect
on Cost / Subsidy Policy Ramp Time, Subsidy Policy Start Time, ( Subsidy Policy Start Time + Subsidy
Policy Ramp Time ) ) )
Units: Dimensionless
If there's a subsidy policy, then effect on our cost will ramp up to it's full effect starting at start
time and taking the amount of time specified by ramp time.
Cost Per Unit = ( Initial Cost Per Unit * ( Cumulative Purchases / Reference Production for Initial Cost )
^ ( LN ( I - Decrease in Costs per Double Purchases ) / LN ( 2) ) ) * Cost Adjustment Fraction Due To
Policy
Units: Dollars/Unit
Cost to manufacture/produce/provide product to purchasers
Cum Prob of Failure Based on Hazard Rate = INTEG( Hazard Rate Incr, 0)
Units: Dimensionless
The cumulative probability of the investors or entrepreneurs giving up on the venture based on
the accumulation over time of a hazard rate of failure
Cumulative Purchases = INTEG( Purchase Rate, 1)
Units: Prospects
Total number of purchases made (regardless of how purchases used)
Current Ratio = IF THEN ELSE ( Working Capital < 0, le-007, ( ( Working Capital + Hazard Rate AR
Pere * Accounts Receivable ) / - Cash Flow From Operations ) / Current Ratio Timeframe )
Units: Dimensionless
Measure of cash relative to burn rate
Current Ratio Timeframe = 1
Units: Month
Timeframe over which to calculate current ratio
Cust Support Needed = Adopters * Cust Support Needed per Adopter + Purchasers * Cust Support
Needed Per Purchaser
Units: Persons *Hours/Month
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Total cust support needed for customers who have purchased and adopted the product (includes
time needed to deliver the product)
Cust Support Needed per Adopter = 8
Units: Hours* P erson/(M onth* Prospect)
Person-Hours needed per month needed to support each adopter
Cust Support Needed Per Purchaser = 40
Units: Hours*Person/(Month*Prospect)
Person-Hours needed per month needed to support each purchaser (in process of adoption)
Decision Productivity Of Sales Effort = MIN ( Max Decision Productivity From Sales , Sales Experience
Productivity Multiplier * Max Decision Productivity From Sales * Effect Of Features On Decision
Efficiency * Effect Of Price On Decision Efficiency * Effect Of Word Of Mouth On Decision Efficiency
* Effect Of Customer Support On Decision Efficiency )
Units: Prospccts/( Person* Hour)
The decision rate of sales effort as effected by price, features, cust support (for trials), and word-
of-mouth
Decision sales effort = Fraction effort for decision * Sales Effort
Units: Persons* Hours/Month
Total number of hours spent by the sales force on decisions per month
Decrease in Costs per Double Purchases = 0.1
Units: Dmnl
Fractional decrease in costs to produce the products per double the amount produced (i.e. sold)
Default Rate = Normal Default Fraction * Effect of Cust Support on Default Rate Fn ( Normalized Cust
Support ) * Effect of Cust Financial Condition on Default Rate Fn ( Normalized Cust Fincl Condition)
Units: 1/Month
Rate at which customers are defaulting based on our cust support and their financial condition
Defaults on AR = Accounts Receivable * Default Rate
Units: Dollars/Month
Dollars per month we're losing due to customer defaults on their bills
Desired Eng Hiring Rate = MAX ( 0, Adjustment for Engineers + Eng Attrition Rate )
Units: Persons/Month
Hire enough people to replace expected attrition and adjust number of engineers to the desired
level (and if need to reduce them, then do so through attrition)
Desired Eng Lay Off Rate = Allow Layoffs * MAX ( 0, - Constrained Eng Hiring Rate )
Units: Persons/Month
If' hiring rate is negative, means we want to get rid of engineers
Desired Eng Proportion = ZIDZ ( Desired Eng Hiring Rate, Desired Hiring Rate)
Units: Dimensionless
Proportion of all new hires we want for engineering
Desired Eng Vacancies = MAX (0, Expected Time to Fill Eng Vacancies * Constrained Eng Hiring Rate)
Units: People
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Number of engineering vacancies needed to generate the desired hiring rate, given the expected
time required to fill an engineering vacancy.
Desired Eng Vacancy Cancellation Rate = MAX ( 0, - Desired Eng Vacancy Creation Rate)
Units: Persons/Month
The desired rate of engineering vacancy cancellation, given by the desired vacancy creation rate
whenever that rate is negative.
Desired Eng Vacancy Creation Rate = Constrained Eng Hiring Rate + Adjustment for Eng Vacancies
Units: Persons/Month
Create enough engineering vacancies to result in the desired hiring rate, adjusted to bring the
stock of vacancies in line with the desired level.
Desired Engineering Effort for Cust Support = Cust Support Needed
Units: Persons*Hours/Month
Assume for now that we desire engineers just for the cust support that's needed now
Desired Engineering Effort for Feature Development = Desired Feature Development
Rate[self,appropriable] * Eng Hrs Required per Feature[selfappropriable] + Desired Feature
Development Rate[self,nonappropriable] * Eng Hrs Required per Feature[self,nonappropriable]
Units: Persons*Hours/Month
How many person hours are needed to develop the features we desire
Desired Engineers = xlDZ ( ( Desired Engineering Effort for Feature Development + Desired Engineering
Effort for Cust Support ), Productive Eng Work Month , 100)
Units: People
How many Engineers we need to make up the feature shortfall, based on their productivity and
how many hours are needed for cust support (current engineering) (but can't be negative if too many
featues)
Desired Feature Completion Rate[company,featuretype] = Feature Shortfall[company, featuretype] /
Desired Time to Catch Up Features[company,featuretype] + Perceived Feature Obsolescense
Rate[company,featuretype]
Units: Features/Month
How many features we'd like to develop per month to obtain stock of features we'd like (taking
into account features we're losing from obsolescense) -- allowed to go negative
Desired Feature Development Rate[company,featuretype] = MAX ( 0, Desired Feature Completion
Rate[company,featuretype] + Abandonment Rate[company,featuretype] + Adjustment for
FUD[company,featuretype] )
Units: Feature/Month
At what rate do we want to be starting feature development, taking into account the features
already under development, and the ones being abandoned
Desired Feature Ratio[self,appropriable] = 1.25
Desired Feature Ratio[selfnonappropriable] = 1.25
Desired Feature Ratio[competitor,featuretype] = 1.1, 1.1
Units: Dmnl [0,8,0.05]
Desired ratio between our features and competitors features (to drive product attractiveeness)
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Desired Features[self,featuretype] = Features[competitor, featuretype] * Desired Feature
Ratio[self,featuretype]
Desired Features[competitor,featuretype] = Features[self,featuretype] * Desired Feature
Ratio[competitor,featuretype]
Units: Features
How many features we desire (based on how many features competitors have, and how we want
to compare to competitors)
Desired FUD[company,featuretype] = Desired Feature Completion Rate[company,featuretype] * Avg
Feature Devl Time[company, featuretype]
Units: Features
How many features we need under development to maintain the rate of feature development we
desire
Desired Hiring Rate = Desired Eng Hiring Rate + Desired Sales Hiring Rate
Units: People/Month
The total amount of hires we desire to make per month
Desired Marketing Effort = Min Marketing Effort * Portion of Min Effort for Marketing Fn ( Prospect to
Population Ratio )
Units: Hours*Person/Month
Devote at least min hours, or the multiple of the min effort determined by the function
Desired Sales Effort = Desired Sales Hours / Time to Apply Effort
Units: Hours*Person/Month
How many person-hours of effort do we want the sales force to apply per month
Desired Sales Force = ( Desired Sales Effort + Desired Marketing Effort ) / Sales Work Month
Units: People
How many people do we want for sales and marketing
Desired Sales Hiring Rate = MAX ( 0, Adjustment for Sales Force + Sales Attrition Rate )
Units: Persons/Month
Hire enough people to replace expected attrition and adjust number of sales people to the desired
level (and if need to reduce them, then do so through attrition)
Desired Sales Hours = ZIDZ ( Potential Prospects , ( Knowledge Productivity Of Sales Effort / Effect Of
Features On Knowledge Efficiency ) ) + ZIDZ ( Prospects , ( Persuasion Productivity Of Sales Effort /
Effect Of Features On Persuasion Efficiency ) ) + ZIDZ ( Hot Prospects , ( Decision Productivity Of Sales
Effort / Effect Of Features On Decision Efficiency ) ) + ZIDZ ( Purchasers , ( Adoption Productivity Of
Sales Effort / Effect Of Features On Adoption Efficiency ) )
Units: Hours*Person
How many person-hours of sales effort do we need based on our sales productivity and the
number of prospects at each stage of the sales cycle
Desired Sales Lay Off Rate = Allow Layoffs * MAX ( 0, - Constrained Sales Hiring Rate )
Units: Persons/Month
If hiring rate is negative, means we want to get rid of sales people as long as we're willing to
make lay offs
Desired Sales Proportion = ZIDZ ( Desired Sales Hiring Rate, Desired Hiring Rate )
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Units: Dimensionless
Proportion of all new hires we want for sales
Desired Sales Vacancies = MAX ( 0, Expected Time to Fill Sales Vacancies * Constrained Sales Hiring
Rate )
Units: People
Number of sales vacancies needed to generate the desired hiring rate, given the expected time
required to fill a sales vacancy.
Desired Sales Vacancy Cancellation Rate = MAX ( 0, - Desired Sales Vacancy Creation Rate)
Units: Persons/Month
The desired rate of sales vacancy cancellation, given by the desired vacancy creation rate
whenever that rate is negative.
Desired Sales Vacancy Creation Rate = Constrained Sales Hiring Rate + Adjustment for Sales Vacancies
Units: Persons/Month
Create enough sales vacancies to result in the desired hiring rate, adjusted to bring the stock of
vacancies in line with the desired level.
Desired Time to Catch Up Features[company, featurctype] = 2, 4: 6, 12;
Units: Months [0,80,0.1]
How soon we'd like our features to reach the desired level
Discount Rate = 0. 1
Units: Dimensionless [0,1,0.005]
Discount Rate of the investor for determining NPV of investment in the venture
Earning Mult = 60
Units: Months
How many months of earnings (cash flow) to add to working capital to calculate the value of the
venture
Effect of Cust Financial Condition on Default Rate Fn ( [(0,0)-
(3,10)],(0,100),(0.1,10),(0.25,4),(0.33,3),(0.5,2),(0.75,1.33),(1,1),(2,0.1),(100,0.01))
Units: Dmnl
If customers are bankrupt, then 100* default rate, and if customers have tons of cash, then 1% of
default rate, and asymptotic in between\!\!
Effect of Cust Support on Default Rate Fn ( [(0,0)-
(5,20)],(0,1000),(0.05,20),(0.1,5),(0.2,3.25),(0.5,2),(0.7,1.3),(1,1 ),(5,0.5),(100,0.25))
Units: Dimensionless
With no customer support at all, all customers default, with norm cust support, defaults are
normal, and with maximum cust support, curve is asymptotic to one quarter the default rate\!\!\!
Effect of Customer Support on Adopter Loss Fraction ( [(0,0)-
(3,10)],(0,10),(0.06,5.5),(0.125,3.5),(0.25,2.25),(0.5,1.5),(1,1),( 1.44037,0.473684),(2,0.1),(100,0.1))
Units: Dmnl
If no cust support we lose everyone, and if great cust support we lose much fewer adopters than
normal, and asymptotic curve in between\!\!\!
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Effect Of Customer Support On Adoption Efficiency = Effect Of Customer Support On Adoption
Efficiency Fn ( Normalized Cust Support )
Units: Dmnl
How the efficiency of implementation is affected by the level of customer support
Effect Of Customer Support On Adoption Efficiency Fn ( [(0,0)-(1,1 )],(0,0),(1,1))
Units: Dmnl
Assuming cust support is needed to help purchaser to use product, linear relationship between
cust support and adoption efficiency
Effect Of Customer Support On Decision Efficiency = Effect Of Customer Support On Decision
Efficiency Fn ( Normalized Cust Support )
Units: Dmnl
How the efficiency of sales at the decision stage is affected by the level of customer support
Effect Of Customer Support On Decision Efficiency Fn ( [(0,0)-(l 0,10)],(0,0.5),(1,1 ),(10, ) )
Units: Dmnl
Assuming only a portion of hot prospects are trialing, 0 cust support will only cut decision
productivity in half, and then it will rise linearly to I
Effect of Features on Adopter Loss Fraction ( [(0,0)-
(3,100)],(0,100),(0.06,32),(0.125,16),(0.25,8),(0.5,2),( 1,1),(1.44037,0.473684),(2,0.1),( 100,0.1))
Units: Dmnl
If no features, we lose everyone, and if great features we lose much less, and asymptotic curve in
between
Effect Of Features On Adoption Efficiency = Effect Of Features On Adoption Efficiency Fn ( Normalized
Features )
Units: Dmnl [0,1]
How the efficiency of sales at the adoption stage is affected by normalized features
Effect Of Features On Adoption Efficiency Fn ( [(0,0)-( 11 )],(0,0),(0.5,0.5),(1.5,0.9),(2,1 ),(100,1) )
Units: Dmnl
No features still equals no sales, but given that they've already purchased, lack of some features
will have less of a negative effect
Effect Of Features On Capab of Adoption Fn ( [(0,0)-(10, 10)],(0,0),(1,1 ),(10, 10) )
Units: Dmnl
Assume linear increase in capability
Effect Of Features On Decision Efficiency = Effect Of Features On Decision Efficiency Fn ( Normalized
Features )
Units: Dmnl [0,1]
How the efficiency of sales at the decision stage is affected by normalized features
Effect Of Features On Decision Efficiency Fn ( [(0,0)-
(1, 1),(0,0),(0. 125,0.02),(0.25,0.1 ),(0.375,0.2),(0.5,0.5),(0.675,0.8),(0.75,0.9),(0.875,0.98),(1,1)],(0,0),(0.2
5,0.02),(0.5,0.1),(0.75,0.2),( 1,0.5),(1.35,0.8),(1.5,0.9),(1.75,0.98),(2,1),(100,1))
Units: Dmnl
S curve with no features = no sales, normal features = 50% sales, double features = 100% sales
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Effect Of Features On Knowledge Efficiency = Effect Of Features On Knowledge Efficiency Fn (
Normalized Features )
Units: Dmnl [0,1]
How the efficiency of sales at the knowledge stage is affected by the normalized features
Effect Of Features On Knowledge Efficiency Fn ( [(0.5,0)-
(1,0.5),(0,0),(0.125,0.02),(0.25,0.1 ),(0.375,0.2),(0.5,0.5),(0.675,0.8),(0.75,0.9),(0.875,0.98),(1,1 )],(0,0),(0.
25,0.02),(0.5,0.1),(0.625382,0.129386),(0.75,0.2),(0.874618,0.33114),( 1,0.5),(1.35,0.8),( 1.5,0.9),(1.75,0.
98),(2,1),(100,1) )
Units: Dmnl
S curve with no features = no sales, normal features = 50% sales, double features = 100% sales
Effect Of Features On Persuasion Efficiency = Effect Of Features On Persuasion Efficiency Fn (
Normalized Features )
Units: Dmnl [0,1]
How the efficiency of sales at the persuasion stage is atTffected by normalized features
Effect Of Features On Persuasion Efficiency Fn ( [(0,0)-
(1,1),(0,0),(0. 125,0.02),(0.25,0.1 ),(0.375,0.2),(0.5,0.5),(0.675,0.8),(0.75,0.9),(0.875,0.98),(1,1)],(0,0),(0.2
5,0.02),(0.5,0.1),(0.75,0.2),( 1,0.5),(1.35,0.8),(1.5,0.9),(1.75,0.98),(2,1 ),(100,1))
Units: Dmni
S curve with no features = no sales, normal features = 50% sales, double features = 100% sales
Effect of Marketing Effort on Market Size Fn ( [(0,0)-
(100,0.06)],(0,0),( 1,0.001 ),(4,0.00578947),( 10,0.01),(17,0.0147368),(26,0.02),(40.0612,0.0310526),(58.7
156,0.0413158),(76.1468,0.0463158),(100,0.05))
Units: 1/Month
No marketing effort has 0 effect, normalized has a tenth of a percent, and the most effect we can
have is 5% (with hundreds of marketing people) and asymptotic in between\!\!\!
Effect Of Marketing On Knowledge Efficiency = Effect Of Marketing On Knowledge Efficiency Fn (
Normalized Marketing )
Units: Dmnl
How the efficiency of sales at the knowledge stage is affected by marketing
Effect Of Marketing On Knowledge Efficiency Fn ( [(0,0)-( 10, 10)],(0.0.1 ),(1,1) )
Units: Dmnl
If no marketing, cuts sales producitivity in by 90%!/o, then linear up to I
Effect Of Marketing On Persuasion Efficiency = Effect Of Marketing On Persuasion Efficiency Fn (
Normalized Marketing )
Units: Dmni
How the efficiency of sales at the persuasion stage is affected by marketing
Effect Of Marketing On Persuasion Efficiency Fn ( [(0,0)-(10,10)],(0,0.5),( 1,1 ) )
Units: Dmnl
If no marketing, cuts sales producitivity in half, then linear up to 1
Effect Of Price On Decision Efficiency = Effect Of Price On Decision Efficiency Fn ( Normalized Price )
Units: Dmnl [0,1]
How the efficiency of sales at the decision stage is affected by normalized price
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Effect Of Price On Decision Efficiency Fn ( [(0,0)-
(10,1)],(0. 1),(0.5.0.92),( 1,0.75),( 1.25,0.5),(2.50765,0.197368),(5,0.02),(10,0) )
Units: Dmnl
S-curve, If price is 0, get 100% sales efficiency, if it's normal, get 75% efficiency, and as price
approaches 10x normal, efficiency goes to 0\!\!\!
Effect Of Price On Knowledge Efficiency = Effect Of Price On Knowledge Efficiency Fn ( Normalized
Price )
Units: Dmnl [0, 1]
How the efficiency of sales at the knowledge stage is affected by normalized price
Effect Of Price On Knowledge Efficiency Fn ( [(0,0)-
(10,1 )],(0, I),(0.5,0.9),( 1,0.5),( 1.25,0.33),( 1.55963,0.22),(2.50765,0.09),(3.42508,0.055),(5,0.01),(10,0))
Units: Dmnl
S-curve, If price is 0, get 100% sales efficiency, if it's normal, get 50% efficiency, and as price
approaches 10x normal, efficiency goes to 0\!\!\!
Effect Of Price On Persuasion Efficiency = Effect Of Price On Persuasion Efficiency Fn ( Normalized
Price )
Units: Dmnl [0,1]
How the efficiency of sales at the persuasion stage is affected by normalized price
Effect Of Price On Persuasion Efficiency Fn ( [(0,0)-
(10,1)],(0, I),(0.5,0.9),(1,0.5),(1.25,0.33),( 1.55963,0.22),(2.50765,0.09),(3.42508,0.055),(5,0.01),(10,0) )
Units: Dmnl
S-curve, If price is 0, get 100% sales efficiency, if it's normal, get 50% efficiency, and as price
approaches 10x normal, efficiency goes to 0\!\!
Effect Of Word Of Mouth On Decision Efficiency = Effect Of Word Of Mouth On Decision Efficiency
Fn ( Normalized Word of Mouth )
Units: Dmnl
How the efficiency of sales at the decision stage is affected by word of mouth
Effect Of Word Of Mouth On Decision Efficiency Fn ( [(0,0)-( 100,10)],(0,0.5),( ,1),(100,1) )
Units: Dmnl
0 word of mouth will cut decision efficiency in half, and then it will rise linearly to I \!\!
Effect Of Word Of Mouth On Knowledge Efficiency = Effect Of Word Of Mouth On Knowledge
Efficiency Fn ( Normalized Word of Mouth)
Units: Dmnl
How the efficiency of sales at the knowledge stage is affected by word of mouth
Effect Of Word Of Mouth On Knowledge Efficiency Fn ( [(0,0)-(2,1)],(0,0. 5),(1,1 ),( 100, 1))
Units: Dmni
If no word of mouth, sales productivity only 15%, then linear up to I
Effect Of Word Of Mouth On Persuasion Efficiency = Effect Of Word Of Mouth On Persuasion
Efficiency Fn ( Normalized Word of Mouth )
Units: Dmnl
How the efficiency of sales at the persuasion stage is affected by word of mouth
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Effect Of Word Of Mouth On Persuasion Efficiency Fn ( [(0,0)-(1, 1)],(0,0.33),(1,1),(100,) )
Units: Dmnl
If no word of mouth, sales productivity only 1/3, then linear up to I
Effective Engineering Effort = Engineering Effort * Engineering Experience Productivity Multiplier
Units: Persons*Hours/Month
How many productive hours engineers work
Effective Prospects = Total Prospects / Initial Potential Prospects
Units: Dimensionless
Current number of prospects compared to the initial number of prospects
Eng Attrition Rate = Engineers * Fractional Eng Attrition Rate
Units: Persons/Month
Rate at which engineers leave (quit)
Eng Experience From Hiring = Eng Hiring Rate * Avg Experience Of New Eng Hires
Units: Persons*Hours/Month
Experience gain from hiring
Eng Hiring Rate= ( Eng Vacancies / Avg Time to Fill Eng Vacancies ) * ( 1 - Bankrupt Switch)
Units: Persons/Month
Hire engineers based on how many vacancies have been created and the avg time to fill them
Eng Hrs Required per Feature[self,featuretype] = 350, 35000
Eng Hrs Required per Feature[competitor, featuretype] = 350, 35000
Units: Hours*Person/Feature
How many hours it would take one engineer to develop a feature
Eng Productivity Change Per Double Experience = 0.33
Units: Dmnl
The fractional change in productivity of engineers for every doubling of their effective experience
Eng Proportion = ZIDZ ( Engineers , Total Labor )
Units: Dimensionless
Proportion of workforce made up of engineers
Eng Vacancies = INTEG( Eng Vacancy Creation Rate - Eng Vacancy Closure Rate - Eng Vacancy
Cancellation Rate, Desired Eng Vacancies )
Units: People
The number of open positions the firm seeks to fill.
Eng Vacancy Adjustment Time = 1
Units: Months
The average time over which to adjust the actual number of engineering vacancies to the desired
level.
Eng Vacancy Cancellation Rate = MIN ( Desired Eng Vacancy Cancellation Rate, Max Eng Vacancy
Cancellation Rate)
Units: Persons/Month
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The rate at which to cancel existing engineering vacancies prior to filling them.
Eng Vacancy Cancellation Time = I
Units: Months
The average time required to cancel an engineering vacancy.
Eng Vacancy Closure Rate = Eng Hiring Rate
Units: Persons/Month
Vacancies are closed when the employee is hired
Eng Vacancy Creation Rate = MAX ( 0, Desired Eng Vacancy Creation Rate )
Units: Persons/Month
The rate at which to create new engineering positions and begins to recruit for them.
Eng Work Month = 175
Units: Hours/Month
How many hours engineers work per month
Engineer Experience = INTEG( Increase In Eng Experience + Eng Experience From Hiring - Loss Of
Eng Experience, Initial Engineers * Initial Avg Engineering Experience )
Units: Persons*Hours
Cumulative sales experience of organization
Engineer Lay Offs = MAX ( Bankrupt Switch * ( ( Engineers / TIME STEP ) - Eng Attrition Rate ) , MIN
( Desired Eng Lay Off Rate, Maximum Layoff Rate ) )
Units: Persons/Month
Engineers being layed off per month
Engineering Effort = Engineers * Eng Work Month
Units: Persons*Hours/Month
How many total hours engineers work per month
Engineering Effort for Cust Support = MIN ( Cust Support Needed, Effective Engineering Effort * ( I -
Min Development Fraction ) )
Units: Persons*Hours/Month
After allocating the min percentage of engineering effort to development, then use engineering
effort to satisfy cust support (current engineering) needs
Engineering Experience Productivity Multiplier = ( Avg Engineer Experience / Engineering Experience
Reference ) ^ ( LN ( 1 + Eng Productivity Change Per Double Experience ) / LN ( 2) )
Units: Dmnl
Learning curve for productivity from experience (from Sterman pg 507, from Zangwill and
Kantor (1998))
Engineering Experience Reference = 2000
Units: Hours
'Normal' engineering experience
Engineering Productive Effort for Development[selfappropriable] = ( 1 - Nonappropriable Devl Fraction
) * ( Effective Engineering Effort - Engineering Effort for Cust Support )
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Engineering Productive Effort for Development[self,nonappropriable] = Nonappropriable Devl Fraction *
( Effective Engineering Effort - Engineering Effort for Cust Support )
Engineering Productive Effort for Development[competitor, featuretype] = 8750, 8750
Units: Persons* Hours/Month
Assume competitor has 50 people each for approb and nonapprob feature devl
Engineers = INTEG( Eng Hiring Rate - Eng Attrition Rate - Engineer Lay Offs , Initial Engineers )
Units: Persons
Number of engineers
Engineers Adjustment Time = 6
Units: Months [0,1000, 10]
The time period over which the firm seeks to bring the labor force in line with the desired level.
Exp Gain Per Adoption = 910
Units: Hours*Person/Prospect [0,6000,35]
How much of a boost in experience does each adopter provide
Exp Gain Per Purchase = 910
Units: Hours*Person/Prospect [0,6000,35]
How much of a boost in experience does each purchase provide to the sales force
Expected Time to Fill Eng Vacancies = Avg Time to Fill Eng Vacancies
Units: Months
For simplicity, assume managers know the real avg time to fill vacancies (i.e. no information
delay)
Expected Time to Fill Sales Vacancies = Avg Time to Fill Sales Vacancies
Units: Months
For simplicity, assume managers know the real avg time to fill vacancies (i.e. no information
delay)
Feasible Feature Devl Ratc[company,featuretypc] = Engineering Productive Effort for
Development[company,featuretypc] / Eng Hrs Required per Feature[company,featuretype]
Units: Features/Month
Given the engineering resources we have, and the amount of time it takes to develop a feature,
how many features can we develop per month
Feature Abandonment Fraction[company,featuretype] = 0.099
Units: Dimensionless
Fraction of features under development that are abandoned
Feature Abandonment Fraction 1 [company,featuretype] = Feature Abandonment
Fraction[company,featuretype] / 3
Units: Dmnl
Fraction of features under development that are abandoned at Ist stage of product development
Feature Abandonment Fraction 2[company,featuretype] = Feature Abandonment
Fraction[company,featuretype] / 3
Units: Dmnl
Fraction of features under development that are abandoned at 2nd stage of product development
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Feature Abandonment Fraction 3[company,featuretype] = Feature Abandonment
Fraction[company,featuretype] / 3
Units: Dmni
Fraction of features under development that are abandoned at 3rd stage of product development
Feature Completion Rate[company,featuretype] = Feature Completion Rate 3[company,featuretype]
Units: Features/Month
The rate at which features are developed into the product determined by how many features were
started and providing a 3rd order delay to complete them in the avg feature devl time
Feature Completion Rate I [company,featuretype] = Feature Devl Rate I[company,featuretype] * ( I -
Feature Abandonment Fraction I [company,featuretype] )
Units: Features/Month
The rate at which features are developed into the product determined by how many features were
started and providing a 3rd order delay to complete them in the avg feature dcvl time
Feature Completion Rate 2[company,featurctype] = Feature Devl Rate 2[company, featuretype] * ( 1 -
Feature Abandonment Fraction 2[company,featuretype] )
Units: Features/Month
The rate at which features are developed into the product determined by how many features were
started and providing a 3rd order delay to complete them in the avg feature devl time
Feature Completion Rate 3[company,featuretype] = Feature Devl Rate 3[company,featuretype] * ( 1 -
Feature Abandonment Fraction 3[company,featuretype] )
Units: Features/Month
The rate at which features are developed into the product determined by how many features were
started and providing a 3rd order delay to complete them in the avg feature devl time
Feature Devl Rate I [company,featuretype] = MIN( Features Under Development
1 [company,featuretype] / Avg Feature Devl Time[company,featuretype] , Feasible Feature Devl
Ratc[company, featuretype] ) * 3
Units: Features/Month
Develop 1/3 of features in minimum of 1/3 the avg feature development time or 1/3 the amount of
time it takes given the resources we have to develop features
Feature Devl Rate 2[company,featuretype] = MIN ( Features Under Development
2[company,featuretype] / Avg Feature Devl Time[company,featuretype] , Feasible Feature Devl
Rate[company,featuretype] ) * 3
Units: Features/Month
Develop 1/3 of features in minimum of 1/3 the avg feature development time or 1/3 the amount of
time it takes given the resources we have to develop features
Feature Devl Rate 3[company,featuretype] = MIN ( Features Under Development
3[company,featuretype] / Avg Feature Devl Time[company,featuretype], Feasible Feature Devl
Ratc[company.featuretype] ) * 3
Units: Features/Month
Develop 1/3 of features in minimum of 1/3 the avg feature development time or 1/3 the amount of
time it takes given the resources we have to develop features
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Feature Obsolescense Rate[company,featuretype] = Features[company,featuretype] / Avg Feature
Lifetime[company,featuretype]
Units: Features/Month
Features that go out of date per month
Feature Shortfall[company,featuretype] = Desired Features[company,featuretype] -
Features[company,featuretype]
Units: Features
How many features we're missing compared to what we desire.
Feature Start Rate[company,featuretype] = MIN ( Feasible Feature Dcvl Rate[company,featuretype] ,
Desired Feature Development Rate[company,featuretype] )
Units: Features/Month
Start features at the rate at which we can develop them
Feature Value[company] = Features[company,nonappropriable] * Nonappropriable Feature Multiple +
Features[company,appropriable]
Units: Features
Value of combined approbriable and nonapprobriable features
Features[company,featuretype] = INTEG( Feature Completion Rate[company,featuretype] - Feature
Obsolescense Rate[company,featuretype] , Initial Features[company,featuretype] )
Units: Features
Features of the product
Features Under Development 1 [company,featuretype] = INTEG( Feature Start
Rate[company,featuretype] - Abandonment Rate I [company,featuretype] - Feature Completion Rate
I [company,featuretype] , 0)
Units: Features
I st stage of feature development
Features Under Development 2[companyfeaturctypc] = INTEG( Feature Completion Rate
I [company,featuretype] - Abandonment Rate 2[company,featuretype] - Feature Completion Rate
2[company,featuretype] , 0)
Units: Features
2nd stage of feature development
Features Under Development 3 [company,featuretype] = INTEG( Feature Completion Rate
2[company,featuretype] - Abandonment Rate 3[company,featuretype] - Feature Completion Rate
3 [company,featuretype] , 0)
Units: Features
3rd stage of feature development
FINAL TIME = 240
Units: Month
The final time for the simulation.
Follow On Investments = Inv2 Amt * PULSE ( Inv2 Time, 1) + Inv3 Amt * PULSE ( Inv3 Time, 1) +
Inv4 Amt * PULSE ( Inv4 Time, 1)
Units: Dollars/Month
Investments made after the initial investment
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Fraction effort for adoption = IF THEN ELSE ( Weighted total prospects > 0, ( ( 1 - Fraction effort for
knowledge ) * ( Purchasers Emphasis Multiplier * Purchasers ) / Weighted total prospects ) ,0)
Units: Dmnl
Fraction of sales effort to make sure purchasers start using product
Fraction effort for decision = IF THEN ELSE ( Weighted total prospects > 0, ( ( 1 - Fraction effort for
knowledge ) * ( Hot Prospect Emphasis Multiplier * Hot Prospects ) / Weighted total prospects ) , 0)
Units: Dmnl [0, l]
Percent of effort of sales people applied to persuading prospects to seriously consider purchasing
Fraction effort for knowledge = 0.25
Units: Dmnl
Percent of sales effort devoted to converting potential prospects to prospects
Fraction effort for persuasion = IF THEN ELSE ( Weighted total prospects > 0, ( ( I - Fraction effort for
knowledge ) * ( Prospect Emphasis Multiplier * Prospects ) / Weighted total prospects ) , 0)
Units: Dmnl [0,1]
Percent of effort of sales people applied to persuading prospects to trial
Fraction Of Firms Capable Of Adopting = Initial Capab of Firms to Adopt * Effect Of Features On Capab
of Adoption Fn ( SUM ( Features[company!,featuretype!] ) / SUM ( Initial
Features[company!,featuretype!] ) ) + Increase Of Capab Of Firms To Adopt Due To Policy
Units: Dmnl
Initial capability of firms to adopt is affected by features relative to the initial features
Fractional Eng Attrition Rate = 0.02
Units: I/Month
Percent of engineers that leave per month
FUD Adjustment Time[company,featuretype] = 2
Units: Months [0,10,0.1]
How long to take to adjust FUD to desired level
Grants == 0
Units: Dollars/Month
Grants from government and other agencies (don't need to be paid back)
Hazard Rate AR Perc = 0.8
Units: Dmnl
Percent of AR to add to Working Cap for failure rate calc
Hazard Rate from Current Ratio = 1 / Current Ratio
Units: Dmnl
Hazard of failure of venture based on the current ratio
Hazard Rate from Current Ratio Ref= 0.01
Units: Dimensionless [0,0.5,0.005]
Value of Hazard Rate from Current Ratio for which Hazard Rate will have normal value
Hazard Rate from Features = 1 / Normalized Features - 1
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Units: Dimensionless
As features approach 0, the hazard rate approaches infinity (if the venture has no features, it's
likely to fail). If features are same as competition (norm features= I), then hazard rate is 0, and if features
are better, then hazard rate is negative (less likely to fail)
Hazard Rate from Features Ref = 2
Units: Dimensionless
Value of Hazard Rate from Features for which Hazard Rate will have normal value
Hazard Rate from Prospects = 1 / Effective Prospects - 1
Units: Dimensionless
As prospects approach 0, the hazard rate approaches infinity (if the venture has no prospects it's
likely to fail). If prospects are normal (1), then hazard rate is 0, and if venture has more prospects then
hazard rate is negative (less likely to fail)
Hazard Rate from Prospects Ref = 2
Units: Dimensionless
Value of Hazard Rate from Prospects for which Hazard Rate will have normal value
Hazard Rate Incr = IF THEN ELSE ( Cum Prob of Failure Based on Hazard Rate < 1, MIN (( I - Cum
Prob of Failure Based on Hazard Rate / Time to Max Prob of Failure ), Hazard Rate of Failure * ( 1 -
Cum Prob of Failure Based on Hazard Rate) ), 0)
Units: 1/Month
If haven't reached 100% prob of failure, incremental prob of failure based on the cum prob of
failure so far and the current hazard rate of failure
Hazard Rate of Failure = MAX ( 0, ( Hazard Rate from Current Ratio / Hazard Rate from Current Ratio
Ref + Hazard Rate from Features / Hazard Rate from Features Ref + Hazard Rate from Prospects /
Hazard Rate from Prospects Ref) * ( Normal Hazard Rate / 3) ) * ( Time / Hazard Rate Time Reference)
Units: I/Month
Sum of hazard rates from current ratio, features, prospects scaled based on the normal hzard rate
and the time the venture has been in operation
Hazard Rate Time Reference = 60
Units: Months
Normal time of operation for venture (hazard rate for times less than this will be decreased, and
for times greater than this, increased)
Hot Prospect Emphasis Multiplier = 4
Units: Dmnl
Emphasis sales force places on hot prospects
Hot prospect loss rate = MAX ( 0, Norm Decision Rate - Purchase Rate)
Units: Prospects/Month
If rate of persuasion is not great enough to keep prospects from remaining the maximum prospect
lifetime, then this is the rate they will be lost at
Hot Prospects = INTEG( Persuasion Rate - Hot prospect loss rate - Purchase Rate, Initial Hot Prospects )
Units: Prospects
Prospects who have been qualified to be more likely to purchase and/or are trialing the product
230
Increase Adoption Capab Switch = 0
Units: Dimensionless [0,1,1]
Whether's there's a policy that will effect firms capab to adopt
Increase In Addressable Market = Effect of Marketing Effort on Market Size Fn ( Normalized Marketing
Units: I/Month
Increase in market (potential prospects) based on the effectiveness of marketing efforts
Increase In Eng Experience = Engineers * Eng Work Month + Adoption Rate * Exp Gain Per Adoption
Units: Persons *Hours/Month
Engineers learn from time spent working and from experience with adopters
Increase In Potential Prospects = Total Population * Increase In Addressable Market * Fraction Of Firms
Capable Of Adopting
Units: Prospects/Month
Tracks increase in size of potential market by fraction of total firms that we are able to address
that are capable of adopting product per time period
Increase In Sales Experience = Sales Force * Sales Work Month + Adoption Rate * Exp Gain Per
Purchase
Units: Persons*Hours/Month
Sales people learn from time spent working and from experience making sales (purchases)
Increase of Adoption Capab = 0.05
Units: Dimensionless [0,1,0.0 1]
What additional fraction of firms will be capab of adopting per month
Increase Of Capab Of Firms To Adopt Due To Policy = Increase Adoption Capab Switch * RAM P (
Increase of Adoption Capab / Adoption Capab Increase Ramp Time, Adoption Capab Increase Start
Time, ( Adoption Capab Increase Start Time + Adoption Capab Increase Ramp Time ) )
Units: Dimensionless
Ramp up effect of policy to increase capab of adoption
Inflows Of Capital = Follow On Investments + Grants + Cash Received From Customers
Units: Dollars/Month
Cash coming in per month
Initial Adopters = 0
Units: Prospects
Start with no adopters
Initial Avg Engineering Experience = 10000
Units: Hours [0,60000,50]
How much relevant experience initial engineers have on average
Initial Avg Sales Experience = 1500
Units: Hours
How much experience initial sales people have on average
Initial Capab of Firms to Adopt = 0.05
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Units: Dmnl [0,1,0.01]
Fraction of firms initially that are capable of adopting product
Initial Competitor Cost Per Unit = 100000
Units: Dollars/Unit
How much it costs competitor to produce the competing unit. Assume this is a mature technology
and that learning does not reduce their costs
Initial Cost Per Unit = 100000
Units: Dollars/Unit
Initial Engineers = 4
Units: Persons [0,40,0.1]
Number of engineers company initially has
Initial Features[company, featuretype] = 110, 4; 100, 2;
Units: Features [0,300,0.1]
Amount of features product has when firm starts compared to competiors
Initial Hot Prospects = 0
Units: Prospects [0,1000,1]
Initial Investment = 3e+006
Units: Dollars [0,1 e+007, 10000]
Initial Payment = Price * Initial Payment Fraction
Units: Dollars/Unit
Amount that customer pays up front
Initial Payment Fraction = 1
Units: Dmnl [0,1,0.01]
Fraction of price that is paid by customer up front
Initial Potential Prospects = 100
Units: Prospects
Initial Prospects = 0
Units: Prospects [0,1000,1]
Start with no prospects
Initial Purchasers = 0
Units: Prospects [0,1000,1]
Start with no purchasers
Initial Sales Force = 2
Units: Persons [0,20,0.1]
Number of sales people company initially has
INITIAL TIME = 0
Units: Month
The initial time for the simulation.
232
Initial Total Population = 100000
Units: Prospects
Max possible number of adopters
Inv2 Amt = 0
Units: Dollars/Month [0,1 e+007,10000]
L.5e+006
Inv2 Time = 12
Units: Months [0,200,0.0002]
Inv3 Amt = 0
Units: Dollars/Month [0, 1 e+007,100000]
Inv3 Time = 24
Units: Months
Inv4 Amt = 0
Units: Dollars/Month
Inv4 Time = 36
Units: Months
Knowledge Productivity Of Sales Effort = MIN ( Max Knowledge Productivity From Sales, Sales
Experience Productivity Multiplier * Max Knowledge Productivity From Sales * Effect Of Features On
Knowledge Efficiency * Effect Of Price On Knowledge Efficiency * Effect Of Marketing On Knowledge
Efficiency * Effect Of Word Of Mouth On Knowledge Efficiency)
Units: Prospects/(Person*Hour)
The persuasion rate of sales effort as effected by price and features
Knowledge Rate = Norm Knowledge Rate * Prospect Conversion Fn ( Potential Knowledge From Sales
Effort / Norm Knowledge Rate )
Units: Prospects/Month
The rate of persuading prospects to become hot prospects is determined by the persuasion from
sales effort until it asymptotically approaches the normal conversion rate (prospects are not persuaded
faster than that)
Knowledge Sales Effort = Fraction effort for knowledge * Sales Effort
Units: Persons*Hours/Month
Total number of hours spent by the sales force on persuasion per month
Loss Of Eng Experience = ( Engineer Lay Offs + Eng Attrition Rate ) * Avg Engineer Experience
Units: Persons*Hours/Month
Experience lost when engineers leave
Loss Of Sales Experience = ( Sales Layoffs + Sales Attrition Rate ) * Avg Sales Experience
Units: Persons*Hours/Month
Experience lost when sales people leave
Lost Prospect Lifetime = 12
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Units: Months
Amount of time before a lost prospect will reconsider becoming a prospect
Lost Prospects = INTEG( Adopter loss rate + Hot prospect loss rate + Potential Prospect Loss Rate +
Prospect Loss Rate + Purchaser Loss Rate - Prospect Regain Rate, 0)
Units: Prospects
Former prospects who currently are not considering adopting the product
Maintenance Billing = Adopters * Quantity Per Purchase * Price * Maintenance Fraction * Maintenance
Period
Units: Dollars/Month
Amount being charged to adopters per month for maintenance
Maintenance COGS = Maintenance Billing * ( 1 - Maintenance Margin)
Units: Dollars/Month
The costs for maintenance
Maintenance Fraction = 0.2
Units: Dmnl
The fraction of the price that is charged per period
Maintenance Margin = 0.8
Units: Dmnl
The fraction of the maintenace charge which is profit
Maintenance Period = 1 / 12
Units: 1/Month
The period over which the maintenance charge is made (i.e. 1/12 of a yearly fee is charged
monthly)
Marketing Effort = MIN ( Desired Marketing Effort, 0.5 * "Sales & Mktg Effort" )
Units: Persons* Hours/Month
Spend no more than 50% of total sales effort on marketing, up to the desired marketing effort
Max Adoption Productivity From Sales = 1
Units: Prospects/(Person*Hour) [0,'?]
Maximum number of purchasers that will able to start using product per hour of sales effort
Max Competitor Margin = 0.3
Units: Dmnl
Maximum margin competitor will extract
Max Decision Productivity From Sales = 1 / 16
Units: Prospects/(Person*Hour) [0,?]
Maximum number of prospects that can be persuaded per person-hour of sales effort
Max Eng Hires = IF THEN ELSE ( Max Hires Per Month > 0, Max Hires Per Month * Desired Eng
Proportion, Max Hires Per Month * Eng Proportion )
Units: People/Month
Max number of engineers we can afford to hire based on ratio of how many we want to hire, or if
we need to layoff people, the number of engineers we need to layoff based on ratio of existing engineers
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Max Eng Vacancy Cancellation Rate = Eng Vacancies / Eng Vacancy Cancellation Time
Units: Persons/Month
The maximum engineering vacancy cancellation rate is determined by the number of vacancies
outstanding and the minimum cancellation time.
Max Hires Per Month = MIN ( Change in Workforce Required / Months for Runway Adjustment, Total
Labor * Maximum Workforce Growth Rate )
Units: People/Month
Maximum number of people to be added (or if negative, subtracted) from work force.
Constrained to be less than the maximum fractional assimilation/growth rate for the labor force.
Max Knowledge Productivity From Sales = 1 / 4
Units: Prospects/(Person*Hour) [0,?]
Maximum number of prospects that can be created per person-hour of sales effort
Max Persuasion Productivity From Sales = 1 / 8
Units: Prospects/(Person*Hour) [0,?]
Maximum number of prospects that can be persuaded per person-hour of sales effort
Max Sales Hires = IF THEN ELSE ( Max Hires Per Month > 0, Max Hires Per Month * Desired Sales
Proportion, Max Hires Per Month * Sales Proportion)
Units: People/Month
Max number of sales people we can afford to hire based on ratio of how many we want to hire, or
if we need to layoff people, the number of sales people we need to layoff based on ratio of existing
employees
Max Sales Productivity Multiplier = 10
Units: Dmnl
Max amount of productivity multiple that experience can bring
Max Sales Vacancy Cancellation Rate = Sales Vacancies / Sales Vacancy Cancellation Time
Units: Persons/Month
The maximum sales vacancy cancellation rate is determined by the number of vacancies
outstanding and the minimum cancellation time.
Maximum Layoff Rate = Engineers / Average Layoff Time
Units: People/Month
Maximum layoff rate is determined by the number of engineers and the layoff time.
Maximum Workforce Growth Rate = 0.25
Units: 1/Months
The maximum fractional rate of expansion for the labor force the firm can
achieve/tolerate/assimilate.
Min Competitor Margin = 0.3
Units: Dimensionless [0,0.3,0.01]
Minimum margin competitor needs to charge
Min Development Fraction = 0.5
Units: Dmnl
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Min percent of engineering effort to devote to development
Min Gross Margin = 0
Units: Dmnl
Minimum margin company will charge (can be negative if wish to sell at below cost to gain
initial sales)
Min Marketing Effort = 350
Units: Hours*Person/Month
Min effort we want to devote to marketing
Min Price = Cost Per Unit / ( I - Min Gross Margin)
Units: Dollars/Unit
Min price will sell at
Min Runway = 3
Units: Months
The min months of runway we need overall, so if less than this will need layoffs
Min Runway In Order To Hire = 12
Units: Months
Minimum number of months of burn we can have in order to hire new employees
Months for Runway Adjustment = 2
Units: Months [0,6,6e-006]
How long to take to adjust hiring/firing based on runway
Months of Runway = Working Capital / Burn Rate
Units: Months
If we're burning cash, then months of cash we have left. If positive cash flow, then this will be a
very large number
Nonappropriable Devl Fraction = 0.5
Units: Dimensionless
Fraction of development effort applied to non-approbriable features (as opposed to approbriable
features)
Nonappropriable Feature Multiple = 100
Units: Dimensionless
Avg multiple of value of approbriable features that nonapprobriable features have
Norm Adoption Rate = Purchasers / Avg Purchaser Lifetime
Units: Prospects/Month
Rate at which purchasers could start using the product
Norm Decision Rate = Hot Prospects / Avg Hot Prospect Lifetime
Units: Prospects/Month
Rate at which prospects can be persuaded to trial the product
Norm Knowledge Rate = Potential Prospects / Avg Potential Prospect Lifetime
Units: Prospects/Month
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Rate at which prospects can be persuaded to trial the product
Norm Persuasion Rate = Prospects / Avg Prospect Lifetime
Units: Prospects/Month
Rate at which prospects can be persuaded to trial the product
Normal Adopter Loss Fraction = 0.01
Units: 1/Months
What fraction of adopters we lose every month normally
Normal Default Fraction = 0.002
Units: 1/Month
The 'normal' fraction of customers that default on what they owe per month
Normal Hazard Rate = 0.05
Units: i/Month
Given normal values for hazard rate components, the normal hazard rate of failure
Normalized Cust Find Condition = 1
Units: Dimensionless
How able customers are able to pay their bills compared to normal (1 is normal, 0 means they are
bankrupt, and >1 means they have cash to spare)
Normalized Cust Support = xlDZ ( Engineering Effort for Cust Support, Cust Support Needed, 1)
Units: Dmnl
Fraction of max cust support effectiveness (If we don't need any cust support, then we're
supplying all that is needed). Also amount of cust support determines how soon product is "delivered".
Normalized Features = Feature Value[self] / Feature Value[competitor]
Units: Dmnl
Features of our company compared to competition (0 is no features, I is equiv features to
competition)
Normalized Marketing = Marketing Effort / Desired Marketing Effort
Units: Dmnl
Normalized marketing determined by proportion of sales/marketing resources we have compared
to desired
Normalized Price = Price / Competitor Price
Units: Dmnl [0,1]
Normalized price (actual price divided by competitor/reference price)
Normalized Word of Mouth = ( Contact Rate * Potential Prospects * Adopters / Total Population ) / Word
of Mouth Reference
Units: Dmni
Adoption by word of mouth is driven by the contact rate between potential adopters and active
adopters. The word of mouth effect is small if the number of active adopters relative to the total
population size is small.
NPV Calc Time Step = 1
Units: Month
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The time step to use for calculating NPV
Outflows Of Capital = Total Salary Expense + COGS
Units: Dollars/Month
Cash being paid out per month
Output NPV = IF THEN ELSE ( ( ( Working Capital + ( Earning Mult * Cash Flow From Operations ) )
>= Initial Investment * ( ( 1 + ( Discount Rate / 12)) ^ ( Time / NPV Calc Time Step ) ) , 1, 0)
Units: Dimensionless
The NPV of the initial investment rate given the discount rate, current time, and current working
capital and a multiple of the cash flow
Perceived Feature Obsolescense Rate[company,featuretype] = Feature Obsolescense
Rate[company,featuretype]
Units: Feature/Month
What managers believe feature obsolescence rate is based on the actual rate (assume perception
meets reality)
Persuasion Productivity Of Sales Effort = MIN ( Max Persuasion Productivity From Sales , Sales
Experience Productivity Multiplier * Max Persuasion Productivity From Sales * Effect Of Features On
Persuasion Efficiency * Effect Of Price On Persuasion Efficiency * Effect Of Marketing On Persuasion
Efficiency * Effect Of Word Of Mouth On Persuasion Efficiency )
Units: Prospects/(Person*Hour)
The persuasion rate of sales effort as effected by price and features
Persuasion Rate = IF THEN ELSE ( Norm Persuasion Rate > 0, Norm Persuasion Rate * Prospect
Conversion Fn ( Potential Persuasion From Sales Effort / Norm Persuasion Rate ) , 0)
Units: Prospects/Month
The rate of persuading prospects to become hot prospects is determined by the persuasion from
sales effort until it asymptotically approaches the normal conversion rate (prospects are not persuaded
faster than that)
Persuasion Sales Effort = Fraction effort for persuasion * Sales Effort
Units: Persons*Hours/Month
Total number of hours spent by the sales force on persuasion per month
Portion of Min Effort for Marketing Fn ( [(0,0)-
(0.005,10)],(0,10),(0.001,2),(0.002,1.5),( 1,1.2),(1.47401,1.1),(1.85933,1.05),(100,1))
Units: Dmnl
If 0 Prospects, then devote max time to marketing, and if equal or more prospects compared to
population, devote most of time to sales, and asymptotic in between\!\!\!
Potential Adoption From Sales Effort = Adoption Sales Effort * Adoption Productivity Of Sales Effort
Units: Prospects/Month
The amount of effort the sales people apply to persuasion times the productivity of that effort
(which is determined by attributes of the product)
Potential Decision From Sales Effort = Decision sales effort * Decision Productivity Of Sales Effort
Units: Prospects/Month
The amount of effort the sales people apply to persuasion times the productivity of that effort
(which is determined by attributes of the product)
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Potential Knowledge From Sales Effort = Knowledge Sales Effort * Knowledge Productivity Of Sales
Effort
Units: Prospects/Month
The amount of effort the sales people apply to persuasion times the productivity of that effort
(which is determined by attributes of the product)
Potential Persuasion From Sales Effort = Persuasion Sales Effort * Persuasion Productivity Of Sales
Effort
Units: Prospects/Month
The amount of effort the sales people apply to persuasion times the productivity of that effort
(which is determined by attributes of the product)
Potential Prospect Loss Rate = MAX ( 0, Norm Knowledge Rate - Knowledge Rate)
Units: Prospects/Month
If rate of persuasion is not great enough to keep prospects from remaining the maximum prospect
lifetime, then this is the rate they will be lost at
Potential Prospects = INTEG( Increase In Potential Prospects + Prospect Regain Rate - Knowledge Rate -
Potential Prospect Loss Rate, Initial Potential Prospects)
Units: Prospects
Potential customers that have been selected to apply sales effort to persuade to trial the product.
Price = MAX ( Target Price, Min Price )
Units: Dollars/Unit
If target price is greater than the min price we can charge, charge that. Otherwise, charge our min
price.
Product COGS = Cost Per Unit * Purchase Rate * Quantity Per Purchase
Units: Dollars/Month
Cost of goods sold for products sold
Product Features Under Development[company,featuretype] = INTEG( Feature Start
Rate[company,featuretypc] - Abandonment Rate[company,featuretype] - Feature Completion
Rate[company,featuretypc] , 0)
Units: Features
Features that are being worked on by the engineering staff
Productive Eng Work Month = Eng Work Month * Engineering Experience Productivity Multiplier
Units: Hours/Month
Productive hours worked per month by engineers (experienced engineers are more productive)
Prospect Conversion Fn ([(0,0)-
(2e+0 16.1 ).(0,0),(0.5,0.5),(0.75,0.7),( 1,0.85),( 1.25,0.95),( 1.5,1 ),( 100,1 )],(0,0),(0.5,0.5),(0.75,0.7),( 1,0.85)
,(1.25,0.95),(1.5,1 ),(lc+016,1) )
Units: Dmnl
Prospect Emphasis Multiplier = 2
Units: Dmnl
Emphasis sales force places on prospects
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Prospect Loss Rate = MAX ( 0, ( Norm Persuasion Rate - Persuasion Rate ) )
Units: Prospects/Month
If rate of persuasion is not great enough to keep prospects from remaining the maximum prospect
lifetime, then this is the rate they will be lost at
Prospect Regain Rate = Lost Prospects / Lost Prospect Lifetime
Units: Prospects/Month
Rate at which lost prospects become potential prospects again
Prospect to Population Ratio = Total Prospects / Total Population
Units: Dmnl
Ratio between all current prospects and total population
Prospects = INTEG( Knowledge Rate - Persuasion Rate - Prospect Loss Rate, Initial Prospects )
Units: Prospects
Potential customers that have been selected to apply sales effort to persuade to trial the product.
Purchase Rate = IF THEN ELSE ( Norm Decision Rate > 0, Norm Decision Rate * Prospect Conversion
Fn ( Potential Decision From Sales Effort / Norm Decision Rate ) , 0)
Units: Prospects/Month
The rate of persuading hot prospects to purchase the product
Purchaser Loss Rate = MAX ( 0, Norm Adoption Rate - Adoption Rate )
Units: Prospects/Month
Rate at which purchasers choose not to use the product
Purchasers = INTEG( Purchase Rate - Adoption Rate - Purchaser Loss Rate, Initial Purchasers )
Units: Prospects
Prospects who have purchased but aren't using
Purchasers Emphasis Multiplier = 1
Units: Dmnl
Emphasis sales force places on purchasers (since they already purchased, relatively less
emphasis)
Quantity Per Purchase = 1
Units: Units/Prospect [0,20,2c-005]
Average number of units each adopter purchases/uses at a time
Reference Production for Initial Cost = 1
Units: Prospects
Initial Cost is assuming already produced this many of product
"Sales & Mktg Effort" = Sales Force * Sales Work Month * Sales Experience Productivity Multiplier
Units: Hours*Person/Month
Total effort for sales and marketing
Sales Attrition Rate = Sales Force * Sales Fractional Attrition Rate
Units: Persons/Month
Rate at which sales people leave (quit)
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Sales Average Layoff Time = 2
Units: Months
The average time required to lay off a sales person
Sales Effort = "Sales & Mktg Effort" - Marketing Effort
Units: Hours*Person/Month
Effort devoted to direct sales
Sales Experience = INTEG( Increase In Sales Experience + Sales Experience From Hiring - Loss Of
Sales Experience, Initial Sales Force * Initial Avg Sales Experience)
Units: Persons*Hours
Cumulative sales experience of organization
Sales Experience From Hiring = Sales Hiring Rate * Avg Experience Of New Sales Hires
Units: Persons*Hours/Month
Experience gain from hiring
Sales Experience Productivity Multiplier = MIN ( ( Avg Sales Experience / Sales experience reference ) ^
( LN ( 1 + Sales Productivity Change Per Double Experience ) / LN ( 2) ) , Max Sales Productivity
Multiplier )
Units: Dmnl
Learning curve for productivity from experience (from Sterman pg 507, from Zangwill and
Kantor (1 998))
Sales experience reference = 2000
Units: Hours
Amount of sales experience which will produce normal productivity
Sales Force - INTEG( Sales Hiring Rate - Sales Attrition Rate - Sales Layoffs , Initial Sales Force)
Units: Persons
Number of sales and marketing employees
Sales Force Adjustment Time = 6
Units: Months [0,90,1]
The time period over which the firm seeks to bring the sales force in line with the desired level.
Sales Fractional Attrition Rate = 0.02
Units: 1/Month
Percent of sales people that leave per month
Sales Hiring Rate = ( Sales Vacancies / Avg Time to Fill Sales Vacancies ) * ( I - Bankrupt Switch)
Units: Persons/Month
Hire sales people based on how many vacancies have been created and the avg time to fill them
Sales Layoffs = MAX ( Bankrupt Switch * ( ( Sales Force / TIME STEP ) - Sales Attrition Rate ), MIN (
Desired Sales Lay Off Rate, Sales Maximum Layoff Rate ) )
Units: Persons/Month
Sales people being layed off per month
Sales Maximum Layoff Rate = Sales Force / Sales Average Layoff Time
Units: People/Month
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Maximum layoff rate is determined by the number of sales people and the layoff time.
Sales Productivity Change Per Double Experience = 0.4
Units: Dmnl
Fractional change in productivity of sales people per doubling of their effective experience
Sales Proportion = ZIDZ ( Sales Force, Total Labor )
Units: Dimensionless
Proportion of workforce made up of sales people
Sales Vacancies = INTEG( Sales Vacancy Creation Rate - Sales Vacancy Closure Rate - Sales Vacancy
Cancellation Rate, Desired Sales Vacancies )
Units: People
The number of open sales positions the firm seeks to fill.
Sales Vacancy Adjustment Time = 1
Units: Months
The average time over which to adjust the actual number of sales vacancies to the desired level.
Sales Vacancy Cancellation Rate = MIN ( Desired Sales Vacancy Cancellation Rate, Max Sales Vacancy
Cancellation Rate )
Units: Persons/Month
The rate at which to cancel existing sales vacancies prior to filling them.
Sales Vacancy Cancellation Time = 1
Units: Months
The average time required to cancel a sales vacancy.
Sales Vacancy Closure Rate = Sales Hiring Rate
Units: Persons/Month
Vacancies are closed when the employee is hired
Sales Vacancy Creation Rate = MAX ( 0, Desired Sales Vacancy Creation Rate )
Units: Persons/Month
The rate at which to create new sales positions and begins to recruit for them.
Sales Work Month = 175
Units: Hours/Month
How many hours worked per month by sales people
SAVEPER = TIME STEP
Units: Month [0,?]
The frequency with which output is stored.
Subsidy Policy Effect on Cost = -0.2
Units: Dimensionless [-1,100,0.01]
What fraction our cost will change based on subsidy policy (-0.1 = 10% decrease, 1 = double, -1
means it goes to 0)
Subsidy Policy Ramp Time = 10
Units: Months
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Time it takes for subidty policy to take full effect
Subsidy Policy Start Time = 0
Units: Months
Time at which subsidy policy starts having an effect
Subsidy Policy Switch = 0
Units: Dimensionless [0,1,1]
Whether's there's a subidy policy or not that will effect our costs
Target Norm Price = 0.75
Units: Dmnl [0,1,4e-006]
How much venture would like price to be compared to competitor's price
Target Price = Target Norm Price * Competitor Price
Units: Dollars/Unit
Price the venture desires to sell the product for, based on price of competition
TIME STEP = 0.125
Units: Month [0,?]
The time step for the simulation.
Time to Apply Effort = 1
Units: Month
Time period over which to apply desired sales hours of effort
Time to Max Prob of Failure = 1
Units: Month
When Hazard rate of failure is very high, how long for cum prob of failure to reach 100%
Total Investments = INTEG( Addl Investments , Initial Investment)
Units: Dollars
Total amount invested in venture
Total Labor = Engineers + Sales Force
Units: People
Total Layoffs = INTEG( Engineer Lay Offs + Sales Layoffs , 0)
Units: Persons
How many people have been layed off in total
Total Population = INTEG( - Increase In Potential Prospects , Initial Total Population)
Units: Prospects
Total population of firms that can conceivably become a prospect
Total Prospects = Hot Prospects + Potential Prospects + Prospects + Purchasers
Units: Prospects
All current prospects
Total Salary Expense = Avg Salary * Total Labor
Units: Dollars/Month
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Total Loaded Salary for entire company
Weighted total prospects = Prospects * Prospect Emphasis Multiplier + Hot Prospects * Hot Prospect
Emphasis Multiplier + Purchasers * Purchasers Emphasis Multiplier
Units: Prospects
Number of prospects weighted by relative importance of prospects vs. hot prospects vs.
purchasers for the purpose of applying sales effort
Word of Mouth Reference = 0. 1
Units: Prospects/Month
Reference value for word of mouth (at which it maximizes sales effectivness)
Working Capital = INTEG( Inflows Of Capital - Outflows Of Capital, Initial Investment )
Units: Dollars
Amount of money venture has available to spend. Increased by investments and revenue, and
decreased by spending on salaries and COGS.
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